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Abstract
Abstract
In this thesis, the role of non-competitive multi-party 
legislative elections in Mubarak's Egypt is examined. The 
personalised authoritarian system of rule which was 
established in Egypt after Nasser and the other Free 
Officers took power in 1952, is assessed in order to 
illustrate how it has been preserved for over four decades, 
not simply as a result of the immense formal powers which 
Nasser vested in the Presidency, but also as a result of 
the disparate clientelist strategies adopted by Nasser and 
his successors, Sadat and Mubarak. Clientelist tactics 
which further contribute towards inhibiting the development 
of formal political groupings and thus the possibility of 
successful challenges to the system of personal 
authoritarian rule. The role of non-competitive multi-party 
legislative elections in Mubarak's Egypt, is subsequently 
examined in this context. Namely as mechanism intended to 
further hinder the development of political groupings 
through the reaffirming and expanding of the clientelist 
structure of dependency and control linking central 
government to those on the periphery.
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Note on transliteration:
For transliteration purpose we have used a simplified version of the International 
Phonetic Alphabet (IPA). Given the distinctive inflections of Egyptian speech, 
it has been decided to transliterate Egyptians’ names in a way that approximates 
the forms of those names as they would be recognised by the subjects themselves, 
modifying somewhat the classical orthography. This may also be applied to 
certain transliterated distinctive Egyptian expressions, institutions or places.
I (glottal stop) 6
1 (long vowel) a
t—j b
dJ t
CL> th
£ j
C h
C ]di
j d
j th
j r
j z
<_>“ s
sh
U *
s
L >^ dh
J* t
z
t
?
i gh
f
j q
d k
J 1
f m
9
%u n
6 h
j  (consonant) w
j  (long vowel) u
if (consonant) y
(j (long vowel) i
f*
fatha a
kasra e / i
dumma o / u
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Chapter One
Problem statement; 
theoretical framework; 
method of research; 
and framework of analysis.
1. Problem Statement
The political system in Egypt passed from a one party to a 
multi-party system in 1977 when the legalisation of 
opposition parties confirmed their return to the political 
arena after an absence of twenty-five years. Since then 
several parties have competed in legislative elections.1 
Yet the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), which is 
headed by the President, remains the largest and continues 
to maintain an absolute majority of seats in the People's 
Assembly. In such a context, multi-party legislative 
elections in Egypt do not affect the replacement or 
succession of government. The purpose of this study 
therefore is to examine what functions these elections 
actually perform in contemporary Egypt, and in particular, 
under the Mubarak regime. The role of co-option, 
clientelism, political individualism and parochialism are 
all examined. It is by understanding the dynamics of multi­
party legislative elections, on the basis of these factors 
that one can appreciate a personalised authoritarian 
regime's efforts to further consolidate its own position in 
the political arena.
1 Whilst this study focuses on the role of legislative elections, the 
argument presented here can, to a large degree, be applied to non­
competitive multi-party elections on the local level. It should be 
noted however, that a local "government" structure in the strict 
meaning of the term, does not (nor does central government intend it 
to) exist in contemporary Egypt. It is largely for this reason that 
the local political structure witnessed as a result of law 145 of 
19 88, its official label of "local government" being replaced by the 
more suitable term of "local administration" . For a look at the 
nature and structure of local government/administration in Mubarak's 
Egypt, See H.H. Radwan, Democratization in Rural Egypt... (Spring 
1994), Cairo. For an in-depth study of local politics under Nasser, 
see: I. Harik, The Political Mobilisation of Peasants... (1974),
Bloomington and London,
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The personalised authoritarian system of rule which was 
established in Egypt after Nasser and the other Free 
Officers took power in 1952, appears to have been preserved 
to date, not simply as a result of the immense formal 
powers which Nasser vested in the Presidency, but also as a 
result of the disparate clientelist strategies adopted by 
Nasser and his successors, Sadat and Mubarak. Clientelist 
strategies which further contribute towards inhibiting the 
development of formal political groupings and thus the 
possibility of successful challenges to the system of 
personal authoritarian rule.
In such a context, our main argument here is that Egypt's 
contemporary electoral arena is intended to function as a 
mechanism with which to reaffirm and, more importantly 
perhaps, expand, the regime's clientelist grip over 
political participation so as to also include political 
opponents and their respective supporters. This strategy is 
based on the logic that within a specific setting, a 
'multi-party' electoral arena could be utilised by the 
regime as a mechanism with which to confer, at various 
levels of the political and social structure, the 
opportunity to be part of the existing political system, 
and in most cases to gain access to a share of the 
resources it commands. In doing so, disparate political 
activists and their potential supporters would be recruited 
into the regime's clientelist system of containment and 
control. This reduces the possibility of formal political 
parties and groupings emerging as serious challengers to 
the existing political order.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
Elections lie at the heart of the democratic process, and 
the difference between democracy and other systems of rule 
is to be found in whether elections are held, and if so, 
what kind. The term democracy itself can mean many things 
depending on ideology, individual or context, but in 
general democracy denotes a system of government whereby 
"the principal office holders of the political system are
12
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chosen by competitive elections in which the largest part
2of the population can participate." In other words, 
democracy is a method of rule which should meet these three 
conditions:
"(1) Meaningful and extensive competition 
among individuals and organised groups 
(especially political parties) for all 
effective positions of government power, at 
regular intervals and excluding the use of 
force; (2) A highly inclusive level of 
political participation in the selection of 
leaders and policies, at least through 
regular and fair elections such that no 
major (adult) social group is excluded (3)
A level of civil and political liberties- 
freedom of expression, freedom of the 
press, freedom to form and join 
organisations- sufficient to ensure the 
integrity of political competition and 
participation."3
Definitions by other authors refer to similar conditions or 
principles.4 However, while such formal definitions are 
relatively straightforward, "democracy is not a quality of 
a social system which either does or does not exist, but a 
complex of characteristics which may be ranked in many 
different ways."5 In this respect, formal definitions can 
represent a major problem in that although many political 
systems may satisfy defined criteria, certain constraints 
"may often in practice make a system less democratic than 
it appears on paper."6 As one author notes:
"The technical regularities of the vote 
(access to the ballot box, counting the 
votes and so on) evidently do not guarantee 
[an election's] competitive character. Nor 
does a plurality of candidates or 
alternatives... Pluralist regimes are known 
in which coercion plays hardly any role in 
the conduct of electoral consultations but
2 S.P. Huntington and C.H. Moore (1970), p509.
3 L. Diamond (1990), pp6-7.
4 Robert Dahl prefers the term "polyarchy" to democracy when 
referring to contemporary political systems that allow effective 
popular control but not self- rule. See: R. Dahl, 1971.
5 S.M. Lipset (1981), P73.
6 L. Diamond (1990), P 6 .
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none the less have elections that are to
■ » 7all appearances non-competitive."
Our concern in this research lies with electoral systems of 
this nature. Multi-party elections of this nature are 
sometimes classified as "exclusionary elections" and are 
characterised by the fact that the governments which hold 
them do not depend upon them for their continuance in
g
office. Subsequently, if one commences the study of such 
elections, then it is necessary to concentrate attention on 
their functions for the rulers of a state, rather than 
their significance to the individual voter.
General characteristics of regimes 
which hold such elections
Non competitive, democratic-style elections are mostly 
established by authoritarian conservative regimes, 
monarchical dictatorships10 or well established post­
military regimes11 who have "taken power, creating from
above a government or privileged party rather than coming
12to power with the support of a movement-type party" . These 
political systems are predominantly characterised by a 
personalised method of rule, and as such, the state can 
best be understood as a government of men rather than 
laws.13 This means that while formal political institutions 
exist, these institutions are usually devices manipulated 
to maximise the personal power of the rulers rather than to 
define and impose universally accepted rules of political 
conduct and constraint.14 The adoption of a formal 
democratic framework can subsequently be understood in such 
terms. Accordingly, should authoritarian rulers adopt
I A. Rouquie (1978), P2 0.
8 G. Hermet (1978), P 5 .
9 G. Hermet (1978), P5
10 J. J. Linz (1978) , P51.
II A. Rouquie (1991), P128
12 J.J. Linz (1978), P61.
13 R.H. Jackson and C.G. Rosenberg (1982), PlO.
14 R.H. Jackson and C.G. Roseberg (1982), Pll.
14
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democratic institutions, they will do their utmost to 
ensure that such measures include "the simultaneous 
exclusion of the four principles which give such 
institutions their true democratic content: consensus
concerning the rules of the game, political accountability 
of the rulers, the right to ample political representation, 
and alternation in power."15
What this means therefore, is that the concept of multi­
party legislative elections cannot be looked upon as open 
competition between various political parties attempting to 
gain control of government on the basis of competing public 
policies or opinion. Nor can the implementation of a 
controlled multi-party electoral arena be regarded as 
planned first steps towards withdrawal from power in the 
foreseeable future. In fact, since the rulers do not 
particularly "consider the possibility of losing power",16 
they tend to maintain a considerable distance from the 
electoral contest and leave such forms of participation to
17those on the perxphery of power.
Electoral competition between political parties in such 
systems therefore, may sometimes produce what appears to be 
"freely" elected representatives, but in reality, these 
public figures remain subservient to the real power- 
holders, whether such power-holders are found in the form 
of a King, President, or military leader. The National 
Assembly in Morocco for example comprises elected deputies 
representing various political parties. However, it is 
difficult for members to implement public policies since 
these deputies remain in a deferential position to King 
Hassan. As one author put it, the King's pre-eminent 
position dissipates the zeal and rhetoric of multi-party
15 L. Martins (1993), P88.
16 J. J. Linz (1978) , P65.
17 A. Rouquie (1991), P128.
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18electoral campaigns. In defence of such personalised rule, 
King Hassan claims:
"I am obliged to personify power as 
strongly as possible, for people do not 
obey a programme or plan. They obey men, a 
team of men, and it is all for the best if 
that team is embodied in a chief and 
symbolised by one face, one voice, one 
personality. "
Similar situations in which the power of authoritarian
rulers overwhelm the power of a multi-party parliament can
be found in other Middle Eastern states including Jordan,
Tunisia and Egypt, as well as many Latin American states
including Colombia, where a former foreign minister notes:
"We have a constitutional fagade, but behind that fagade we
20have a military which is very powerful." More recently, 
several African states such as Kenya, Botswana, The Gambia, 
Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal also appear to be developing 
similar patterns of rule since their respective transitions 
from single party rule.
The electoral arena:
some government imposed constraints
The rulers who adopt these systems tend to impose a number
of constraining conditions in order to ensure the arena of
political contest remains under their stringent control.
The laws regulating the licensing of opposition parties for
example always demand a public commitment to the existing
21political order and the substantive acts of the regime. As
the case of Jordan illustrates, the primary concern of King
Hussein with regard to legalising political parties in 1991
was to ensure that "such parties agreed in advance to
22support the constitution and the monarchy". The same
18 M. Palmer (1989), P227.
19 J. Lacouture (1970), P 7 .
20 M. Palmer (1989), P227.
21 J.J. Linz (1978), P62.
22 R. Owen (1992) P23 8. It should be noted that political groups
were first permitted legal status in Jordon under the Political 
Parties Law of 1955. This however, was a very short-lived affair
16
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situation is also witnessed in Morocco. When King Hassan 
attempted to recreate a system based on multi-party 
elections in 1977 potential parties were forced to 
demonstrate their allegiance to the King and his policies 
if they were to be allowed to compete.
In addition, authoritarian rulers can, and very often do, 
exercise a veto against the participation of certain groups 
or individual personalities. In most cases, such 
exclusionary measures are confined to those whom the rulers 
believe may have the potential to attract wide scale appeal 
and who may subsequently use such appeal to mobilise large 
sectors of the public against the regime. This can largely 
explain why political parties in certain Worth African 
states are granted legal permission to function only if
23they do not possess a broad social base within society. 
Linz's observation of government caution towards electoral 
activities in Eastern Europe states such as Estonia and 
Latvia during the first half of the century is also evident 
in contemporary systems of this nature:
"...elections with licensed or controlled 
parties are unlikely to have [a] festive 
and revivalist character... The rulers are 
less likely to encourage this, because they 
are uncertain about the turn-out and the
24outcome."
Waterbury observed this phenomenon in contemporary Morocco. 
According to the author, King Hassan did not only place 
himself as arbiter of all political issues and groups, he 
intentionally prevented efforts of large-scale mobilisation 
of any sectors of society during elections, even favourable 
ones, for fear that they might eventually turn against 
him.25 Such ambiguous electoral tactics can also be noted in 
Brazil's post-1964 authoritarian regime. One observer 
comments: "there w a s ...a succession of arbitrary
since they were subsequently banned in April 1957 and remained so 
until 1991. See: R. Owen, (1992), P233-37.
23 A. Hermassi (1994), P2 41.
24 J.J. Linz (1978), P64.
25 J. Waterbury (1970), P148.
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modifications to the rules of the electoral game in order 
to diminish political competition, guarantee predictable 
outcomes, and to keep party alternation in government under 
strict control."26 Again, the same patterns are evident in 
Egypt, as most patently illustrated prior to the 1984 
elections. President Mubarak, arguably apprehensive of an 
unexpected electoral turn-out during the first legislative 
elections under his rule, went as far as to completely 
change the electoral laws in an attempt to curb potential 
opposition progress and to ensure his National Democratic 
Party maintained its dominant position within the arena of
. . 27political contest.
General characteristics of non-competitive 
multi-party elections
The reluctance of personal authoritarian rulers to allow
large-scale mobilisation of any sectors of society during
elections, means that in contrast to plebiscitarian
elections in mobilising single party systems, controlled
multi-party elections do not endorse wide scale political
indoctrination and propaganda on behalf of the regime.
Instead, political participation is rather indirect and is
embedded in a complex network of clientelist relations
28linking the periphery to the centre. As such the 
government supported party is primarily made up of "a 
conglomerate of personalities, factions and interests
. . . . .  29without common ideological or programmatic positions," 
with elections turning out relatively simple and 
uncontroversial slogans such as "order", "economic 
progress" and "social justice". In most cases, contestants 
representing the government party are reduced to commending 
and advocating the achievements of public officials who do
30not actually take part in electoral contest' such as the
26 L. Martins (1993), P77.
21 R. Springborg (1989), P160: R. Owen (1994), P186.
28 N. Chazan et a l ., (1988), P168.
29 J.J. Linz, (1978), P65.
30 J.J. Linz (1978), P65.
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31ruler and specific ministers. Opposition contestants are 
even more limited by the formal and informal boundaries set 
by the rulers on their activities and whatever their regard 
for the political system, it is highly unlikely that they
32would publicly question its legitimacy.
Non-Competitive multi-party elections 
as a legitimization tool
Since such elections do not have any profound visible 
effect within the political arena, if the ruler derives 
some form of legitimacy from holding non-competitive multi­
party elections, it is in a limited context. On the 
international level, such elections may for example, help 
to enhance a regime's standing on the international stage. 
Senegal's President Senghor for example, initiated limited 
electoral reforms which subsequently meant some opposition 
parties were allowed to compete in the 197 8 legislative 
elections. Whilst he ensured that his own party maintained 
the majority of seats (82 percent of the votes cast), this 
move: "probably enhanced his international standing in the
West as a leader of a regime that respects civil and
33political rights" ' and indicative of this was the fact: 
"his party was the first in Africa to be admitted into the 
ranks of the moderate Socialist International."34
International considerations were also among of the main 
reasons Egypt's late President Sadat decided to authorise a 
'multi-party' arena. His government was, in the words of 
one author: "seeking political forms that would help its
appeals to Western sources of support and cared little
i . . . 3 5about making itself attractive to Communist countries." 
The fact that legislative elections in which opposition 
parties participate, continue, even under Sadat's
31 Personal observation of Egypt's 1995 legislative elections.
32 J.J. Linz (1978), P65.
33 R.H. Jackson and C. G. Roseberg (1982), P97,
34 R.H. Jackson and C. G. Roseberg (1982), P97.
35 W. Zartman (1990), p233.
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successor, to have no affect on the replacement or 
succession of government, nevertheless, continues to help 
President Mubarak gain Western, especially American 
support. Egypt's non-competitive multi-party elections in 
other words, make: "it easier for the president and the US 
congress to provide aid, while very much reducing the 
possibility that Egypt will be criticised for human rights 
abuses. "36
It is worth taking into consideration however, the fact 
that a regime's international position, especially with 
regard to Western democratic nations, is, in the final 
analysis, determined on other, more important factors than 
the nature of its electoral system. In some instances, the 
electoral practice of a regime can count for very little. 
With regard to the U.S. for example:
"support can be enlisted for the foreign 
policy in question [and] for this purpose 
no precise criteria of what counts as 
"democracy" are needed; but foreign 
governments that do not share the official 
American world view, will find it hard to 
secure recognition in Washington as truly 
democratic, however liberal their electoral 
practices or their p o litical 
philosophies. "37
Turning to the national level, it is noted that the whole 
concept of proclaiming democracy as a central political 
goal may help to provide some form of legitimacy for the
38rulers who hold them. But this is likely to be because the 
ruler is attempting to illustrate his "commitment" to the 
general principles of holding elections rather than the
39possibility of government alternation. The underlying fact 
however, is that the legitimacy of a regime which did not 
come to power as a result of competitive elections, is 
unlikely to be judged by the public, solely on the basis of
36 R. Owen (1994), P190.
37 L. Whithead (1991), pll.
38 M.C. Hudson (1977), PP22-24.
39 R.S. Milne (1973), P208.
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electoral dynamics. This is explained in the comments of 
one author regarding the political system in Mexico, and 
can also be applied to similar non-competitive systems:
"Because the regime had originated in a 
revolutionary transformation rather than 
through an inclusive and widely accepted 
electoral process, public perceptions of 
regime legitimacy depended more on overall 
evaluations of government performance and 
the fulfilment of a comprehensive 
revolutionary programme than on government 
adherence to particular procedural 
requirements . "40
A similar point is also made by a prominent Egyptian 
writer, who notes (with reference to Sadat) that while in 
the West: "A new President or Prime Minister. . . will no
doubt be expected to implement at least some of the 
programme he offered before his election. . . In the Third 
World the leader's legitimacy, and so his survival, depends 
on his achievements."41 Defining these achievements depends, 
invariably, upon the social, economic and political 
circumstances that each ruler individually confronts. The 
legitimacy derived by President Nasser following his ascent 
to power in post-1952 Egypt for example, may have been 
partly a result of his government's role in: "evicting the 
British from Egyptian bases, nationaliz[ing] the Suez 
Canal, and emerg[ing] victorious from the 195 6 invasion of
42 •Egypt by England, France and Israel." Socio-economic 
reforms in terms of land redistribution and developmental 
projects such as the Aswan High Dam, could also be regarded 
as factors which further contributed to his political 
legitimacy. As Hudson notes: "The Aswan High Dam scheme was 
not just an economic development project but an important 
legitimacy-building device, which explains in part Nasir's 
violent reaction to America's decision not to finance it."43 
Elections therefore played a minimal role in the legitimacy
40 K.J. Middlebrook (1993), P126.
41 M.H. Heikal (1983), P55.
42 M. Palmer (1989), P160.
43 M.C. Hudson (1977), P239.
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stakes and thus functioned within the limited framework of 
a one-party system.
Furthermore, the legitimacy of Nasser's successors, Sadat 
and Mubarak respectively, could hardly have been the result 
of the non-competitive multi-party arena that followed. In 
fact, opposition parties were not even granted formal 
authorisation to function until the period between 1978 and 
1979. In other words, just over three years before Sadat's 
assassination. That Egypt's 'multi-party' elections do not 
appear to constitute the basis of regime legitimacy in the 
Mubarak era, is reflected in the words of one potential 
voter. In his words:
"The government is not all bad. Some are 
bad because they are corrupt and some 
because they are stupid and useless. But 
President Mubarak is good because he is 
trying very hard to solve the country's 
economic problems. Hasan Al-'Alfi [the then 
Minster of Interior] and T.Amr Musa [the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs] are also 
good. . . Al-'Alfi tries to control the 
police and make sure they do not hassle 
people for no reason at all and Musa seems 
to know what he is talking about... Really, 
it does not matter how these people get 
into government. What is important is that 
they do a good job."44
It would seem that the rulers themselves are largely 
responsible for the fact that non-competitive multi-party 
elections do not have much legitimising significance within 
the political arena. In the absence of a dominant party 
based on a strong ideological or programmatic position and 
their reluctance to endorse wide scale mobilisation, the 
utilisation of such 'multi-party' elections, cannot, 
logically, be utilised as a major legitimization tool, as 
for example, is the case of mobilising single party 
elections. As one author explains:
44 Personal interview with Ahmad Hasan, retired truck-driver, 
Helwan, Egypt, 14 November 19 95.
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"Without being assured of a turn-out that 
would give symbolic expression to the 
willingness of the people to participate 
within the regime, and fearful. . . of the 
number of votes the opposition might gain,
[the rulers] are unlikely to attach much 
symbolic and legitimising significance to 
the elections"45
In the final analysis, one can argue that the establishment 
and subsequent regulation of a multi-party system using 
various measures to ensure electoral results with foregone 
conclusions can appear as an unnecessary arrangement for 
authoritarian rulers who already control the major levers 
of coercion and maintain centralised command over the 
political apparatus without being effectively bound by any 
formal rules other than those which fit their own political 
or personal convenience. However, as Schmitter points out, 
for such elections to be held in the first place "they must 
have some reason or motive; they must contribute in some 
way to sustaining...the mode of political domination. They 
must have some functions... or they would not exist."46 On 
this basis, it is perhaps best if attention is turned to 
another angle; the role of these elections within the 
framework of clientelist co-option and control.
Non-Competitive multi-Party elections as an 
instrument of co-option and clientelist control 
In the absence of effective constitutional-legal rules of 
restraint, one can argue that authoritarian rulers need to 
resort to alternative and more informal strategies in 
efforts to ensure the maintenance of centralised control 
over political activity. These strategies may rest upon 
attempts to cultivate the support and loyalty of 
subordinates on the basis of co-option and patronage. Of 
course they can, and at times do, resort to coercion, but 
as Jackson notes:
"...the method of intimidation and coercion 
has built-in costs; to the extent that
45 J.J. Linz (1978), P64
46 P.C. Schmitter (1978), P149.
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opposition is suppressed, it is possible 
only to secure acquiesce, not active co­
operation. But to survive, most personal 
rulers ... rely on the willing co-operation 
of other political actors, and generally, 
they attempt to secure it by the stratagems 
of co-option, consultation, agreement, and 
patronage - especially the last."47
Authoritarian rulers can also attempt to deal with 
opponents on similar principles: either by actively
contriving to eliminate them or attempting to win their co-
48operation and adherence. In the long term, broadening the 
power base of the regime to co-opt potentially subversive 
new elements appears a more viable option as the extended 
use of repression can have profound consequences on 
political stability should opponents turn radical in
49efforts to counteract government actions. As Anderson 
explains:
"All governments face dissent, but it is 
usually the government itself that selects 
the arena and chooses the weapons with 
which the battle is fought. Regimes that do 
not recognise [such] mechanisms ... appear 
to run a much greater risk of wholesale 
opposition to the entire system than do 
governments that permit some form of the 
expression of dissent..."50
In this context, the establishment of a multi-party arena 
can perhaps best be examined as an instrument of control 
which permits authoritarian regimes to "make sure dissent 
would be institutionalised and channelled, not 
spontaneous."51 Accordingly, by providing an arena of 
political contest whereby disparate political actors can 
participate, the power-holders are most likely to monitor 
their activities from a better angle than if these 
opponents were forced to resort to illegal and subsequent
47 R.M. Jackson and C.G. Rosenberg (1982), P26.
48 R.H. Jackson and C.G. Roseberg (1982), P25.
49 M. Palmer (1989), PP104-111.
50 L. Anderson (19 87), P227.
51 D.C. Levy and K. Bruhn (1994), P192.
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clandestine methods of participation. It is therefore no 
surprise that non-competitive elections in Portugal prior 
to 1974 have arguably been regarded as periods which 
extended the surveillance capacity of the regime and
52 * ibrought "police records up to date." While this may appear 
exaggerated, the general principles are prevalent in some 
form or other within most authoritarian systems of this 
nature, including Egypt, where the electoral register is 
also maintained by the police and where legal electoral 
activities are also constantly infiltrated by state 
security personnel.53
As an instrument of control however, a non-competitive 
multi-party arena may be better understood in terms of 
clientelist relations. That is, it is the extension of 
patronage into the arena of political contest in order to 
reinvigorate and expand political clientelism and thus 
reaffirm government domination over political activity. 
Electoral practice after all, is not simply embedded in a 
political tradition but also in a specific socio-economic 
and cultural context. Thus elections may not necessarily 
have the same meaning in a complex industrialised society 
where political participation centres around organised 
groups based on socio-economic interests and conceptions, 
as they do in societies where "the modes of relationship 
favour primary groups, while secondary groups are weakly 
developed" .54
In the former, relatively full employment, social security, 
diverse opportunities and other characteristics which 
constitute the basis of modern liberal society lessen the
5 5 .possibilities of personal domination and permit 
individuals the opportunity to affiliate with groups which 
are "voluntary, self generating, (largely) self-supporting
52 P.C. Schmitter (1978), P154.
53 Personal communication with various political activists, and 
personal observation during 1995 election campaigns.
54 A. Rouquie (1978), P22.
55 Rouquie (197 8), P24.
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[and] autonomous from the state".56 On this basis, state- 
society relations are based primarily on generalised 
reciprocity rather than on particularistic and hierachial
57 * •bonds of clientage. In developing countries however, the 
scarcity of resources and the general insecurities that 
emerge when reliable avenues to deal with problems of 
economic survival do not exist, tends to produce vertical 
patterns of dependency. Which in turn means that the 
particularistic and hierachial ties of clientelism are more 
likely to constitute the basis of state-society relations. 
In general, clientelism can be defined as a:
"personalized, affective, and reciprocal 
relationship between actors, or sets of 
actors, commanding unequal resources and 
involving mutually beneficial transactions 
that have political ramifications beyond 
the immediate sphere of dyadic 
relationships. "58
The difficulty in defining political clientelism in more 
specific terms is largely due to the fact it varies in form 
depending not only the political system in which it 
prevails, but also upon which level of the political system 
it is operating. Lemarchand and Legg also emphasis a 
similar point when noting that: ""clientelism" cannot be
meaningfully considered apart from the setting in which it 
exists. The forms which it takes depend to a considerable 
degree on the structure of society and on the political
59system in which it operates." Basically, however, a 
clientelist structure is characterised by the patron-client 
relationship which, to borrow Scott's definition, is:
"...an exchange relationship between roles 
[and] may be defined as a special case of 
dyadic (two-person) ties involving a 
largely instrumental friendship in which an 
individual of higher socio-economic status 
(patron) uses his own influence and 
resources to provide protection or
56 L. Diamond (1994), P5.
57 L. Diamond, (1995), PP30-31.
58 R. Lemarchand and K.Legg (1978), PP122-23.
59 R. Lemarchand and K.Legg (1978), P127.
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benefits/ or both, for a person of lower 
status (client) who, for his part, 
reciprocates by offering general support 
and assistance, including personal services 
to the patron. "60
It is the process of reciprocity, the author stresses, 
which distinguishes patron-client ties from other 
relationships - such as those which are based upon formal 
authority or pure coercion - that can also link individuals 
of different status. As he put it:
"A patron may have some coercive power and 
he may also hold an official position of 
authority. But if the force or authority at 
his command are alone sufficient to ensure 
the compliance of another, he has no need 
of patron-client ties which require some 
reciprocity. Typically then, the patron 
operates in a context in which the 
community norms and the need for clients 
require at least a minimum of bargaining 
and reciprocity".51
The agrarian setting for example, in which a major landlord 
constitutes: "the major source of protection, of security,
of employment, of access to arable land or to education, 
and of food in bad times. . .is in an ideal position to 
demand compliance from those who wish to share in these 
scarce commodities."62 In turn, the compliance which a 
patron obtains from his 'clients' is important in that it 
not only enhances his status within society, but more 
importantly perhaps, it: "represents a capacity for
mobilising a group of supporters when he cares to."63 The 
capacity of the patron to mobilise support from his clients 
in times of need, is sometimes further reinforced as a 
result of the dyadic or personal nature of patron-client 
ties. This assumption is based upon the view that the:
"continuing pattern of reciprocity that 
establishes and solidifies a patron-client
60 J. c . Scott (1977), PP124
61 J. c . Scott (1977), P125.
62 J. c . Scott (1977), P125 .
63 J. c . Scott (1977) , P126 .
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bond often creates trust and affection 
between the partners. When a client needs a 
small loan or someone to intercede for him 
with the authorities, he knows he can rely 
on his patron; the patron knows, in turn, 
that "his men" will assist him in his 
designs when he needs them."64
It should also be noted that the ties linking a client to 
his patron can, theoretically, be made even more enduring 
because of the fundamentally 'diffuse' nature of the 
relationship. What this means is that unlike formal 
contractual relations, the link between a patron and his 
client/s "is a very flexible one in which the needs and 
resources, and hence the nature of the exchange, may vary 
widely over time...[and can therefore] persist so long as 
the two partners have something to offer one another."65
Within the larger socio-political framework therefore, a 
clientelist structure can be understood to exist when the 
patron-client relationship expands so that;
"Patrons exist at different levels of the 
society (national, regional, local) and the 
lower-level patrons are the clients of 
higher level patrons who have access to 
greater amounts and types of resources."66
Whilst the expansion of the state apparatus into society 
constitutes the underlying process responsible for the 
establishment of such linkages,67 the difference between one 
clientelist system and another is arguably dependent upon 
who ultimately controls (or at least exerts the most 
influence over) the greatest resources within society. Alex 
Weingrod for example, has stressed how the expansion of 
state power into society brings with it: "the establishment 
of new national and regional organisations, the initiation 
of new agricultural programs, the recruitment of cadres of
64 J. C. Scott (1977), P126.
65 J. C. Scott (1977), P126.
65 L. Guasti (1977), P423.
67 R. Lemarchand (19 81), Pi8.
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68workers [and] the commitment of huge capital funds". The 
consequence of which is that:
"These new resources of jobs and funds are 
typically administrated or controlled by 
political party members or by persons 
designated by the parties. . . This close 
association of party with government opens 
new possibilities for patronage; once 
having gained control of these resources
the parties use them to serve their own
69electoral ends."
Hence, this process, which the author refers to as "party-
directed patronage" can be used to explain how certain
political parties use clientelism as a means to restrict
genuine electoral competition and thus protect their
dominant position in the existing power structure. The
party's use of patronage for such purpose, it should be
noted, can generally be distinguished on two main levels.
On one level, there is the "party machine". On the other,
« 70there is the "party of social integration". The emergence 
of a "party machine" (labelled by Lemarchand the "orthodox 
machine")71 is predominantly: "a question of an organism
72responding to particular demands m  exchange for votes." 
What this means is that the "party machine" functions 
through the clientelist manipulation of vulnerable people 
such as rural migrants and foreign immigrants. Most of whom 
are located in crowded urban areas where unemployment is 
rife and there exists little avenues to help them cope with 
problems of economic survival. In such an environment, the 
party is usually in the position to 'buy', through brokers, 
the votes of these people, in return for "concrete short- 
run benefits".73 As Rouquie explains with regard to the 
United States during the first part of this century:
68 A. Weingrod (1977), p326.
69 A. Weingrod (1977), pp326-27,
70 A. Rouquie (1978), P31.
71 R. Lemarchand (1981), P19.
72 A. Rouquie (1978), P31.
73 R. Lemarchand (1981), P21.
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"Machine politics assumed its classical 
form in institutional contexts of 
competitive pluralism, notably in the 
United States before and after the First 
World War. Founded on the power of the 
'boss' exercising power without 
responsibility, the election machine 
functioned thanks to the boss7 s services to 
a population that was often outcast and 
vulnerable. The boss brought often- 
indispensable assistance to immigrants and 
foreign minorities in crowded city areas; 
they used their votes as a piece of 
merchandise. . . When a machine was 
thoroughly entrenched in a ward, the 
opposition did not even bother to organise 
there. Thus, there was not only a non­
competitive election, but also a single
74party."
The same situation, as the author continues, prevailed in 
urban Argentina, most notably in Buenos Areis where:
"The isolation and anonymity of urban life 
resulting from atomisation and immigrant 
uprooting are equally responsible for the 
success of the Radical Party machine in 
Buenos Aires at the beginning of the 
century. . . The district chiefs (caudillos 
de barrio) provided help, charity and 
credit. Party committees even sold low- 
priced food, known as 'Radical bread' and 
'Radical milk'.7
Whilst the clientelist control of the vote by the "party 
machine" is based upon the exchange short-term material 
benefits, the party of "social integration" maintains a 
different, more intense, type of clientelist control. This 
is because a party of this nature (also labelled "mass 
patronage machine")76 tends to preserve its dominant 
position in power on a long-term, if not permanent basis, 
by using "the resources of power" to grip "the state and 
society in a clientele network of extreme density."77 What 
this means is that the party of social integration: "is
74 A. Rouquie (1978), P31.
75 A. Rouquie (1978), P31.
75 R. Lemarchand (1981), P21-23.
77 A. Rouquie (1978), P32.
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much more in nature of a mass organisation, its resources 
are far more diversified (and so is its clientele), and its 
ramifications to the state bureaucracy are considerably
78 * *more complex and extensive." The Christian Democratic 
Party in Italy assumes the main characteristics of this 
complex, all-encompassing, clientelist party. In the words 
of one Italian politician:
"Clientelism... [used to evoke] the letter 
of recommendation from the notable, a 
practice still in existence and still 
frequent in Sicily, though less and less 
so. For at least fifteen years clientelism 
has been changing in nature and instead of 
being vertical ties as before, descending 
from the notable to the postulant... it now 
concerns entire (social) categories, 
coalitions of interests, groups of 
(private) employees, employees of public 
office or of regional enterprises. It is 
mass clientelism, organised and 
efficient... concessions granted no longer 
to the individual, but to favoured groups.
In order to put this powerful machine to 
work, through time, the Christian Democrats 
have had to place party men at every level 
of power, in each key position. . . (Today 
clientelism) is a relationship between
i 79large groups and public power,"
This type of clientelist control is even more evident, and 
constitutes the main reason, the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) in Mexico has remained in power since 
the early part of this century. The PRI, which was created 
by President Plutarco Elias Calles in 1929, was regarded
initially as "little more than a facade that ratified the
80 » * political status quo." However, even though opposition
parties have formally existed since the late 1930's and
81 » » *1940's, the fact the party has managed to maintain its
dominant position for so long, and with relatively little
78 R. Lemarchand (1981), PP21-22.
79 Cited in M. Caciagli and F.P. Belloni (1981), PP35-36.
80 S. K. Purcell (1981), P198.
81 For example, the conservative "National Action" party (PAN) was 
founded in 19 3 9 and; the "Socialist Popular" party (PPS) was 
founded in 1948 and later re-organised in 1958. See K.J. 
Middlebrook (1993), P128.
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need for coercion, is largely the result of the clientelist
tactics instigated on behalf of the party by President
Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940). Under his rule, new sectors
within the PRI were specifically created to incorporate the
military, the middle class, the workers and the peasants-
all of whom he had organised into officially separate group
entities. Once incorporated into party membership: "each of
these groups, and especially the workers and peasants, was
encouraged to regard itself as a corporate entity with
interests that were distinct from, and often in conflict
82with, those of the locally-based strongmen [caciques]."
Cardenas further reinforced the workers and peasant's 
independence from the caciques through the provision of 
various rights and rewards. The workers for example, were 
provided with a re-organised and strengthened union and 
collective bargaining system, whilst at the same time he 
ensured their right to strike was reinforced. The peasants 
on the other hand, were given property which had previously 
been confiscated from large landowners during the 1910-17 
social revolution. Such tactics were not insignificant 
since it also helped to institutionalise the party's 
dominant position within the political arena by ensuring: 
"the newly-organised peasants and workers were tied to an
83institution, the official party, rather than the ruler."
The point here however, is that whilst the corporatist 
organisation that was created within the framework of the 
PRI acted: "as a countervailing force against the locally-
84based clientelist structure" , at the same time, it helped 
the party build an alternate clientelist structure, which 
to date, allows it to dominate the Mexican political arena. 
As Purcell explains:
"[T]he manner in which the peasants and 
workers were incorporated made them
82 S.K. Purcell (1981), PP198-199.
83 S.K. Purcell (1981), P199.
84 S.K. Purcell (1981), P199.
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extremely dependent on national leaders.
Both groups had been organised before they 
had a strong sense of class identity that 
would have enabled them to define their 
true interests, select their own leaders 
and enter the political system on their own 
terms. As a result, the price they paid for 
the "gifts" of organisation, resources and 
rights, was high. Having entered the 
national system from a position of relative 
weakness, they would find it difficult, if 
not impossible, to increase their power 
over their new national patrons."85
The manipulation of state resources by a political party to 
ensure that it is not simply individuals, but also 
disparate group entities that are dependent upon it is 
important with regard to elections from one particular 
angle. Namely that strategies aimed at creating such 
patterns of dependency encourage elections to function 
predominantly as a mechanism for reaffirming clientelist 
control. This, one can argue, is because if: "the machine
or the party and its parallel hierarchies guarantees a 
minimum of social protection, the election enables the 
client" to pay his debt to the party and "by paying his 
debt, to deserve a patronal largesse once again."86
The participation of opposition parties in such a context, 
does little to lessen the clientelist grip of the dominant 
party over state and society. Rather, the dominant party's 
monopoly of state resources can further strengthen its 
position if such resources are also used to tempt members 
of the opposition into co-option. This problem was in fact 
a major issue in Mexico prior to the 1979 federal Chamber 
of Deputies elections. As a result of Mexico's 1976-77 
economic crisis, the then President, Lopez Portillo (1976- 
82), became "personally convinced" that broad reform of the 
"political party system and the electoral process" would
87help alleviate part of the crisis. It was for this reason
85 S.K. Purcell (1981), P199.
86 A. Rouquie (1978), P34.
87 K.J. Middlebrook (1993), P131.
33
Problem statement; theoretical framework; methods of research; and framework of analysis
therefore, that opposition parties were particularly
encouraged to participate in the 1979 elections. The fact
was that most opposition organisations participated,
however, with some hesitation. They were aware that
participation in the reforms, of which the 1979 election
was part, could "result in their co-optation by the
88established regime." The opposition, as Middlebrook 
explains:
"were fully aware that minority 
representation in the executive-dominated 
Chamber of Deputies offered limited 
opportunities to effect substantial change. 
Furthermore, they had misgivings concerning 
the corruptive effects that access to 
government resources and opportunities for 
individual political advancement might have 
on opposition leaders."89
Indeed, the 1977 political "liberalisation" reform: "marked 
an important departure in Mexican politics" since it led 
to: "more active [opposition] participation in the
electoral process [thus] significantly improv[ing] the 
ability of opposition parties to articulate alternative
• 90public policies and widen their membership base." Yet, as 
the author acknowledges, such "liberalisation" tactics also 
served to incorporate, under government-defined rules: "the 
most important unregistered opposition organisations into 
the existing party system without greatly increasing their
* » 91real political influence."
On another level: "the lack of opposition-party access to
92significant resources and power" may indeed be regarded as 
a major contributor to their subsequent "limited progress"
93within the electoral arena.' But this, one can argue, is 
not a wholly unexpected conclusion in view of the fact the
88 K.J. Middlebrook (1993), P133.
89 K.J. Middlebrook (19 93), P133.
90 K.J. Middlebrook (1993), P143.
91 K.J. Middlebrook (1993), P146.
92 K.J. Middlebrook (1993), P147.
93 K.J. Middlebrook (1993), P147.
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opposition were participating within a framework in which 
electoral domination by the PRI, since the early part of 
the century, has been closely linked with the downward flow 
of state-controlled patronage. Perhaps more important from 
the regime's view therefore, is not the outcome of 
elections. Rather, by actually encouraging the registered 
opposition parties to participate in such a patronage- 
dominated electoral arena, the chances of them becoming 
clientelistically dependent upon the regime (i.e. through 
the resources it controls and the necessity of being 
allocated a share of it if electoral gains are to be 
achieved) could be greatly enhanced. Indeed, as we already 
mentioned, the fear of co-optation was on the minds of the 
opposition. Yet, the fact this fear did not, in the final 
analysis, deter the majority from participating, may, from 
the regime's view, be regarded as a step forward in terms 
of achieving this aim.
In situations whereby a political system is not simply 
structured along authoritarian lines, but also within the 
framework of personal rule, non-competitive multi-party 
elections can also be viewed as an important mechanism of 
clientelist co-option and control. The nature of 
clientelist control however, differs by virtue of the 
ruler's personal monopoly of patronage. For example, whilst 
one particular party may dominate the electoral arena, such 
a party cannot be compared to the dominant party in Mexico 
for example, or until very recently, India where the 
Congress Party controlled: "not only the state and national 
governments, but most of the local governments and new 
quasi-governmental bodies... [with the outcome being that] 
the Party has been able to establish extensive control over
94 *patronage." Instead, it is the individual ruler who 
maintains ultimate control over state resources. The 
dominant party in other words, is simply provided, courtesy 
of the ruler, with access to, not control over, state 
resources.
94 M. Weiner, 1964, P21, cited in A. Weingrod, (1977), PP326-7.
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Personal rule, after all, functions with minimum coercion 
only if political institutions and groupings are weak, 
dependent upon the ruler and thus easier for him to 
control. In such a context, if a dominant party does exist 
(and unless the ruler maintains a single party system or 
can manage the precarious task of placing himself as an 
arbiter of all parties, then a dominant party of which he 
is head, is likely to exist), it is in the interest of the 
ruler to ensure such a party (or indeed, any of the 
participating 'opposition' parties) does not emerge as a 
strong political entity that could potentially challenge 
his personal consolidation of power.
The role of elections as a mechanism of co-option and 
clientelist control in such a context, can perhaps be 
better understood along more traditional, and thus more 
personalistic lines. What this means is that because it is 
the ruler who maintains ultimate control over patronage, a 
political party cannot be regarded as an institutionalised, 
independent political entity. Instead, it is more likely to
be made up of a conglomerate of personalities each
possessing their own personal network of supporters. The 
traditionally personalistic ties on which political parties 
in the Philippines were based, and the way it affected the 
nature of elections, is typical of that found in personal 
authoritarian systems of rule. As Lande explains:
"Formally, each party [in the Philippines] 
is an association composed of those who 
have become party members. In practice each 
party, at any point in time, is a multi­
tiered pyramid of personal followings, one 
heaped upon the other... If one wishes to 
discover the real framework upon which 
election campaigns are built, one must turn 
away from political parties and focus one's
attention upon individual candidates and
the vertical chains of leadership and 
followership into which they arrange
i i » t 95themselves at any given point m  time."
95 C. H. Lande (1977), P86.
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The personalistic nature of these ties, and the fact these 
ties were structures independent of political parties meant 
that electoral victory was predominantly for those: "with 
the greatest personal wealth, . . . the most flamboyant 
campaign styles, and ... those who are thought most likely 
to be able to win and thus have access to patronage and
96 *other rewards of office," More importantly, one of the 
main consequences of this electoral system was that it lead 
to a: "preoccupation with personalities, offices and
spoils, and that lack of interest in policy or ideology, 
which is so strikingly characteristic of Philippine
97politics."
This preoccupation by party members and their personal 
followers with patronage and spoils, put simply, left 
political parties- as unified organisations, in a weak 
position. In fact, because such electoral dynamics affected 
the nature of party organisation, the two major parties 
were, in the final analysis: "poor instruments for the
. 98formulation of distinctive and consistent programmes." 
This, in turn, left each new President who took office with
99the: "freedom to create his own program." A program which 
was predominantly: "guided by his personal views, the views 
of his advisers, and by a variety of pressures... which no 
President can ignore."100
On the basis of such individualistic methods of political 
participation, one can understand why it was not too 
difficult for President Marcos (1965-1986) to establish 
himself in office for over two decades. The fact that 
electoral contest focused upon personality-directed 
patronage as opposed to party policies or even party- 
directed patronage, meant that political parties remained
96 C. H. Lande (1977), PP86-7.
97 C. H. Lande (1977), P88.
98 C. H. Lande (1977) , P87.
99 C. H. Lande (1977), P87.
100 C. H. Lande (1977), PP87-8.
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disorganised, disunited and thus weak political entities. 
Therefore, when Marcos decided in 1972, one year before the 
end of his second term as President, to impose a state of 
emergency and suspend elections, it was virtually
impossible for any of the political parties to effectively
, . 101oppose him.
The dynamics of elections based on personality-directed 
state patronage, one can thus argue, encouraged, or at 
least contributed towards the emergence of personal 
authoritarian rule in the Philippines during the Marcos 
era. In general however, such elections do not necessarily 
contribute towards the emergence, but rather help in the 
preservation of, personal authoritarian rule. This one can 
argue, is because with patronage ultimately under the 
personal control of the ruler, and with ruler usually 
installing himself as head of the 'ruling' party, such 
elections not only as a mechanism of distributing to the 
masses tangible and other forms of rewards in return for 
regime-directed political support. But more importantly 
perhaps, an electoral arena of this nature also acts as a 
mechanism through which the dependency of political actors 
on the ruler is maintained and reaffirmed.
In traditional society, the expansion of the government's 
clientelist apparatus into society, as mentioned 
previously, facilitated the recruitment of traditional 
patrons such as large landowners, into the state apparatus. 
This, in turn, enabled the power-holders to redefine their 
roles, so that: "instead of being largely creatures of the 
locality who dealt with the centre, (the patrons) became 
increasingly creatures of the centre who dealt with the
101 In fact, had it not been for the combined efforts of the Church 
and the Media in mobilising the masses following the 'non­
competitive' elections of 19 85 and the subsequent defection of two 
of the President's most senior men, it is possible the President 
could have remained in office for the remainder of his life. To 
prevent a recurrence of personal rule, the current Philippine 
constitution, similar to the Mexican system, now limits the 
presidential tenure to a one, non-re-electable, six-year term. 
Telephone interview/conversation with the Head of the Office of HE 
the Philippine Ambassador to London. 8 January 1998.
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102local community." Such type of clientelist recruitment 
one can argue, is most prominently reflected in an 
electoral arena where the manipulation of state resources 
to provide facilities such as piped water supplies, paved 
roads or a new school in return for supporting the "right" 
candidate (i.e. a government nominated candidate), can be 
very enticing to an impoverished public - and more so in an 
arena where opinion based voting is of little significance 
to electoral outcome. In such a context, the utility 
calculations of individual voters in a single party, multi- 
candidate system will also prevail in a non-competitive 
multi-party system:
"Under a competitive party system, it makes 
sense for citizens to pay attention to a 
candidate's stand on those issues affecting 
the entire national political system. For 
if a candidate is committed to a party, 
then [their party's] success could 
conceivably affect national policy; [the 
candidate's] performance at the polls could 
combine with the performance of other 
candidates from [the same] party and their 
joint performance would help to define 
which team would subsequently control 
government...[under a single-party, 
multiple candidate system] if successful, a 
candidate . . .would. . .have little impact 
upon national policies. In the absence of a 
competitive party system, voters, behaving 
rationally. . .therefore tend to pay more 
attention to the ability of candidates to 
do things of immediate, local value than to
* i 103their stands on national issues."
In this respect, it is logical to view the clientelist 
control of the vote as a mechanism of social control 
derived from the satisfaction of tangible demands in return 
for political support. In fact, elections in such a context 
function as "little more than devices through which 
clienteles are given the opportunity to register their
102 Scott and Kerkvliet, 1977, P454; cited in R. Lemarchand
(1981), P18.
103 R. Bates (1989) , P92 .
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loyalty to competing patrons through the vote."104 As 
Lemarchand and Legg note:
"Without in any way denying the selectivity 
with which...members of parliament act out 
their roles... their relationships with 
their... constituents are essentially based 
on personalised, affective, reciprocal 
ties. The deputy-constituent relationship 
in this case is but an extension into the 
modern parliamentary arena of the patron- 
client relationships discernible at the
« 105local or regional level."
The point however, is that because it is the ruler, not the 
individual patrons, or the party of which they are members, 
which controls most of the patronage, it is thus difficult 
for them to become independent of the ruler himself. The 
ruler's control of state resources in such a context 
c o n t r i b u t e s  towards ensuring i n d i v i d u a l  
"patrons"/politicians cannot compete against, but in 
compliance to the prevailing regime if they are to satisfy 
the demands of potential "clients"/constituents. 
Furthermore, as political clientelism radiates from a 
single point in the political process -i.e. the ruler- the 
dependency of potential "patrons" is confined to one 
patronage base at the apex of the system.106 What this means 
is that an individual entering the electoral contest with 
aspirations to become a "patron" is more inclined to seek 
the patronage of the ruler through high-ranking political 
connections, or through membership of the party which he 
heads. And in doing so, he must thus comply with the 
ruler's definition of 'rules of the game'.
The same method of political control can theoretically be 
extended to opposition party members. Their success in the 
electoral arena also depends upon the support of potential 
'clients/voters' within society, which in turn, is 
predominantly obtained in exchange for tangible benefits.
104 R. Lemarchand and K. Legg (1978), PP138-139.
105 R. Lemarchand and K. Legg (1978), P126.
106 R, Lemarchand and K. Legg (1978), P138.
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As voters come to expect benefits which can realistically 
only be channelled from the centre, members of the
opposition, like members of the state supported party, may 
not have much choice but to depend upon the power-holder if 
some gains are to be made in the electoral arena.
In such a context, if members of the opposition decide to 
accept the patronage of the ruler for the sake of electoral 
gains, the result would arguably be advantageous (to the 
ruler) from a number of angles. The first and most logical
being that these opposition groups would be compelled to
accept, at least formally, the existing political status- 
quo. More importantly however, is the increasing
possibility these opposition groups would become further 
weakened. What is meant here is that if the ruler's control 
of patronage ensures his own 'ruling' party is little more 
than a conglomerate of personalities each possessing their 
personal network of followers, then it is likely opposition 
groups, through participation in this regime-defined arena 
of political contest, would eventually function on a 
similar, and thus easily controllable basis.
Thus by granting opposition parties permission to 
participate in an electoral arena whereby competition is 
not realistically between parties, but between rival 
contestants whose campaigns focus predominantly upon 
claimed and demonstrated potential for serving the 
interests of voters and channelling state resources into 
the community, it is conceivable that members of the 
opposition might become inclined to focus more upon being 
representative of a constituency, and less upon being 
representative of a party point of view. In doing so, their 
role as intermediaries between those on the periphery and 
the centre would logically be enhanced. This, in turn, 
makes it more probable that party unity would weaken as 
each member of the opposition- like members of the ruler's 
'dominant' party- would be more concerned about preserving 
and expanding their own personal base of support, than upon 
participating in party politics that could potentially
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threaten such a base of support. In such a context, the 
ruler's position as ultimate patron would theoretically be 
enhanced and expanded, whilst the development of organised 
institutions and groupings becomes further hindered, thus 
reducing the possibility of effective challenges to the 
system of personal rule. This, we will argue, is the main 
function of non-competitive multi-party elections in 
contemporary Egypt.
The case of contemporary Egypt
The role of non-competitive multi-party elections in 
Mubarak's Egypt as a mechanism of clientelist co-option and 
control can perhaps be better understood in the context of 
political activity in Egypt. The nature of political 
activity in Egypt, as Springborg notes, is not even based 
upon formal political groupings. In fact, he maintains that 
political activity in Egypt cannot be examined by relying 
on organised groups as key units of analysis simply because 
such groups are not that important in Egypt. He goes on to 
suggest that: "groups may not be indispensable to the
* 107[Egyptian] political process". Quoting C.H. Moore, he 
points out that "Egyptians do not act politically primarily 
through organised groups" because the transformations that
occurred post-1952 were not radical enough to discard
* ■ * 108 certain deeply embedded traditions within society.
Such traditions which have been rooted in Egyptian society 
over the last few centuries include the "individualistic 
orientation toward economic activity" which has "hindered 
the formation of a "unified and egalitarian working 
class"."109 The traditions of the predominantly peasant 
community are considered another factor which has 
contributed towards the weakness of categorical ties. As 
one writer discussing the political activities of Egyptian
107 R. Springborg (1975), P83.
108 C.H. Moore, September, 1972, P18, cited in R. Springborg,
(1975), P83.
109 R. Springborg (1975), P84.
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peasants prior to 1952 observes "the most striking feature
of [peasant] communal action is its lack of formal
organisation or planning."110 Communal action in Egypt, as
the author elaborates, "required no formal planning,
organisation, or mobilisation to occur. In a dispute with
landlord or an official, a peasant could often rely on the
active support of relatives."111 The peasant in dispute not
only depended upon and received the support of close
relatives "but also of scores, even hundreds of relatives
* 112(close and remote), friends and associates". As a result, 
the "[t]ies of family and friendship... formed the basis of
* 113community as often as did common village residence." 
Whilst the culprit "who gave cause for complaint was viewed 
as an oppressor but not as a class enemy."114
Islam is also considered as an important factor which may 
have contributed to the predominance of political 
individualism in Egypt. This, it is argued is because 
"Islam, unlike Christianity, was never effectively 
institutionalised. Islam had never provided a 
counterbalance to arbitrary rulers nor checked their 
ambitions by imposing a clearly delineated, theoretical 
guideline to circumscribe the exercise of secular power."115 
Rather, the J.ulama of Islam were divided into cliques which 
centred around charismatic teachers and jurors. By offering 
the clique leaders administrative posts and other forms of 
patronage, the rulers were in a position to co-opt and 
control them. The consequence, as one author puts it, 
resulted in "the entire religious structure [being] 
dependent upon the favours of the ruling elite."116
110 N. J. Brown (1990), Pill.
111 N.J. Brown (1990), Pill.
112 N.J. Brown (1990), P112.
113 N.J. Brown (1990), P112.
114 N.J. Brown (1990), P80.
115 R. Springborg (197 5) , P85
116 D. Crecelius (1972), P171
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In the final analysis, it is because developed organised 
groupings remain absent that: "Egypt's rulers continue to 
exercise the prerogatives of leadership unfettered by the
, B t 1 1 7 .
constraints of organised constituencies." This, for 
example, is evident by the fact that since 1952 all 
political activity including the policy making process 
remains under the exclusive control of the President. While 
in modern democratic systems, the head of the executive 
branch also dominates control over the decision making 
process, in Egypt, the President is not institutionally 
bound to formal political organisations who share in the 
setting of policy. That is, characteristic of authoritarian 
regimes, the legislative branch of government has little 
role in exercising political pressure or restraint on the 
policy decisions of the President.
This is primarily due to the fact that while the 
legislature is provided with formal control over the 
executive in the form of constitutional authority to 
license or dissolve government, in reality this power is 
rendered futile by virtue of the President's constitutional 
right to overrule the Assembly's vote through a public 
referendum. Other factors including executive patterns of 
appointment, the President's prerogative to enforce 
emergency laws and most important, the President's position 
as head and patron of the ruling party further reinforce 
his individual control over the decision-making process. 
Accordingly, multi-party elections under Mubarak are 
characterised by the fact that their outcome has 
consistently remained predetermined in favour of the 
President's National Democratic Party. With this in mind, 
it is understandable to suggest that:
"Mubarak's assessment of the politically 
active secular and semi-secular middle and 
upper classes is that they do not pose a 
significant threat to him. He can afford to 
indulge them by granting rights of 
expression in the form of newspapers, 
political parties, elections and so on, for
117 R. Springborg (1975), P86.
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not only are their demands limited, but the 
expression of them is almost as important 
as their fulfilment. For [this] small 
price. . .he obtains their consent to his 
rule and their support in his campaign to
X18isolate radical extremists"
Yet as these "middle" classes do not themselves control 
major levers of coercion or accumulation nor do they even 
enjoy a broad social base of support in society, it is 
difficult to understand why Mubarak would need their 
support or even consent to his rule. In fact, one can argue 
that granting formal participatory space to this group can 
permit them to expand their social base of support and 
politicise the masses against the regime more effectively 
than extremist groups.
This is why it would seem more logical to view the 
extension of political activity to include the 
participation of "opposition" elements in the political 
arena as efforts to recruit them into the government's 
clientelist apparatus so as to inhibit and contain their 
development so that they do not become potential threats to 
the regime. Multi-party elections can best illustrate the 
mechanisms by which the regime reaffirms its political 
domination on the basis of clientelist control. With the 
President at the apex of this clientelist structure and the 
state resources at his disposal, he is in a prime position 
to co-opt non-extremist opposition leaders into the 
existing political system not only by granting them the 
right to form parties, establish newspapers and participate 
in elections, but also by occasionally assisting them 
during electoral competition, and in most cases providing 
them with some access to state resources. This latter point 
is of extreme significance for both the government and the 
opposition. The opposition is aware that in order to obtain 
electoral gains they must be capable of channelling state 
resources into constituencies. The government, also aware 
of this dependency readily manipulates the situation to
118 R. Springborg (1988), P159.
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ensure their compliance in the same manner it controls 
members of its own party.
Through the use of clientelist control of the vote, it is 
difficult to create a relationship between voters and 
parties on the basis of programmatic or ideological 
conviction as voters are more concerned with the tangible 
benefits they can acquire in return for their votes. 
Electoral competition is subsequently structured on a 
highly parochial basis with political campaigns between 
rival contestants concentrated on claimed and demonstrated 
potential for serving the interest of voters and promoting 
the development of the local community. Consequently, the 
majority of individual contestants attempt to seek 
membership of the National Democratic Party, since, as the 
ruling party, it is in a position to provide its members 
with direct access to the state resources required to 
deliver the goods and services necessary for the continued 
electoral support of their constituency. Such attraction to 
the President's party has, as a result, contributed towards 
a weak, highly decentralised party dominated by intense 
intra-party competition from individual activists promoting 
their own personal careers.
However, from the government's perspective, this situation 
appears ideal for not only is it easier to maintain and 
control a conglomerate of personalities which constitute 
the dominant party, but the situation also highlights and 
strengthens a clientelist set of linkages which starts from 
the President and passes through the party and the 
representative before eventually reaching the constituency. 
In short, this process not only reinforces the dependence 
of activists on the government and its party for their 
personal political careers, but also illustrates to the 
voters their own dependence on the state.
The same argument can be more or less applied to Assembly 
members representing opposition parties. While opposition 
parties depend upon cordial relations with the government
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in order to simply function, electoral competition appears 
to further reinforce such dependence. The government's 
clientelist control of the vote ensures that 
representatives from opposition parties are regarded by the 
majority of voters as intermediaries between themselves and 
central government, rather than as representatives of a 
party point of view. Subsequently government opponents are 
elected on the same principles of personal networks and 
services to the community which define the role of NDP 
representatives. In other words, voters very rarely support 
an opposition representative because of his ideological 
persuasion. Instead, it is usually because they believe 
that once the individual in question enters the People's 
Assembly, he will be in a position to influence the 
government into channelling some form of resources in their 
direction. In this respect, opposition-government relations 
are of great significance for it can determine the amount 
of state resources that will be diverted into respective 
constituencies and subsequently decide the electoral 
prospects of individual opponents and their party in future 
elections.
The extent to which 'multi-party' elections in Mubarak's 
Egypt, performs such a role, will be discussed in detail as 
we examine, in the following chapters, how the fidelity 
reward exchange which this electoral arena has created, 
permits the President to establish a four-tier clientelist 
structure (consisting of the President, political parties, 
political activists and the masses) which links those on 
the periphery to the centre of power and subsequently 
contributes towards their containment and control.
1.3 Methods of Research
The study of controlled multi-party elections as one method 
of understanding a political system and its actors appears 
at first to have more limitations than it does advantages. 
First, there is very little detailed empirical research 
focused on such elections not only in comparison to 
democratic elections, but also in comparison to the
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attention devoted to single party systems. Instead broad 
trends and empirical generalisation rather than detailed 
systematic analysis constitutes what is available in this
119 . . . .field of study. Examining the significance of multi-party 
elections within an authoritarian regime continues to 
remain a neglected field of research even with the collapse 
of many single party systems in the 1980's and 1990's. The 
new in-depth studies which have appeared on the scene such
as the extensive four volume Transitions from Authoritarian
120 • • •Rule have tended to devote minimal attention to the
electoral functions of 'transiting' authoritarian regimes. 
Instead, studies on this topic are inclined to focus on 
factors such as historical or international parameters 
which directly contribute to, or hinder such transitions. 
This subsequently provides us with a rich variety of 
concepts and constructs in relation to successful and 
unsuccessful democratic transitions, but very little on the 
functions performed by "controlled" multi-party electoral 
systems.
The limited availability of in-depth literature on this 
subject can be partly the result of academic indifference 
to processes which do not appear to have any visible impact 
within a political arena, and partly due to the fact that 
researchers appear to overlook the "weak" opposition and 
prefer to focus on the overall dynamics of the dominant 
party rather than the electoral dynamics of the whole 
system. A detailed examination of controlled multi-party 
elections not only should provide us with an understanding 
of the electoral dynamics and activities of the dominant 
party but should also highlight some aspects of the motives 
and mechanisms of the governments which hold them. 
Furthermore, non-competitive multi-party elections are not, 
even with their foregone conclusions, one party elections.
119 The authors of Elections Without Choice have set out some 
principal guidelines in this direction. The book however, is 
limited by the fact that it is rather dated and does not enter 
into very much detail with regard to non-competitive multi-party 
systems.
120 G. O'Donnell, P.C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (1991) .
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Therefore in order to properly understand their role in a 
state, it is necessary to examine individuals and 
organisations who do not represent the government and 
question the relationship which exists between them and the 
authorities. It is only by assessing elections on this 
basis, that one can construct a better understanding of the 
mechanisms and complexities which exist behind the 
simplistic appearance of predetermined electoral results.
The limited data on this subject can perhaps also be 
attributed to other factors directly related to the 
political systems in which they operate. As we have 
mentioned in our theoretical framework, multi-party 
elections in personal authoritarian regimes are not 
institutionalised in the sense that power-holders are 
primarily dependent on changing the "rules of the game" 
when it suits them, as well as resorting to a variety of 
manipulative and informal techniques to help them maintain 
their dominant position in the political arena. Hence, 
controlled multi-party elections are less coherent than the 
procedurally standardised democratic or even mobilising 
single party systems. From this viewpoint, the study of 
controlled multi-party elections does not only appear 
discouraging from a theoretical perspective, but also from 
the practical side. How does one construct a systematic 
framework of analysis when organisations in such systems 
are not in a position to develop regularised patterns and 
routines? More importantly, because information does not 
always travel a consistent route, how can one obtain data 
(either from government or opposition sources) which is not 
suppressed or distorted? Furthermore, how can one interpret 
information obtained from informal and sometimes random 
routes? In short, the lack of enthusiasm on the part of 
researchers with regard to this ambiguous topic is 
understandable as it is not always easy to obtain or 
accumulate methodical data in such systems.
In view of these problems and due to the fact that we 
maintained an inductive rather than a deductive approach to
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our hypothesis, it became necessary during the course of 
analysis to apply a mixture of research methods. The 
research methods we adopted consisted of printed data, 
extended interviews, informal interviews and non 
participant observation, which we tailored around the three 
broad questions that constituted the foundation of our 
enquiry:(i) the government's purpose in holding elections; 
(ii) the reasons political activists participate in 
elections; and (iii) the role of the public within the 
electoral arena.
Accumulating printed data was naturally a continuous 
process throughout the research period. Extended 
interviews, informal interviews and non-participant 
observation were carried out in Egypt in two stages. The 
first stage was carried out for three months between 
October 1994 to January 1995, whilst the second stage was 
carried out during the same period the following year. In 
order gain access to research sources during our visits, we 
relied upon personal networks and recommendations. On our 
arrival in Egypt, we first contacted some individuals who 
were recommended to us by our academic -supervisor Dr 
Charles Tripp. As a result of our connection to Dr Tripp, 
we were able to secure our first interview with a senior 
political analyst at his newspaper headquarters, within the 
first couple of days of our arrival. After a two hour 
interview he recommended that we meet one of his 
colleagues, whom he promptly telephoned and fixed an 
appointment for us to see that same day.
During our meeting with this colleague, we mentioned that 
we were particularly interested in interviewing active 
politicians. He admitted that he was not personally 
acquainted with these people but he knew someone who was 
and could arrange for us to meet him. This other person as 
it turned out had extensive connections within the 
political arena and very kindly arranged a number of 
appointments for us with various political activists. Once 
our interviews started to gain momentum, we found that the
50
Problem statement; theoretical framework; methods of research; and framework of analysis
best method to obtain new sources was to approach 
interviewees/contacts and ask them for personal 
recommendations and guidance. We subsequently established 
and expanded our networks in this manner. It was necessary 
to collect data using such informal techniques because as a 
result of our general familiarity with Egyptian society, we 
were aware that if we turned up unannounced and unknown 
with the intention of obtaining access to any form of 
information whether from an individual or an organisation, 
it would most likely be met with non-co-operation and 
perhaps even with suspicion. A more detailed account of our 
research methods is as follows:
Printed Material
We accumulated printed material from a variety of sources 
including foreign (mainly British, and occasionally 
American) press, periodicals, NGO reports and the Egyptian 
state service information releases. Periodicals such as the 
Middle East Contemporary Survey were initially useful for 
deriving summarised annual reports on the political 
situation in Egypt. Access to various press reports 
dedicated to domestic politics in Egypt since 1981 were 
obtained predominantly from the London Business Library, 
and occasionally from the collection in the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies. Other articles and press 
reports were obtained from more random locations including 
the American University in Cairo Library. Political rights 
reports from foreign non governmental organisations (i.e. 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch Middle East etc.) 
and Egyptian NGOs (i.e. Centre for Human Rights Legal Aid, 
Independent Commission for Electoral Review etc.) were also 
examined in libraries but usually acquired directly from 
the actual organisations in question. The Egyptian State 
Information Service provided official government texts for 
legislation, the constitution and various Presidential 
speeches . We also paid particular attention to the 
available literature provided by both government and 
opposition sources in Egypt. However, during the course of 
research, experience revealed to us that data in the form
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of newspaper articles, party programmes and various other
forms of literature produced by both sides were
insufficient for an analysis of the Egyptian electoral 
121process.
The problem with relying on printed data of this nature is 
that it was generally rather distorted and incomplete. 
Printed matter produced by parties such as their respective 
programmes and ideologies were vague and mostly in the form
of pamphlets and booklets. Opposition and government
122 » * newspapers were undeniably useful for assessing and
comparing respective political viewpoints and concerns with
regard to campaigns and other activities during
12 S ielections. ' However, most newspaper reports were impaired
by a certain degree of bias and exaggeration that could put
the most 'popular' tabloid newspapers in Britain to 
124shame. While the collection and study of this data 
extended for a period of over four years, by virtue of its 
generality it could do no more than set the scene and 
provide occasional reference points for the research 
argument.
Interviews and non-oarticioant observation:Ecrvot 1994/5 
Extended interviews: These interviews were initially aimed
125at political activists and were intended to serve two
121 Political programmes, election propaganda and similar material 
of the NDP, Labour Party, Neo-Wafd Party, Liberal Party, Nasserite 
Party, NPUP (Tajammu_U and the Muslim Brotherhood were obtained 
personally from individual members of each organisation 
respectively.
122 Al-Ahram newspaper archives allowed us to view its collection 
of government and opposition newspapers dedicated to legislative 
elections under Mubarak. A similar collection was personally 
accumulated for the 1995 elections.
123 As long as the electoral concerns of activists did not question 
the legitimacy of the state or reflect negatively on the President 
in person, then politicians were more or less free to publish 
these concerns in their respective newspapers.
124 We are referring here to newspapers owned and run by political 
parties. The semi-autonomus state run Al-Ahram and its sister 
paper Al-Ahram Weekly were less sensationalist.
125 Those most relevant to our research include: Dr Hamdi Al-Sayyed 
(member of People's Assembly, NDP and Head of the Egyptian Medical
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purposes, first, to formulate a framework of what was 
actually going on in the electoral arena based on their 
personal knowledge and experience. The second was to elicit 
information about the character and personal political 
convictions of these individuals. Each extended interview 
took between one and a half and two and a half hours and 
two sets of questions were raised during that time. The 
first set of questions were personally oriented and 
required fixed answers. These questions included the 
subjects' professional background, local origin, the number 
of years active in politics and so forth. After the initial 
set of questions, the interview was then directed with more 
open ended questions around issues such as personal views 
on the political system, the reasons for their (or their 
party's) participation in electoral politics, examples of 
the problems encountered, examples of success achieved, 
political beliefs and political aims in past, present and 
future context. Such questions allowed the respondents the 
freedom to express their opinions in a less constricted 
manner, to recount personal or general experience and give 
as much detail as possible in order to clarify or qualify 
their answers.
The respondents were much more gracious and open than we 
had expected, and provided us with a wealth of information 
which helped us construct a clearer idea of the Egyptian 
electoral arena and the actors in it. In fact the problem 
we encountered was not that they were too cautious, but
Association), Dr Hamdi Faysal (member of People's Assembly, NDP)
Dr lEsam Al-t_Eryan (senior Muslim Brotherhood leader, former 
secretary-general of the Egyptian Medical Association and former 
Assembly member), Dhiva' Al-Din Dawud (chairman of Nasserite Party 
and Assembly member), Hamed Mahmud (deputy chairman, Nasserite 
Party), Majdi. Ahmad Husayn (former Assembly member, senior member 
of the Labour Party and editor of Al~Sha.±b) , J_Ali Salama (deputy- 
secretary general of the Neo-Wafd Party), Mona Makram yobayd (ex- 
Neo-Wafd member and Presidential appointee to the Assembly, 1990- 
1995), Lotfi Waked (deputy chairman, Tajammul party) , Dr RifJ_at 
Sayid (secretary general, Tajammu_l_ party and Presidential 
appointee to the Shura Council, 1995-), _!Abdel Al-Ghaffar Shokr 
(deputy secretary general, TajammuA party) Al-Badri Farcrhali 
(member of Assembly, Tajammui party), Fikri. Al-Jazzar (Independent 
Assembly member (1990-1995), also incumbent deputy during Nasser 
and Sadat eras).
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that most of them appeared too enthusiastic in promoting 
themselves (i.e. "people would vote for me regardless of 
what party I represented")/ or their party (i.e. "the whole 
nation supports us, but we don't win many seats in 
elections because the government falsifies the results"). 
NDP members appeared more indifferent to the situation 
(i.e. "I would only join a government supported party") .
During the course of this part of the research it became 
apparent that the majority of respondents (especially from 
the opposition) were somewhat biased with regard to a few 
of the open ended questions directed at their limited 
position in the electoral arena. Members of the government 
supported National Democratic Party, were somewhat more 
cautious in their response, but provided surprisingly 
straightforward responses by comparison to their opposition 
counterparts. Especially with regard to enquiries such as 
why they joined the government side or why the government 
party has such extensive monopoly within the electoral 
arena (i.e. "the NDP is in a privileged position because it 
is headed by the President"). Perhaps the opposition 
activists believed that being interviewed by a student from 
the University of London would provide them with the same 
publicity abroad as being interviewed by a news 
correspondent from London. In any case, within completing 
the first few extended interviews with the political 
activists, it became necessary to find supplementary 
research sources to help us overcome some of the 
inadequate responses we obtained from the activists and to 
corroborate the adequate ones. The research avenues we 
subsequently pursued in parallel with the extended 
interviews with the politicians consisted of extended 
interviews with certain political specialists; and more 
informal interviews and interaction with the politicians 
previously encountered.
The political specialists we interviewed were selected on 
the basis of their knowledge of aspects within the 
political arena in Egypt relevant to this study. These
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specialists comprised mostly academics, retired 
politicians, newspaper editors, political analysts, 
researchers and journalists.126 The questions addressed to 
the specialists were broadly centred around the three main 
research questions in the study and each interview in 
general, lasted between one and a half to two and a half 
hours. The open-ended questions were again designed to 
allow the interviewee flexibility and greater freedom to 
discuss what they personally considered to be important 
issues within the Egyptian electoral arena. Moreover, in 
order to corroborate certain data, specific questions were 
usually addressed concerning some answers obtained from the 
political activists we had previously interviewed. For 
example, if individual "A" from party "Z" had mentioned to
us that his failure in a certain election was a result of
government malpractice, it was useful to ask as many 
specialists as possible their views concerning government 
malpractice, their opinion on party "Z" and why they think 
certain people such as "A" do not do very well in 
elections.
The in-depth knowledge of the specialists was on the whole, 
very useful in providing a much more detached and 
analytical insight of the electoral arena in Egypt and
126 The most relevant of those who were interviewed in this
category include: Dr Mostafa Kamel Al-Sayyed (Cairo University),
Dr Salwa Shairawi Jomia (American University in Cairo) , Dr Mostafa 
Al-Figi (Director of Diplomatic Institute) , Dr Said Al-Din Ibrahim 
(Director of Ibn Khaldoun Research Centre), Dr AAli Al-Din Helal 
Desucri. (Dean of Political Science and Economics College, Cairo 
University) , Dr AAbd Al-Mon_lim Sayyed _\Ali (Director of Centre of 
Strategic Studies, Al AhramL, i_Amr Hashem (researcher on Egyptian 
parlimentary affairs, Centre of Strategic studies, Al Ahram), Dr 
'Osama Ghazali. Harb (Editor of Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliyya, Al Ahram),
Dr Wahid AAbd Al-Majid, (editor of Al Hayat - Cairo branch, and 
editor of Al Ahram's Centre of Strategic Studies Annual Report)
Dr HaJLa Mostafa (senior researcher and specialist on Islamic 
movements in Egypt, Al Ahram's Center of Strategic Studies) 
Muhammad Sid ’Ahmed (senior political analyst, Al-Ahram), Fahmi 
Howaydi (Islamic writer and senior political analyst, Al-Ahram) 
Noiman Al-Zayyati (political and economic journalist, Al-Ahram Al- 
' Icrtisadi). Tahsin Bashir (retired ambassador and senior political 
analyst), Dr Muhammad AAsfur (political analyst and ex-senior Neo- 
Wafd member) and General Muhammad Fawzi (minister of defence, 
1968-71) .
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those who participate in it. But by virtue of their 
position as experts in the field rather than actors, the 
data accumulated from them was primarily a supplement to 
compensate the inadequate literature available on the 
subject, and to clarify and corroborate the extended 
interviews derived from the political actors themselves. 
Also as this group was not the focus of our investigation, 
it was not necessary to maintain continuous interaction 
with them, although we found it useful to remain in contact 
with a few key individuals for the purpose of general 
guidance and to benefit from their personal connections 
within both the specialist and political field.
Informal Interviews: These interviews were conducted with 
the political activists who had already participated in 
extended interviews. This method of research was a more 
gradual process, but was certainly an indispensable method 
for cross-examination and for getting to understand the 
mentality behind the action - or inaction of political 
participants. The familiarity process prior to and during 
the informal interviews enabled the subjects to be more 
relaxed and open in their responses, as opposed to some of 
the "formal publicity" responses previously encountered. It 
also allowed us to approach the individuals in question 
with new enquiries and for further elaboration or 
background on issues previously discussed. As a result of 
informal interviews, we were also in a position to obtain 
in-depth information on their less known activities and 
relationships with various individuals and groups outside 
their own particular realm. Due to our continuous 
interaction and informal "chats" with these activists, we 
were able to construct a clearer idea of the Egyptian 
political arena and differentiated between the formal side 
of electoral activities (such as party programmes, 
newspaper reports, and the "official" position of 
participants) and the reality (political individualism, 
personal connections, clientelist networks and so forth).
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Opposition leaders for example, were not necessarily 
isolated individuals fighting an overwhelming cause in 
their attempt to gain entry into the political arena. As we 
discovered, many were already part of the existing system. 
Personal networks with each other and with those in power 
appeared to be a much stronger than the image of 
"oppressed" opposition one would usually associate with 
systems of this nature. Informal interviews however, also 
provided us with the opportunity to examine and understand 
the negative side of political individualism. Through 
interviewing political activists on a less formal basis, 
they were more open about their own fears and shortcomings, 
as well as the "behind the scenes" problems encountered 
with each other and with the authorities.
We also used informal interviews to assess politicians' 
opinion of each other and to corroborate each others 
responses. The corroboration technique applied was the same 
as that used with the political specialists. The responses 
with regard to their opinion of other political activists 
were on the whole more personal than the responses obtained 
from the specialists. With regard to their assessment of 
organisations other than their own, however, their 
responses were largely compatible with the responses 
derived from the specialists. We found informal interviews 
to be a very productive method for accumulating research 
material and we did not encounter major obstacles with this 
research method.
Informal interviews were however, a much more spontaneous 
process than extended interviews. This was because informal 
interviews took place whenever the opportunity arose, 
rather than with pre-planned schedules and "defined" time 
allocation. In other words, we would usually pass by the 
office of an individual on the way to or from another 
interview, or whilst attempting to obtain some literature. 
We would thank the individual for their help on the 
previous occasion and generally update them on our 
progress. This procedure induced familiarity and allowed
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informal interviews to advance. On some occasions an 
interview extended for over an hour, on other occasions it 
would just last 10 or 15 minutes. That was why continuous 
interaction was very important and was sometimes 
supplemented by telephone conversations.
While we found interviews of this nature to be a very 
productive mechanism for acquiring interesting and new data 
for our research, it must be pointed out that such data was 
primarily dependent upon the co-operation of the 
politicians in question. Furthermore, their co-operation 
with researchers on a more personal level is dependent upon 
a number of factors including the general political
. . 127atmosphere during the period of research; their own
128political predicament during the time of research; and 
sometimes politicians may even take into account personal 
factors such as a researcher's nationality or religion 
before formal barriers are relaxed.129 The limitations 
therefore of adopting this research method lies primarily 
in the fact that the results obtained are dependent upon a 
number of circumstances which can be sometimes difficult to 
reproduce.
Non-Participant Observation: During our 1994-5 stay in 
Egypt, applying the research technique of non-participant 
observation was rather limited. We spent a number of days
127 While the political atmosphere during our time of research was 
generally relaxed, one must put into consideration the fact that 
the political atmosphere in systems of this nature can be somewhat 
unpredictable. For example shortly before our departure from Egypt 
in January 1996, the official Muslim Brotherhood building in 
central Cairo, a site which was useful for maintaining regular 
contact with certain individuals was abruptly shut down during a 
government crackdown on Islamist activity.
128 For example, one prominent politician we continously 
encountered in 1994/5 was preoccupied with court trials during our 
return visit in 1995/6 and while he invited us to his home during 
our second fieldtrip to Egypt, he was clearly very distracted by 
the circumstances. On the other hand, another prominent politician 
who was preoccupied with a court trial during the 1994/5 period, 
was much more relaxed and was able to give us a lot of his time 
during our 1995/6 visit.
129 During the course of research we were continously asked 
questions of this nature.
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at the People's Assembly as the visiting guest of one 
politician. During that time he introduced us to some of 
his associates. While this provided us with the opportunity 
to interview some politicians and establish new contact 
with others, more importantly it allowed us to observe and 
record Assembly members' interaction with each other and 
with their (constituency) visitors. On another occasion, we 
visited a member of parliament at his party's local office 
in a Cairo suburb to observe him receiving his 
constituents. On that day it was possible to question 
constituents waiting to see the politician, record 
constituent-representative interaction, the reasons those 
constituents visited their parliamentary representative and 
the manner in which the representative dealt with the 
issues confronting him. While we did not devote too much 
time to non-participant observation during this stage of 
research, these few days were useful in providing us with a 
working insight of the preoccupation of constituents, the 
role they assign their representative and the type of 
relationship which exists between them. Although we had 
already constructed a framework of what these issues 
involved as a result of our previous research methods, the 
days devoted to non-participant observation basically 
helped to clarify and confirm a few of the points from the 
data we had already accumulated.
Non-participant observation and interviews: Egypt 1995/6 
As opposed to the first part of our fieldwork, we applied 
non participant observation extensively during our second 
trip to Egypt. The main objective in returning to Egypt was 
to be present for the 1995 legislative elections in order 
to observe electoral activity and campaigning first hand. 
Non-participant observation during this stage was primarily 
to ascertain the validity of the primary data accumulated 
through the previous year's interviews. It was important to 
engage in non-participant observation so that a practical 
analysis of the behaviour, interactions and relationship of 
the electoral actors at various levels of the system could
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be checked and compared with the data obtained from in- 
depth and informal interviews.
Electoral activity was for security reasons authorised for 
a period of one month before election day (29 November), 
and the second round of elections for the constituencies 
where none of the contestants passed the 51% mark was 
scheduled for 15 December. This short period of time meant 
that preparation and organisation for the research needed 
to be completed before the start of the electoral period. 
This was made possible with the assistance of several 
contacts whom we had interviewed during the 1994/5 period. 
These individuals assisted us in our search for relevant 
"sources" and arranged appointments once we had decided 
whom we wanted to observe. As a result of their assistance 
we were in a position to embark on research from the start 
of the campaigning period.
We divided non-participant observation into two parts. The 
first part was devoted to analysing the role of political 
actors within the electoral arena; whilst the second part 
focused on examining the role of the voters. While both 
parts invariably overlapped, we found it more useful to 
focus our attention on one group at a time and to examine 
its relationship with the other groups in the electoral 
arena. Extended and informal interviews were also applied 
to supplement some of the equivocal aspects of non­
participant observation research. The aim was to eventually 
compare and link the patterns which emerged from the data 
accumulated from both group perspectives.
Non-Participant Observation: (Contestants)
As mentioned above, the contestants were selected with the 
help of individuals who had been interviewed and befriended 
during the first stage of fieldwork. The main priority was 
to find one or two contestants who represented one of the 
following categories: (i) independent (ii) the NDP (iii)
the Muslim Brotherhood (iv) the Labour party (v) the Neo- 
Wafd (vi) the NPUP (Tajammul) (vii) the Liberal party. We
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wanted to examine their campaign programmes, assess voter 
response to their campaigns, and examine their relationship 
with their parties, with other competitors and with the 
authorities during the electoral period. For practical 
reasons, the contestants we selected were not based in 
constituencies further than 150 kilometres from Cairo since 
the short period authorised for the electoral campaign 
meant that it was crucial to economise on the time spent 
travelling to and from a contestant's constituency. 
Furthermore candidates rather than constituencies were 
selected as research samples because the NDP was the sole 
party represented in all electoral constituencies. We also 
took into consideration the fact that it will be the 
attributes of candidates in a constituency, rather than the 
constituency's social characteristics which is primarily 
responsible for the electoral outcome. The number of 
contestants recommended were narrowed down to the following 
group:
Candidate
Political
affiliation Constituency Type
Mostafa Bakri Liberal Helwan Industrial
Muhammad hAki f Muslim
Brotherhood
Hadayiq
Al-Qobba
Urban W.C.
AAdel Husayn Labour Madinat Nasr Urban M .C .
Muhammad
Al-Sayyed
NDP Hadayiq
Al-Qobba
Urban W.C.
Khaled Mohyi 
Al-Dd.n
NPUP Kafr Shokr Rural
Fatheyya
AAssal
NPUP Imbaba Urban W.C.
Jaber iAbd 
Al-AAziz
Nasserite Doqqi Urban Mixed
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Nojjnan Jom/_a Neo-Wafd Imbaba Urban W.C.
HamdjL
Al-Sayyed
NDP Nozh wa' Almaz a Urban Mixed
Mostafa Jaj_far Independent Helwan Industrial
Non-participant observation was applied by joining 
contestants and their entourage during their electoral 
activities. Field notes recorded the salient features of 
this process. Non-participant observation provided the 
opportunity to record some of the dynamics of running 
electoral campaigns, techniques used by contestants to 
attract support, diverse attitudes of the voters towards 
contestants during public gatherings, and some of the 
objectives of both candidates and voters in participating 
in elections. The period of observation described was for
130 •27 consecutive days, ' and was divided more or less equally 
between the sample. On some occasions it was also possible 
to find the time to attend public gatherings of 
contestants competing against the research subjects and 
these opportunities assisted in broadening the scope of 
analysis and reasserting some of the findings obtained from 
our own research sample.
The time limitation imposed by the authorities was our 
biggest obstacle as it prevented us from expanding our 
research sample and from spending more time with each 
contestant. Also, electoral campaigning was very chaotic in 
that very few contestants or their assistants extended 
their campaign plans to more than a few days ahead, if 
that. Organised public gatherings were usually the only 
activities planned a few days in advance, but even then 
they were sometimes prone to cancellation or rescheduling. 
Sometimes we would join a contestant and his assistants at
30 Most electoral activity began around 4pm and continued 
sometimes until 2 or 3 am.
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their base only to observe them debate for hours what 
course of campaign action to pursue for that same evening. 
This "spontaneous" method of campaigning gave us first hand 
insight into some aspects of election campaigns which 
politicians and specialists had only briefly touched upon 
during our interviews. However, it also meant that data was 
not acquired in a systematic manner since circumstances 
more than individuals tended to dictate the course of 
events.
Extended Interviews: The extended interviews we conducted 
during our 1995/6 visit to Egypt were primarily with our 
sample contestants. Apart from Hamdi Al-Sayyed (NDP) whom 
we had interviewed several times during our previous visit 
to Egypt, there was initially no personal contact with any
131of the other nine contestants. However, prior to meeting 
these contestants, we managed to accumulate some background 
information on them through our established contacts. Once 
we had met, we were able to obtain information directly 
from them as a result of personal interviews which were 
more or less modelled around the extended interviews we had 
conducted the previous year. Again, some of the contestants 
provided rather formal responses, but most of them were 
less cautious. Perhaps this was because they were already 
familiar with our research through our mutual contacts and 
hence decided it was best to accelerate the familiarisation 
process.
Towards the end of our stay in Egypt we conducted several 
more extended interviews with certain specialists and 
politicians. The purpose of these interviews was primarily 
to clarify specific queries and corroborate certain data 
accumulated during the electoral period. We therefore 
specifically selected individuals who did not compete in 
the 1995 elections and whom we had maintained particularly
131 There were previous telephone conversations with _l_Adel Husayn 
during the 1994/5 period, however, due to an unexpected court 
case, we were unable to meet him in person at that time.
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close relations with, so that this concluding part of the 
research would be subject to less fettered responses.
Informal interviews: During our time with the contestant 
the data accumulated from the extended interviews and non­
participant observation was supplemented by informal 
interviews with the contestants and their assistants. 
Depending on the issue or circumstances we would ask either 
the contestant or an aide to elaborate upon the background 
or significance of a topic or action which was unclear at 
the time. We focused as much attention as possible on the 
assistants in order to obtain as much data as possible on 
the campaign methods and campaign costs of the particular 
contestant they worked with. We also discussed their views 
on the contestant, the party the contestant represented and 
the type of supporters they hoped to attract by their 
campaign in order to compare their responses with the 
contestant's views and with our actual observations of the 
campaign. As most of the assistants were hired help rather 
than party members, their responses were much more 
straightforward than we would have expected had they been 
party members.
However, we could not interview many of the assistants of 
the Muslim Brotherhood contestant in this manner because 
they were not hired help but real Brotherhood members and 
the majority did not particularly want to talk to women. 
The Brotherhood contestant himself, however, spent the most 
time with us during extended interview research and 
compensated for the fact that his assistants were rather 
distant by personally explaining to us in great detail
about his campaign strategy, costs and voters they aimed to
132 * •attract. To a lesser degree, we also faced a similar
problem with the assistants of the Labour Party contestant
because that particular contestant had borrowed half his
assistants from the Muslim Brotherhood Organisation. Like
132 Our extended interview with this particular contestant was 
split into interviews because it comprised over five hours.
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the Muslim Brotherhood contestant, he also spoke to us at 
some length about his campaign efforts.
Public Participation: The second part of our research
during our 1995/6 visit centred specifically on the role of 
the voters during elections. The aim was to observe and 
examine the social structures and values which influence 
the process of voter participation. Most of the research 
was conducted for a period of two weeks, beginning two days 
prior to election day. During those two weeks we were 
situated in a rural village based in the electoral 
constituency of Kafr Ghanem (Daqahliyya) as the guest of a 
local notable and his family.133
The decision to reside in a rural community was based on 
several facts and assumptions about electoral activity in 
Egypt. First, rural areas produce the highest voter turn­
out in Egypt and therefore a rural area would produce a 
rich source of material for examination. Another reason for 
choosing a rural site for research is that the salient 
features of public participation in rural areas can to a 
lesser degree be applied to the urban working class areas 
which produce the second highest source of voter turn-out 
in elections. However, we also took into consideration the 
fact that we would obtain unrestricted access inside the 
voting station on election day.
Our research site in comparison to many rural villages in 
Egypt can be considered prosperous since the overwhelming 
majority of inhabitants lived in red brick, rather than the 
familiar mudbrick houses usually associated with such 
areas. We were told by many of the inhabitants we spoke to 
that until about fifteen years ago most houses were mud 
brick but the exodus of many young men to work in the Gulf
We were personally acquainted with, certain members of the 
host's family prior to our research. However, it is not generally 
difficult to find a research site of this nature once a researcher 
develops personal acquaintances in Cairo because almost everyone 
there has some form of rural connection which could be utilized 
for such research purposes.
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and other Arab states such as Jordan and Iraq during the 
1980's brought much needed income into the village. This 
income allowed many families to purchase plots of 
agricultural land, modern household appliances and 
eventually rebuild their homes using redbrick. In fact some 
homes now resemble apartment blocks found in towns since 
some families have built self contained flats on the upper 
floors for their married sons. According to its 
inhabitants, work abroad is not as easy to obtain as it 
once was and apart from a few professionals and artisans, 
most inhabitants have returned to agriculture.
Although it is a rather large village, every family is 
familiar with the other local families. This is because the 
majority of inhabitants are at least of fourth or fifth 
generation local descent. There are some families which 
have migrated to the village but the inhabitants regard 
them as outsiders or "foreigners" and they are not usually 
fully accepted as locals until after several generations of 
residence and intermarriage within the village.
The village has two primary schools, one presecondary 
school, a health clinic, several private medical 
practitioners, a small police station, several small shops, 
a couple of coffee shops and a large open market which is 
set up once a week by outside traders. While most children 
and young adults have experienced some form of formal 
education, most of the older generation are illiterate. 
There are 67 00 registered voters in the village but the 
number of inhabitants including children is approaching 
twenty thousand.
Our host was the village J_omda,134 a post he inherited from 
his father and which has been in that family for over
The term J_omda. basically means village headman or chief. His 
main functions in the village include settling local inter or 
intra family disputes, entertaining important guests to the 
village such as government officials and communicating with such 
guests on behalf of the locals. Traditionally, the Jomda is a 
respected and financially independent landowner because the post
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seventy years. Several families in the village are 
wealthier than our host's family, but according to local 
gossip, these families have never been interested in the 
J_omda's post because of the effort and expense it entails. 
In the village, a family is considered notable if most of 
its male members have been literate landowners for more 
than three or four generations.135 However, the general 
social harmony which appeared to be prevalent in the 
village can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the 
inhabitants had never actually experienced any dominant 
landowing "pasha" class families in their midst.
During our stay in the village, our host introduced us as a 
distant relative. This we believe assisted us to enter more 
easily into the community and gain a sort of semi-local 
status.136 We spent a number of days prior to elections in 
the company of our host observing him interact with a 
couple of "outside" contestants. Since there was a local 
man standing for election, our host spent most of the time 
in the company of this local contestant and certain male
requires considerable personal qualities such as good judgement 
and discretion, as well as substantial personal funding for 
continuous hospitality expenses and occasional financial 
assistance to the needy. While the J_omda.' s post usually remains in 
the same family for generations, it was actually an elected post 
until early 1996 when it officially became an appointed post. In 
other words, the J_omda must now nominate himself to the 
government, and depending on his political record within the 
ministry of interior, the President decides whether or not he is 
to be appointed. See following chapter for an elaboration on the 
implications of Presidential appointments.
135 For example, on a number of occasions we visited large and 
expensive looking homes of individuals whose offspring were 
established professionals such as teachers or lawyers or even 
medical doctors. We would later be told that these were not 
notable families because the father was perhaps an average 
illiterate peasant who took advantage of the free (post-1952) 
educational system to educate one or two of his sons and that the 
prosperity we saw was due to the children rather than the 
forefathers. On other occasions we would be informed that the 
occupiers of certain humble looking homes were of notable descent 
but for one reason or another were facing current economic 
hardship.
136 The system of fabricating kinship is a common process in 
Egypt and is usually regarded as a practical method for speeding 
the familiarisation process amongst individuals or groups who are 
connected to the fictitious kin.
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villagers discussing the elections and their plan for 
election day.
Observing their interaction produced invaluable data on the 
dynamics and significance of extended personal networking, 
patronage and the nature of electoral activity within the 
community, whilst the activities observed inside one of the 
local schools which substituted as the voting station on 
election day gave us firsthand insight of the nature and 
methods of electoral misconduct in Egypt. The only public 
campaigning during our stay was in the form of local youths 
roaming the streets in the evening shouting slogans for the 
village contestant. Local norms meant that we could not 
observe them other than from the "respectable" distance of 
the veranda. In fact, public participation in the village 
was much less conspicuous than in the urban areas we 
examined whilst accompanying our sample contestants. This 
reasserted our findings that elections were more along the 
lines of business deals and public participation in terms 
of attending public gatherings or rallies did not 
necessarily suggest genuine electoral support. Again, non­
participant observation as a method of research during our 
residence was limited by the time constraints imposed on 
overall electoral activity. After election day therefore, 
we had no choice but to rely upon informal interviews as a 
means of accumulating further data on the public's role in 
elections.
Informal interviews: We applied this method of research to 
interview voters from the village, as well as voters in the 
constituencies of our sample contestants. We accumulated 
over fifty informal interviews with electoral supporters 
whilst accompanying the contestants on public campaigns. 
Prior to or immediately after a public gathering we would 
attempt to start a conversation with an individual, ask him 
about his profession, what motivated him to attend that 
evening's event, what was his opinion of the candidate, did 
he attend public gatherings for other candidates, what
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determines his electoral choice, whether he voted in 
previous elections and so forth.
As with all our interviews we preferred to keep most of the 
questions open ended so that respondents had more freedom 
to discuss and elaborate on the issues which were of 
particular interest and concern to them. During the course 
of the interview, we would find a small group of three or 
four gathered around us and it might then turn into a group 
interview. Interviewees tended to ask what our interest in 
the topic was for, we would tell them that we were carrying 
out a study on elections for a college project. These 
interviews did not usually last more than half an hour per 
person, but our field notes recorded salient features of 
the motives for participation from a voter's perspective 
and the type of participation which occurs.
Most in-depth material however was gathered during our stay 
in the village. We spent many days after the elections 
interviewing some of the local residents. We conducted 
informal interviews with our host, his extended family, his 
guests, other villagers who were kind enough to invite us
. • i i » 137to their homes, their families and their friends. Most of 
the questions revolved around issues such as their personal 
views of elections, whether they vote or "delegate" voting, 
what characteristics do they look for in a candidate, why 
they were unanimously supporting the local contestant and 
what was their opinion of previous representatives. 
Depending on the replies, we may then ask them to elaborate 
or cite examples. As discussions progressed, experiences, 
activities and debates regarding past as well as the
137 There was usually a constant flow of villagers in the Aomda's 
home and many invited us to visit them in their homes. When we 
visited them we would conduct our interviews over some tea. After 
an interview we sometimes asked them whether they could introduce 
us to their neighbours or friends. On most occasions we did not 
need to because a neighbour or friend was already present and 
would voluntarily invite us to meet their own family. Networking 
was not very difficult in the village because life there in 
general was very communal.
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current elections were shared with us by members of the 
community.
• • » « * 1 3 8We relied primarily on group interviews because 
attempting to interview inhabitants on an individual basis 
would not have produced satisfactory results. This is 
because nobody was ever alone in their home and it would 
have appeared an insult to others present if they were 
excluded from the "discussions". Furthermore asking to 
interview each person on their own would have produced a 
sort of interrogation atmosphere in a close knit community 
such as the village. However, the presence of friends or 
relatives in a relaxed social atmosphere provided more in- 
depth material even though individuals interrupted each 
other to state their own view or to expand on someone 
else's view.
In all we carried out interviews of this nature with one 
hundred villagers (men and women) mainly during the days
139after the elections. ‘ The average interview lasted about 
three hours and we usually conducted two group interviews a 
day. Within a fortnight, election interest had died down 
and it became more difficult to obtain new data or 
individuals willing to discuss the topic in detail. As we 
discovered, when people showed interest in an event they 
would discuss it continuously, compare it to previous 
experiences, discuss faults or merits, and generally 
divulge their personal opinions in detail.140 However, once 
interest died down, so too did the enthusiasm for
138 An average group comprised five people.
139 As interviews were carried out within the confines of people's 
homes, most group "sittings" included both the men and women of 
the family.
140 To our suprise, everyone we spoke to (mostly comprising 
illiterate men and women) could name their previous 
representative, give examples of services he had done for the 
community or for individual locals, and acurately predicted who 
would win, as well as giving plausible reasons for their 
predictions. Furthermore, all the people we spoke to during the 
interviews were also aware that an Assembly deputy was more 
influential than an J.omda in solving problems concerning the 
community or specific families in relations with the authorities.
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discussing the subject in great depth. As we did not want 
to exploit the generosity of the villagers, we decided to 
cease our interviews. The decision to cease our 
investigation in the village two weeks after the elections 
fitted more or less with the time-framework we had planned. 
We were aware from previous experience that the quality of 
data from informal interviews depended primarily on the co­
operation of respondents. We had therefore assumed 
(rightly) , that this limited period would be the most 
suitable time to obtain such data since the events which 
surround elections are one of the few occasions which 
voters might show any profound interest in the subject.
In summary, as our research methods illustrate, obtaining 
in-depth data on contemporary electoral systems of this 
nature in a straightforward and systematic manner is rather 
difficult. Political actors can sometimes be cautious and 
suspicious. More often though is the fact that researchers 
can be misled with biased or deficient material. This may 
not always be intentional, but the actual environment of 
non-competitive multi-party elections no doubt contributes 
to such frailties. It is subsequently with these factors in 
mind that we saw the necessity to use several research 
techniques to corroborate the reliability of data.
1.4 Framework of Analysis
The subsequent chapters are organised around the 
clientelist chain which appears directly related to Egypt's 
controlled multi-party electoral arena. Chapter two 
examines the role of the President, who by virtue of his 
position, is the premier patron in this clientelist system. 
The chapter focuses predominantly upon the nature of 
Presidential authority, and in particular, the significance 
of clientelism in the context of such authority. What we 
want to show is how clientelist politics is an important 
aspect contributing towards the safeguarding of 
personalised rule in contemporary Egypt. As we examine 
President Mubarak's strategies of rule, our primary focus 
will be on the way in which he utilises his enormous powers
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to define the arena of political contest in a constrictive 
manner which subsequently appears to encourage the 
incorporation of leading participants into the existing 
clientelist structure of dependency and hence control.
The role of political parties, as the second tier within 
the clientelist system, is examined in chapter three. The 
structure and dynamics of both the NDP and the opposition 
are assessed. The activities of and opportunities for 
political parties within the arena of political contest are 
to a large degree determined by their relationship with 
central government. We examine this relationship in terms 
of clientelist relations, rewards for conformity and 
methods of discipline for insubordination. The main reasons 
why legalised political parties appear to be left with 
little option but to accept these "rules of the game" are 
also examined to clarify and substantiate our argument. 
Examples derived from the "ruling" NDP, and the six 'major' 
opposition 'parties' - the Neo-Wafd, the TajammuL, the 
Nasserites, the Liberal Party, the Labour Party and the 
formally unrecognised Muslim Brotherhood Organisation, are 
examined and compared to highlight these issues.
The fourth chapter focuses specifically on electoral 
candidates. The relationship between candidates and party, 
and candidates and voters is discussed to illustrate the 
nature of political individualism, personal networking, 
role expectations and clientelism. The main argument here 
is that due to various factors, the majority of party 
candidates are compelled to adopt individualistic campaign 
strategies which are predominantly independent of the 
parties they officially represent. Furthermore, the aim is 
illustrate how the intended role of political activists as 
intermediaries between central government and those on the 
periphery seems to be further reinforced as a result of the 
expectations of voters from potential representatives. This 
process, in short, emphasises the reason political parties, 
as group entities, remain weak and are thus more easily 
incorporated into the clientelist structure linking the
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centre to those on the periphery. Moreover, the short term 
material rewards which the electorates have come to expect 
from elections, not only ensures overall social order and 
their incorporation into the existing clientelist 
structure, but it also discreetly reinforces the 
government's control over them.
The concluding chapter of the research focuses on the 
prevailing and potential consequences of Egypt's non­
competitive multi-party arena. Whilst an electoral arena of 
this type appears to be a useful instrument for the 
maintenance of the political status quo, the chapter 
examines the frailties of such a system and questions how 
long can this clientelist method of control be upheld.
In the final analysis, the aim of this thesis is to 
illustrate how non-competitive multi-party elections in 
Mubarak's Egypt, are not simply intended as a facade aimed 
at stressing the regime's democratic orientations. More 
importantly, such elections act as an important tool for 
hindering the development of group-based political 
participation. This, in turn, contributes towards the 
preservation of the prevailing system of personalised rule 
through reaffirming and expanding the regime's system of 
clientelist co-option and control.
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Chapter Two 
The Presidency in Egypt: 
Mubarak's powers; conceptions; 
and strategies of control.
2. Introduction
Our view that non-competitive multi-party elections in 
Mubarak's Egypt can best be viewed as an instrument of 
clientelist co-option and control, cannot be appropriately 
elucidated without first understanding the nature of the 
Presidency in post-1952 Egypt, and in particular, the 
significance of co-option and clientelism with regard to 
this Presidential system of rule.
The dominant position of the President constitutes the most 
salient aspect of Egypt's post-1952 political system. The 
Egyptian President for example, maintains a virtual 
monopoly over the decision-making process. As Hinnebusch 
noted with reference to the Sadat era:
"the president is above such formal 
constraints as law or the administrative 
regulations which bind his subordinates; he 
remains the sole source of major policy or 
ideological innovation; and he still 
defines and can change the rules of the 
political game - the conditions of 
political participation. The presidency 
today is no less a concentration of 
enormous personalised power than under
141Nasser"
Such personalisation of power can still be detected in the 
Mubarak era. As we will emphasise in the first part of this 
chapter, it is due not only to the immense legal- 
constitutional powers vested in the Presidency, but also to 
the fact that Egypt's successive Presidents have focused 
upon strategies of rule in which co-option and clientelist 
mechanisms of control play an important role. These
1 A I
R. Hinnebusch cited m  M.Y. El-Gamal (1992), P107 .
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strategies are significant predominantly in ensuring the 
dependence of political institutions and groupings on the 
individual occupying the post of the President. This in 
turn, allows for the preservation of this personalised 
system of rule.
The second section focuses on the nature of President 
Mubarak's rule, and in particular, the factors which 
indicate that the embryonic multi-party arena he inherited 
from his predecessor is intended to clientelistically 
enhance, not democratically transform, the prevailing 
system of personal rule. This view will be illustrated as 
we examine the President's strategies of rule; his attitude 
towards the multi-party arena inherited from his 
predecessor; his conception of his role within it; and the 
utilisation of Presidential powers to ensure adherence to 
such conceptions. On the basis of these factors, our aim is 
to show how the arena of political contest is defined in a 
constrictive manner which logically suggests that the 
President's primary aim is to impede the development of 
genuine party competition so that the entire multi-party 
arena can be incorporated into (thus reaffirming and 
expanding) the existing clientelist structure of dependency 
and hence control.
2.2 The Egyptian Presidency: An Overview
Sources of power and authority
The pre-eminent position of the Egyptian President can be 
detected as early as 1953 when the provisional constitution 
formally authorised the "leader of the Revolution" the 
power to take any steps deemed necessary in order to 
protect it.142 Safeguarding the Revolution, or perhaps more 
appropriately, establishing the personalised system of rule 
which continues to characterise Egyptian politics was not 
difficult to achieve because although the 1952 'Revolution' 
began simply as a military coup, it arose:
“ 2 T. El-Bishri (1981), P38.
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"out of a "time of troubles", and 
Nasser... soon emerged as a charismatic 
leader, embraced by Egyptians as a national 
hero with unmatched personal legitimacy. It 
was this that legitimised the regime, 
allowing it to transcend its purely 
military origins [and raise Nasser] above 
the rest of his colleagues - turning them, 
in effect, into his "staff"."143
Nasser's personal charisma not only contributed towards 
legitimising the new regime and elevating his position 
above other members that comprised the Revolutionary 
Command Council,144 it also allowed him to construct a 
political system essentially devoid of institutional checks 
and balances. Adopting a presidential system in which the 
President was to be elected through popular referendum, the 
1956 constitution became the first of five145 further 
constitutions created by Nasser to institutionalise 
personalised authoritarian rule. In other words, these 
constitutions were utilised in the authoritarian manner of 
being devices "important less as constraints on the abuse 
of power and more as legal instruments that a personal 
ruler could amend or rewrite to suit his power needs."146
While the growth of Nasser's charisma went hand in hand 
with his attainment of the status of sole decision-maker, 
the legal-constitutional powers vested in the Presidency 
have contributed towards ensuring the legacy of personal 
rule continued into the 197 0's under Sadat. This was 
perhaps best illustrated when Sadat managed to overcome an 
internal power struggle which marked the first seven months 
of his Presidency.147 The move, labelled the 'corrective
143 R.A. Hinnebusch (1990), P188.
144 The Revolutionary command council comprised the core Free 
Officers Group that had executed the 1952 coup.
145 The other four were implemented in 1958, 19 62, 19 64 and 19 69
respectively. T. El-Bishri (1981), P39.
146R .H . Jackson and C.G, Rosberg (1982), P16.
147 Sadat was, at the time of Nasser's death, the Vice-President, 
and through a referendum he legally acquired executive office. 
However, in reality, Nasser's top men had expected to share with 
him some form of decision-making powers, since, at best, he was 
considered only first among equals. Determined to remain the
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revolution' coincided with the implementation of yet 
another constitution. The 1971 Constitution, which remains 
in effect to date, was constructed upon the same tenets as 
the previous constitutions. Consequently, to understand 
why, after the demise of the 'charismatic' Nasser, 
personalised presidential rule remained intact, it is 
necessary to first start by examining the manner in which 
this constitution (and thus the previous ones) were 
formulated.
President bv referendum148
As under Nasser, the President is officially instated by 
referendum. According to article 76 of the Constitution, 
the People's Assembly nominates the President of the 
Republic. The "candidate" must then obtain two thirds of 
the Assembly's votes before the decision is ratified 
through a popular plebiscite. In the case of the 
President's death or permanent disability, article 84 of 
the Constitution states that the Assembly Speaker 
temporarily assumes the Chief Executive's position until a 
new President is instated. Since the Assembly can only 
refer one person to a national plebiscite (article 76), 
this means that the President does not compete for his 
position. Rather, this procedure of appointment 
automatically raises him above any mechanisms whereby he 
would have to compete with other opponents.
In such a context, the Egyptian President's official claim 
to office is not formally grounded on the basis of a 
majority support, but on the basis of near unanimous 
support, as reflected in the astounding percentage of "yes" 
votes officially declared after such plebiscites. The
ultimate source of power within the political system, he embarked 
upon strengthening the Presidency by removing from the elite body 
actual and potential opposition. The most prominent of whom were 
Nasser's Minister of Interior, Sha_frawi JomAa, Sami. Sharaf, 
Director of Nasser's Personal Security Services, Nasser's Minister 
of Defence, Muhammad FawzjL, and First Secretary of the ASU, _\Ali 
Sabri.
148All articles quoted are derived from the 1971 Constitution of 
the Arab Republic of Egypt. State Information Service Press 
(Egypt), 19 81 copy.
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results of Mubarak's 1987 Presidential referendum for 
example, were formally declared by the Ministry of Interior 
as producing a massive 88.5% voter turn-out, ninety-seven 
percent of whom apparently voted "yes". As the turnout had 
in fact been low, observers were forced to note that such: 
"government claims appeared a reversion to the false 
plebiscites of Nasser and Sadat. And in particular, they 
were ". . .disturbed that Mubarak went along with this 
charade."149 Indeed, like his predecessors, Mubarak has 
shown few qualms about the dubiousness of his referendum 
results. Publicly embracing the results of his 1993 
referendum results for example, the President declared: 
"all I can say is that I was moved by the high percentage 
of the people who turned out to vote. I believe that I have 
never seen such massive numbers of ballots in my life."150 
Whilst political legitimacy in an authoritarian context, as 
we have discussed in the previous chapter, tends to be 
determined upon certain factors predominently related to 
the achievements of the individual in office, the point 
here is that regardless of the authenticity of referenda as 
a method of reaching office, the fact remains that such 
extraordinary results allow the Egyptian President to 
formally claim total popular support and thus absolute 
legal legitimacy.
Presidential terms
Article 77 of the constitution defines a Presidential term 
as six years, and according to the same article there are 
no limits to the number of terms a President is re­
nominated. This constitutional prerogative means that 
Egyptian Presidents can, quite legally, remain in office 
for life. Both Nasser and Sadat died in office and to judge 
from the current situation, it appears Mubarak is also to 
follow this trend.
149 A. Lesch (1989) , P93.
150 BBC SWB 7 October 1993/ ME/ 1813/MED/8.
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It is worth noting that both Sadat and Mubarak initially 
proclaimed their reluctance to rule for more than two 
terms. In fact, Sadat appeared so adamant, that he formally 
implemented a two term limitation in the original article 
77 of the 1971 Constitution. However, as he subsequently 
had a change of mind, the article was duly amended through 
a plebiscite in 1980 so that he could remain in office. 
Mubarak also initially declared his disapproval of long 
term Presidential rule. As he declared in 1984, "I do not 
conceal from you the fact that I believe that the 
assumption of the office of the President by any one of us 
should not exceed two terms." He also added "It pleases me 
that I shall be the first President to whom this rule will 
apply."151 However, like Sadat, Mubarak changed his mind and 
accepted re-nomination for the third term of office. As he 
explained: "this high position [of the Presidency] though
one of distinction and splendour, means for me no more than 
toil, sweat and constant effort ...There is no gain, 
respite or ambition, but toil and sacrifice that continue 
day after day to protect this dear homeland." Yet, 
characteristic of authoritarian rulers, it would seem that 
Mubarak had by then begun to perceive himself as 
indispensable to the nation. Hence, in his view, "the call 
of duty" left him with "no other choice but to... assume 
the honour of responsibility regardless of troubles and 
difficulties" .152
Significantly, although both Sadat and Mubarak initially 
advocated the idea of a two-term Presidency, the fact that 
both Presidents changed their mind, illustrates the 
difference between formal political procedures, whereby the 
Assembly officially chooses the President, and the reality, 
in which the President actually decides his own tenure in 
office.
151 BBC SWB 26 June 1984/ ME/7679/A/1.
152 BBC MSME 24 July 1993/307240158-YGS3Y1/9307226.
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The People's Assembly
It can be argued that the People's Assembly is not obliged 
to re-nominate the President at the end of a Presidential 
term. This, legally, is possible. It is also possible, on a 
basis of two-third majority vote, for the Assembly to file 
charge against the President for committing high treason or 
any other "criminal act" (article 85) . However, the 
Egyptian legislature has never exercised this prerogative. 
Neither has it ever decided against re-nominating an 
incumbent President.
The People's Assembly is, in fact, granted a number of 
constitutional prerogatives which should in theory 
counterbalance the office of the Chief Executive. For 
example, while the President is granted the right to 
appoint and dismiss the entire Cabinet, which comprise the 
Prime Minister, his deputies, the Ministers and their 
deputies (article 141), the Assembly, according to article 
124, is entitled to address questions to any of its members 
concerning matters within their jurisdiction. If the 
Assembly is not satisfied with the performance of the 
Cabinet or any of its individual members, then it is 
entitled to withdraw its vote of confidence (article 126). 
As stipulated in article 128, if the Assembly withdraws its 
confidence from any of the Ministers or their deputies, the 
individual in question is expected to resign his office. 
The same article also stipulates that if the Prime Minister 
is found responsible before the Assembly, then he too must 
submit his resignation. It must be noted however, that 
whether under Nasser, Sadat or Mubarak's leadership, the 
Assembly has never resorted to exercising its withdrawal of 
confidence with regard to any member of the President's 
cabinet. If a Prime Minister, Minister or even a whole 
Cabinet is deemed competent or otherwise, this is a 
decision which has invariably been determined solely by the 
President.
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Another important prerogative of the Assembly is that of 
formally monitoring the considerable legislative powers 
accorded to the Egyptian President. As stipulated by 
article 147 for example, the President, in the Assembly's 
absence, and in situations which "cannot suffer delay" has 
the right to issue decisions which have the force of law. 
However, according to the same article, such decisions must 
be submitted to the Assembly within fifteen days from the 
date of issuance. In the case where the Assembly is 
dissolved or is in recess (usually July to October), then 
the President is legally obliged to submit the decisions on 
its first meeting. If any decisions are not submitted to 
the Assembly, or if the Assembly declines to ratify such 
decisions, then "their force of law disappears with 
retroactive effect".
In the presence of the Assembly, the Egyptian President can 
also authorise the issuing of resolutions which have the 
force of law (article 108) . This article, known as the 
"Delegation Act" has the potential to enhance the 
President's legislative powers considerably as it provides 
him with the right to rule by decree. Therefore, in efforts 
to present a formal distribution of power, the same article 
stipulates that the President can only be granted such 
power upon the approval of the Assembly and only for a 
defined period of time. Furthermore, the President must 
point out to the Assembly "the subjects of such resolutions 
and the grounds upon which they are based."
While the President enjoys the right to conclude treaties, 
as confirmed by article 151, such treaties must be 
presented to the Assembly accompanied by suitable 
clarification. The conclusion of important treaties such as 
peace settlements, alliance pacts, commercial and maritime 
treaties and any other treaties involving the rights of 
sovereignty, territorial modifications, or agreements 
involving additional charges excluded from the State 
budget, then President is required to first seek the 
Assembly's approval. The President's power to declare war
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(article 150) is also formally hindered by the article's 
stipulation that he must first seek the approval of the 
People's Assembly. In reality, however, there is evidence 
to suggest that it is precisely within the realms of such 
important issues that the Egyptian President excludes the 
Assembly and even his own cabinet from any form of 
participation.153
The powers of the Egyptian President formally extend to his 
exclusive right to implement a state of emergency (article 
148) . The President, according to article one of the 
prevailing Emergency Law 162 of 1958, is entitled to 
declare a state of emergency "whenever security or public 
order are jeopardised within the Republic or in any of its 
regions, whether due to war or circumstances threatening 
war, national unrest, general disasters or the outbreak of 
an epidemic"154 Under such a vaguely termed declaration, the 
President is entitled to safeguard security and public 
order by restricting the freedom of movement, assembly and 
residence of the citizens. However, although this law can 
enhance presidential power through its potential to suspend 
the constitutional rights of all citizens of the Republic, 
the President's right to declare a state of emergency is 
officially restrained by the Assembly's supervisory role. 
According to article 148 of the constitution the President 
can issue a state of emergency on condition that he submits 
such a proclamation to the Assembly within fifteen days for 
approval. The same article also states that "in all cases" 
a President's decision to proclaim a state of emergency 
cannot extend beyond a "limited" period without the 
Assembly's approval.
153 For example, Sayyed Mara_Li, father-in-law to one of Sadat's 
daughters and the then speaker of the Assembly, claimed he knew 
nothing of Sadat's decision to enter the 19 73 war against Israel. 
Moreover, he strongly doubted:"that anyone other than Ahmed Ismael 
(the War Minister) knew." See M. Y. El-Gamal (1992), P191.
154 Emergency Law 162 of 1958, Article one, cit. in M. El-Ghamry 
(September 1995), P14.
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In view of the latter point, all three Egyptian Presidents 
have managed to call for and obtain a formal state of 
emergency each of which has lasted for an extraordinary 
long period of time. During the period between 195 6 and 
1963 for example, Nasser ruled under a state of emergency 
using the pretext of the threat of an offensive against 
Egypt. By June 1967, another state of emergency was 
declared by Nasser due to the 1967 Egyptian-Israeli war. 
Although declaring a state of emergency during a war is not 
uncommon, it is remarkable that while the 19 67 war was 
almost over before it started, the state of emergency 
extended for a total of thirteen simultaneous years. This 
means that even after Nasser's death in 197 0, Sadat 
continued to rule under emergency measures for another 
decade. In his last year of rule, this law was eventually 
lifted only to be re-instated upon his assassination in 
October 1981. Since then, Mubarak has continued to request 
and obtain the Assembly's approval to maintain emergency
155law, on the grounds of violence and terrorism.
Yet one should stress that the People's Assembly is 
constitutionally empowered to question and even challenge 
presidential authority. And the fact that it refrains from 
doing so, cannot be attributed to genuine unanimous 
approval of presidential policies. Rather, the People's 
Assembly has been confined to the role of rubber-stamping 
presidential decisions because its powers are in fact 
restricted by certain presidential powers which are beyond 
its control.
The legislative powers of the Assembly for example, can be 
virtually eliminated as a result of the President's 
authority to by-pass the Assembly. According to article 152 
of the Constitution, the President is entitled "to call a 
referendum of the People on important matters related to 
the supreme interests of the country." Consequently, if the
155 See: Table to show the Declarations of a State of Emergency
during the Period 1914-1995 in M. El-Ghamry (September 1995), P13 .
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President decides to endorse his proposals through 
referendum, then it is impossible for the Assembly to 
intervene or deliberate upon the subject matter. In 
addition, the potential use of referendum not only hinders 
the Assembly's legislative role, it also restrains its 
supervisory role. Thus if the Assembly decides to use its 
constitutional prerogative of withdrawing its vote of 
confidence from the Cabinet (article 126), the President 
can refuse to endorse the decision (article 127) and 
subsequently take the matter to a public referendum, as is 
his legal entitlement.
It must be noted however that the President in Egypt does 
generally refrain from using referendum except in 
circumstances were it is a formal requirement, as in the 
case of initiating constitutional changes. The reason for 
not needing to by-pass the Assembly by referendum is 
largely linked to the fact that there is little motivation 
to do so. The bulk of laws passed through the legislature 
are initiated by the President in the first place. 
Moreover, according to one veteran Assembly member whose 
career spans all three presidential eras, almost all 
presidential proposals are passed by the required two-third 
majority with little if any deliberation at all.156
The 199 0 Electoral Law amendment for example, illustrates 
the extent to which the legislature's role is predominately 
one of formalising presidential decisions. In May 1990, the 
Supreme Constitutional Court struck down a section of the 
1986 Electoral Law. Although features of this case will be 
examined in more detail later in the thesis, for now 
suffice it to state that President Mubarak decided to 
comply with the ruling. In doing so, the President set up a 
"technical preparatory committee" whose task was to remove 
and revise the parts of the Electoral Law found 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. This eight 
member Committee comprised two constitutional law
156 Personal interview with Fikri Al-Jazzar, 2/1/95, Cairo.
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professors, two legal experts from the Ministry of Justice, 
two police officers from the Ministry of Interior who 
possessed doctoral degrees in law, the Minister of Justice 
and the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers. In 
other words, the Committee was so narrowly composed, it did 
not include any elected members of parliament to represent 
either the dominant party or the members of the Opposition 
who had initiated the Court challenge in the first place. 
Moreover, the draft recommendations were promptly passed as 
legislation without the President even pausing to allow any 
"input and comment" on the matter. As the Opposition 
emphasised in a formal statement, the revised Law was
« * 157drafted "single-handedly and m  absolute secrecy." The 
point here is that the swiftness with which the legislation 
was passed illustrates the extent to which the majority of 
Assembly members are willing to overlook matters, even 
those concerning their own interest, rather than challenge 
the decisions of the President.
In retrospect, it is very difficult to do otherwise. The 
Assembly's refusal to comply with the President, can result 
in his decision to invoke his powers to dissolve the 
Assembly. As article 13 6 of the Constitution states, the 
Egyptian President is empowered to dissolve the People's 
Assembly if "necessary and after a referendum of the 
People." In such a case, the President is formally required 
to issue a decision terminating the sessions of the 
Assembly and then conduct a referendum within thirty days. 
If, or more realistically, when, the public's approval is 
officially announced, the President then proceeds to set a 
date for new legislative elections. Naturally the power to 
dissolve the Assembly has enormous implications for the 
Assembly's conduct and ultimately the balance of power 
within the decision making process. If the Assembly decides 
to take on a role which extends beyond supporting and 
formalising presidential legislation, the President can
157 Egypt: Electoral Concerns, News from Middle East Watch, New
York Office, (November 15 1990), PP5-6.
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resort to referendum and thus dissolve it. The consequence 
not only being the inevitable disruption and inconvenience 
of new elections, but the dissolution of the Assembly which 
can then allow the President to exclude 'unruly' 
politicians from parliament.
Presidential patronage
and the issue of political participation
The President's power to exclude non-conforming politicians 
from the Assembly, can best be understood in view of the 
President's clientelist control over political 
participation and the way in which it has enhanced the 
system of personal rule whilst marginalising the role of 
political parties in post-1952 Egypt. Prior to 1952, a 
multi-party parliamentary system functioned within the 
framework of a constitutional monarchy. Yet the abolition 
of the monarchy was followed by a temporary suspension of 
multi-party activity. Under the pretext that multi-partyism 
constituted both an obstacle to national unity and a 
betrayal of the regime's ideological goals of social equity
158and justice, this temporary suspension of political 
parties thus became a total ban.
Egypt's move towards a single party was, as in most 
developing nations during the nationalist struggle era, 
primarily intended to function as a device for generating 
an attitude of obedience to authority and acceptance of the 
measures enacted by the new ruler. As the author of an 
early study on post-independent West African states put it; 
"with few exceptions the trend has been for one man in each 
state to be elevated to a position of great power... Often 
the constitution reflects this domination of the state not 
only by a single party, but, within that party, by a single 
man,"159 Consequently, while the formal purpose of this all- 
encompassing type of party was to provide a mechanism
158 A .E . Hillal Dessouki (1981), Pll.
159 K. Post (1968), P96 cited in R.H. Jackson and C.G. Roseberg
(1982), P24.
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whereby the majority of the people would meaningfully 
participate in the political process, in reality, this was 
rarely the case.
For Nasser in particular, the President feared that an
organised, single party with popular participation or
decision-making powers may result in a Soviet style system
which could potentially challenge his personal position as
160the ultimate source of legitimacy and power. This fear 
subsequently impelled the President to use the party "more 
as a means of mobilising political support than as a 
vehicle for political participation."161 The extent to which 
the single party was intended to be no more than "an 
extension of one and the same command structure - the 
President"162 was reflected in the nature of political 
participation at the time. Potential candidates for office 
were not only subjected to rigorous scrutiny, but were 
dependent upon presidential decrees to grant their
163authorisation to participate. In addition, electoral 
results were processed and announced, not by an independent 
body, but by the Ministry of Interior. This system 
continues to be in effect to this date. The President's 
strategy it seems, was to ensure that those who reached the 
legislature were aware their position was not acquired by 
independent means but by his personal will and patronage.164 
Evidently, this aim was achieved as none of the three 
consecutive organisations165 under Nasser's one party system
160 In response to a private enquiry as to why the party cannot be 
strengthened, Nasser replied " If I allow the party to expand 
where would that leave me? We would end up like the Soviet system 
where every decision made has to pass through party committees and 
could be rejected. What a waste of time." Relayed during personal 
interview with Dr Rif_fat SaJLid, 9 January 1995.
161 A. H. Dessouki (1981), P15.
162 I . Harik (1973) , P90.
163 R. Stephens (1971), P544.
164 Personal interview, Dr Rifkat Sa_lid, 8 January 1996. Based on a 
conversation between interviewee and Nasser's Minister of 
Interior, Shal_rawi Jomya.
165 The Liberation Rally (1952-56), the National Union (1956-1962) 
and the Arab Socialist Union (1962-1972)
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managed to emerge as independent political entities that
"reflected the structure of social forces [or] served as
vehicles through which the dominant social force could
166extend, moderate, and legitimise its power."
In view of this personalised system of rule, the decision 
to change 'the rules' of political participation and 
transform the political arena from a one party to a multi­
party system in 1977 can arguably be regarded as Sadat's 
personal policy initiative.167 There did however appear to 
be a need to "satisfy participatory pressures",168 but since 
the expansion of formal political groupings and organised 
political contest could rally diverse constituencies of 
supporters which would potentially challenge the very 
existence of personalised authoritarian regimes, Sadat's 
move to authorise an official opposition was hardly aimed 
at establishing a more democratic form of government. 
Instead, 'liberalising' the political arena for Sadat, 
appears to have been intended to serve other purposes. 
Namely to differentiate his regime from Nasser's in order 
to appeal to his new Western allies and to cultivate an 
image of political liberalisation to coincide with the 
implementation of his programme to liberalise the economy. 
Also, on another level, Sadat's objective was to use the 
multi-party arena as a mechanism with which to enhance the 
strategy of divide and rule. The aim, it seems, was to 
encourage overt division in elite opinion, refrain from 
taking sides, and consequently adopt the role of arbiter so
169as to make himself immune from attack.
As the nature of political parties will be examined in 
detail in the following chapter, suffice it for now to note
166 S. Huntington (1968), P249 .
167 This is reflected in the fact that both high officials within 
the government and the army - for disparate reasons - opposed the 
idea of a multi-party system. See R .A . Hinnebusch, Jr. (1985), 
PP158-160.
168 R.A. Hinnebusch, Jr. (1985), P159 .
159 R.A. Hinnebusch Jr. (1988), P62.
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that the extent to which Sadat intended to create a weak 
multi-party system that could be manipulated for such 
purposes is reflected in the manner in which political 
parties emerged at the time. The 'ruling' National 
Democratic Party (NDP) for example, was in itself a 
creation of Sadat. Having perceived the ASU as a potential 
threat to his personal consolidation of power even in the 
aftermath of his 'corrective revolution', Sadat proceeded 
in 1974 to divide the party into three platforms. The 
President then decided in 1977, to disband the ASU 
altogether and confer upon these platforms the official 
status of fully fledged political parties.
However, when a year later, Sadat decided to create his own 
party {the NDP), approximately two hundred and fifty 
members of the People's Assembly rushed to join the 
President's new party.170 Such a move was invariably related 
to the fact that the President's party would ensure for its 
members direct access to state resources, material and 
otherwise. Our main point however, is that since most of 
its members were originally members of the disbanded ASU, 
the NDP's creation was more a product of presidential 
instigation than pressures of an organised constituency. 
Put differently, the mass conversion from 'socialist' to 
'democratic' ideology formally displayed by joining the 
President's newly created party not only implied the desire 
to remain under direct presidential patronage, but that the 
emergence of 'ruling' NDP was no more reflective of 
constituency interests than under Nasser's party system.
As with the NDP, the first two opposition parties were also 
created from above, initially in 1976 as official platforms 
within the ASU, and then in 1977 as independent parties. 
Hence, although these two opposition parties- the National 
Progressive Union Party (Al-Tajamul) and the Liberal Party 
(Al-'Ahrar)- were theoretically expected to represent 
socialist and liberal tendencies respectively, they did not
170 Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 October 1995.
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develop as a result of an independent political movement 
that represented certain social forces within society. 
Instead, both parties were also artificially created by the 
President who chose old associates to head them, and in 
attempts to signal his official stamp of approval and thus 
ensure their loyalty, he encouraged some of his supporters 
to join them.
The same procedures can also be detected during the 
formation of the Socialist Labour Party in 1978. Ibrahim 
Shokri, the then agriculture minister, was encouraged by 
Sadat to launch this new party after the President felt 
that both TajammuJ_ and Ahranr leaders were not the 
'supportive' opposition he had expected. Especially in the 
light of their criticism to his Egyptian-Israeli peace
171 ■ «efforts. During that period, the Muslim Brotherhood's 
revival can arguably be understood in a similar context. 
That is, although the group was (and remains), formally 
unrecognised as a legal party, it was Sadat who personally 
encouraged its re-emergence as a counter-balance to what he 
eventually came to regard as his opposition. Namely 
sections of the elite that comprised of "Nasserites, 
leftists, liberal intellectuals [and] Wafdists
172survivors."
The Neo-Wafd's revival in January 1978, proved the 
exception to the rule: it was not artificially induced by 
the President. Yet it must be noted that as soon as Sadat 
felt its base of support might pose a potential threat to 
the regime, he issued a decree forbidding those who had 
held prominent political positions prior to the revolution 
from party membership. The consequence of this being that 
the Neo-Wafd's veteran leaders were banned from 
participation and the party was forced to suspend its 
activities.
171 For example, see Sadat-Opposition relations in: J. Waterbury
(1983), PP354-388; R.A. Hinnebusch, Jr. (1985), PP158-1970.
172 M. Heikal (1983), P128.
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The stringent control over political participation even 
after the transformation to a multi-party arena, has meant 
that entry to the legislature in post-1952 Egypt has been 
primarily a consequence of presidential patronage, rather 
than a reflection of independent political contest. It is 
therefore understandable that, for the majority of 
politicians who reach the Assembly, being subservient to 
the President is the only way that they can ensure their 
continued incumbency. Equally important is the fact that 
the clientelist domination of the President appears so 
embedded that it extends to the other major political and 
state institutions.
Presidential patronage extended
The powers of appointment -and dismissal- accorded to the 
President, combined with the patterns of recruitment into 
these posts, is illustrative of the manner in which the 
Egyptian President enhances his control over the major 
institutions of the state. Beginning at the apex of the 
political structure to include advisors, prime ministers, 
ministers and provincial governors, these powers of 
appointment extend to incorporate all the most senior posts 
within the ruling party, armed forces, judiciary, 
bureaucracy, state-owned media, public enterprises, 
national universities and the formal Islamic establishment. 
More importantly the pattern of recruitment into these 
posts is ill-defined in that individuals are not appointed 
on the basis of superior professional merit or as a result 
of ethnic, linguistic or other categorical considerations. 
Rather, personal attributes such as trustworthiness and 
loyalty comprise the most important consideration for the 
president when using appointment powers.
In order to procure such loyalty, Springborg explains how 
informal organisations such as the family, the dufj_a 
(graduating class) and the shilla (group of friends) are
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utilised as clientelist mechanisms of elite recruitment.173 
Prior to 1952, patterns of entry into the political elite 
were based almost exclusively within the realms of wealthy 
landing owning families who, through inter-marriage and 
extensive clientelist networks, monopolised top political 
posts. While the political and economic reforms that 
followed 1952 undermined the prominent role of the family 
as an informal unit of political organisation, it did not 
eliminate it. On the contrary, in order to obtain 
"administrative expertise" and "political connections to 
segments of the articulate public" Nasser was himself 
"perfectly willing to recruit into his cabinets and into 
the ASU ancien regime politicians from prestigious 
families".174 Thus what emerged within the post-1952 regime, 
was a pattern in which the importance of the family in the 
recruitment process was maintained, but was more dependent 
upon personal contacts within the state apparatus than upon 
the material wealth of the family.
In other words, the prospect of an elite appointment in 
post-1952 Egypt, became less dependent upon the socio­
economic status of an individual's family, yet more 
enhanced if a member of the family occupied the ranks of 
the upper elite strata {and could thus recommend the 
individual in question to the President or someone close to 
the President) . The dufj_a network is perhaps most clearly 
depicted under Nasser's rule since the officers who led the 
1952 coup, the Revolutionary Command Council which ensued, 
and the majority of top elite posts during that period were 
largely occupied by members of the same military academy 
dufj_a. Finally, the shilla as a mechanism of recruitment is 
more extensive in scope. Since it is based upon the concept 
of 'friendship', it incorporates both a wide range of 
social acquaintances some of whom may also be linked to the 
president through family or dufj_a ties. The disparate 
mixture of elites under Sadat correlates more to the shilla
173 R. Springborg (1975), PP83-108.
174 R. Springborg (1975), P93.
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than dufj_a network. Since the majority of those occupying 
top posts under Mubarak's rule have been his close 
associates during the vice-presidency period, it would seem 
the shilla tie is also depicted, albeit less conspicuously, 
under Mubarak.
As the President- for practical reasons, focuses his 
appointment powers primarily on the highest level positions 
of the state, his subordinates are provided, as a form of 
tangible goods, with lower level appointment powers which 
in their role as patrons to individuals still lower in 
status, they are able to distribute to their own clients. 
It is when attempting to understand the large, highly 
diffuse and opportunistic patron-client ties at that lower 
level of the elite structure that informal organisations 
such as those defined by Springborg are perhaps most 
useful. However, the highest level of the clientelist 
structure is more stable and straightforward because of two 
main factors.
First, the underlying importance of personal loyalty impels 
the President to appoint into the top elite posts of the 
state apparatus only those individuals with whom he is 
personally acquainted or who come with the personal 
recommendations of trusted confidantes. 'Osama Al-Baz for 
example, acquired the position of senior presidential 
advisor (a position he maintains to this date) shortly 
after Mubarak assumed the presidency, largely as a result 
of the close relationship cultivated when Mubarak occupied 
the post of Vice-President and Al-Baz was assigned the role 
of his advisor on foreign affairs. President Mubarak's 
decision to appoint J_Amr Musa in .1992 as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs is also illustrative of this clientelist 
pattern of elite recruitment. In other words, Musa's 
appointment to the post which he still occupies to this 
date was not based on any apparent formal considerations on 
the President's part. But because Al-Baz, as one of the 
most trusted presidential confidantes, personally 
recommended Musa - previously a Foreign Ministry employee
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and a client of Al-Baz - to the President. In fact, it 
would be very difficult to find, whether under the 
presidency of Nasser, Sadat or Mubarak, a member of the 
inner elite circle whom the President or one of closest 
advisors were not personally acquainted with prior to 
recruitment.
This leads to the second main factor regarding the 
stability of the patron client ties at the apex of this 
clientelist structure. The individuals on this elite level 
are tied to one patron - the President. Hence, in the 
absence of a higher patron to which to attach themselves, 
the main objective is to preserve their existing 
relationship by remaining subservient. It is for this 
reason, one can argue, that this segment of the elite have 
a very good chance of maintaining their posts for a long 
time. The government of iAtef Sidg;i (1986-1996), for 
example, comprised the longest serving since the first
175 i .modern cabinet was formed m  1914. Yet, m  view of this 
static, record-breaking predicament, Mubarak's response 
was: "I'm not going to take the decision [to change the
176cabinet] only to please those calling for change" And in 
fact he has not. The cabinet has thus remained more or less 
the same with the only significant change being the 
replacement of Sidqi in early 1996. Yet, even then, Mubarak 
did not search very far for a successor. The President's 
choice, an inconspicuous bureaucrat, Kamal Al-Janzuri had 
been an incumbent Minister throughout the entire Mubarak
177years.
175 Even so, it is worth noting that many ministers have held their
portfolios for an even longer period. The Minister of Information,
Safwat Al-Sharif; the Minister of Electricity and Energy, Maher 
'Abaza; and the Minister of Agriculture and Food Securities, Yusef 
Wali., have been particularly conspicuous in that they have held 
exactly the same portfolios respectively since Mubarak came to 
power.
176 Middle East Times Egypt. 3-9 December 1995.
177 Since 1982, Al-Janzuri bas held the portfolio of Minister of
Planning. In 1985, he was appointed Minister of Financial Affairs 
and International Investment and Co-operation, in addition to 
retaining the Ministry of Planning. In 1992 Al-Janzuri. was
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Finally, this clientelistic power structure is perhaps even 
more secured due to the fact that a change in the person 
occupying the Presidency, is not followed by a massive 
shift in the elite personnel of the system. That is, whilst 
each President may appoint a 'new' group of individuals who 
are personally close to him into top level positions, the 
existing elite personnel are not forced into retirement, 
but are largely reshuffled to other senior posts within the
178political and state apparatus. Invariably, this process 
has led to "an amorphous, sprawling elite of officers, 
bureaucrats, professors, ancien regime politicians, and
179 * ■ >others. . . " . Yet, more significantly, such an enormous
patronage network also strains the "bonds of elite 
180cohesion" , which, in turn, diminishes the potential
emergence of powerful and challenging factions within the 
181regime. In addition, the provision of permanent state 
bases to take in the pool of circulating elites not only 
promotes the acquiescence of these elites, but also ensures 
that the prospect of a powerful group of them emerging 
outside the state apparatus to challenge the regime remains 
practically unfeasible. The fact that political mobility is 
ultimately dependent upon personal rather than 
organisational loyalty, has thus reduced the roles of
appointed Vice-Prime Minister and subsequently left the Ministry 
of Financial Affairs, but not the Ministry of Planning.
178 The impact on the clients of the 'reshuffled' elite is somewhat 
minimal since the process of maximising individual opportunities 
of upward mobility means patron-client ties on that level are 
essentially ephemeral.
179 R. Springborg (1975), P92 .
180 R. Springborg (1975), P92.
181 For example, although the Leftist faction that attempted to 
oust Sadat in 1971 comprised important ASU leaders, the Minister 
of Interior and the Minister of Defence and their respective 
clientelist power bases, it failed to achieve its objectives and
was instead purged by Sadat. This "was perhaps due to its
Byzantine complexity, which would have made a well-timed, 
carefully co-ordinated strike difficult and security leaks
inevitable." Springborg (1975), P95. The Minister of Defence,
General Muhammad Fawzi who spent 1971-1976 imprisoned as a result 
of his involvement in the faction also hinted at this probability 
by stating to us that "Sadat sensed we might have him for dinner, 
so he decided to have us for lunch." Personal interview, 15 Nov. 
1995, Cairo.
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formal organisations and institutions to little more than 
"vehicles through which personal connections are 
established"182
The personalised power of the President in post-1952 Egypt 
is further enhanced by the President's personal control of 
state funds and resources. Hence, although an annual budget 
is presented to the Assembly at the beginning of each 
fiscal year for approval, this is primarily a formality and 
specific resource allocations are neither revealed to the 
Assembly, nor pursued through formal channels. Instead, the 
allocation of resources to the various political and state 
organisations is primarily determined according to the 
personal and political objectives of the President in 
office. In a study on Egypt's ministerial elite, for 
example, El-Gamal reveals how, during the Sadat era, a 
swearing match took place between two ministers over the 
allocation of cement to their respective ministries. The 
scene, between the former Minister of Defence _l.Abd Al-Halim 
'Abu Ghazala, and the former Minister of Construction and 
Housing, Hasaballah Al-Kafrawi, was randomly (and 
personally) settled by Sadat in favour of 'Abu Ghazala. The 
reason, it seems, is because Abu Ghazala was closer to 
Sadat than Al-Kafrawi, and as the author noted, "those
• 183closest to the President won".
On the basis of such informal and personalistic mechanisms 
of resource allocation, it would not be contentious to 
argue, as El-Gamal has done, the extent of the President's 
closeness to one Minister over another would ultimately 
determine the outcome of such conflicts. However, even 
though in that particular episode 'Abu Ghazala did happen 
to be personally closer to Sadat than Al-Kafrawi, the fact 
that the Minister of Defence gained the upper hand over a 
civilian Minister cannot be simply attributed to the 
President's personal disposition. This is especially the
182 R. Springborg (1975), pl04.
183 M.Y. El-Gamal (1992), PP186-187.
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case if one takes into account the role of the Egyptian 
military and the way in which presidential patronage 
appears to safeguard that role.
Since the Nasser period, the military establishment has 
come to perform a prominent role as the protector of 
Egypt's post-1952 regime. It was after all a military coup 
which brought about the post-1952 regime, and the fact that 
all three Presidents were originally military officers 
cannot be overlooked. Securing the protection of the armed 
forces however, has not simply been due to these factors, 
but primarily because of the extent of presidential 
patronage extended in that direction. Under Nasser, the 
most prominent form of patronage bestowed upon the military 
was in the form of appointments to key political and state 
positions ranging from ministerial posts to top posts in 
the then newly nationalised economy. In the post Nasser 
era, the armed forces were "no longer a corporate member of
184the Alliance of the Working Forces of the People" and the 
re-emergence of a multi-party arena was followed by a ban 
on military personnel joining political parties or voting. 
Presidential patronage in the form of elite political and 
bureaucratic appointments subsequently became less 
conspicuous. However, this move was supplemented through 
additional material benefits for officers and their 
families. Such benefits have included subsidised housing, 
automobiles, hospitals, sporting clubs and even electrical 
household appliances and grocery stores. State financed 
study programmes in Egypt and abroad also became more 
accessible to officers in the ensuing patronage 
transformation. Presidential appointment as a form of 
patronage was not however completely eliminated. As 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the President still 
appoints the top military positions including the cabinet 
posts of Minister of Defence and Minister of War 
Production. In addition, Nasser's tradition of reserving 
the presidentially appointed posts of Egypt's provincial
184 N. Ayubi (1991) , P243 .
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governors for retired (military and police) officers, was 
diligently preserved by his successors.
As a consequence of such patronage, it is logical to assume 
the military has maintained a vested interest in protecting 
and upholding the personalised authoritarian system of 
post-1952 Egypt. Illustrative of this is the fact that 
since 1952, the military has never refused a President's 
call to combat mass riots such as in 1968185 and 1977 , 186 or 
even to confront challengers from within the system as in
187 i1986. The extent of the military's loyalty to the 
President and its obedience to his decisions, is perhaps 
most poignantly reflected in the military's support of 
Mubarak's declaration to join forces with Western nations 
against Iraq in the 199 0 Gulf War.
In the final analysis, the system of personalised 
authoritarian rule in post-1952 Egypt was constructed by 
Nasser and sustained by his successors due to several 
factors which ensure the absence of autonomous group 
entities and thus the President's direct control over all 
state apparatuses. The President's prerogative of 
appointing and dismissing the Cabinet for example, ensures 
his personal control over the entire executive branch of 
government. In addition, his chairmanship of a party which 
gains no less than three-quarters of the Assembly seats 
whilst essentially being devoid of any independent power 
base, and his legal-constitutional authority to overrule 
the Assembly and even dissolve it, ensures the 
legislature's acceptance for him to rule by presidential
185 Nasser resorted to calling in the army, when, in February 1968, 
public anger erupted into demonstrations against the system at 
large in the wake of the 19 67 Israeli defeat.
186 Government subsidies on basic food commodities has been a 
policy pursued since 1952 and constitutes a huge drain on the 
budget. Hence, the 1977 food riots erupted when Sadat attempted to 
balance the budget deficit by removing some of the subsidies.
187 Again, the military proved indispensable, this time for 
Mubarak, when thousands of army conscripts in the Central Security 
Forces, caused havoc in Cairo on the news that their military 
service might be extended. Personally present in Cairo during this 
incident.
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decree, enact emergency measures and in short, dominate the 
entire decision-making process. Furthermore, the 
President's enormous appointment powers and the way they 
are utilised, ensure the top operators of the state 
apparatuses are tied to the President on a clientelist 
rather than institutional basis. Hence, the conglomeration 
of such powers in the hands of the President, coupled with 
his patronage to, and position as, Commander-in-Chief to 
the armed forces, have allowed the President to sustain 
personal, authoritarian rule in post-1952 Egypt.
The development of a multi-party arena in which political 
parties function as cohesive, autonomous group entities 
competing for control of government, would, in such a 
context, logically obliterate the foundations on which this 
personalised system of rule is based. Put differently, the 
system of personalised rule in post-1952 Egypt, as we have 
stressed, has prevailed for over four decades predominately 
as a combined result of the enormous legal-constitutional 
powers vested in the Presidency and the clientelist 
structure which - through the safeguarding of this 
structure by Egypt's three successive Presidents- has 
ensured the dependency of political actors and institutions 
on the individual occupying the office of the President. 
The pre-eminent position of the President in contemporary 
Egypt therefore, is inherently linked to the preservation 
of this clientelist structure of dependency and hence 
control. Reaffirming and expanding this clientelist 
structure to incorporate potential challengers to the 
existing political system, is thus a logical step for a 
President intent on preserving the political status-quo. It 
is in this context that one can thus understand President 
Mubarak's strategies of rule with regard to the newly 
constructed multi-party arena he inherited upon assuming 
office.
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2.3 The Multi-Party Arena under Mubarak
Inheriting the political arena
As Vice-President, Mubarak ascended to power on Sadat's
death with relative ease. However, while both of Mubarak's
predecessors came to power with a record of political
activity including being core members of the Free-Officers
group, Mubarak could not claim such a legacy nor could he
claim direct association with any pre-revolutionary
nationalist activities. In fact, as an airforce pilot,
Mubarak's main political credential prior to assuming
office was the position bestowed on him by Sadat in 1973 of
Vice-President. Mubarak initially justified his relative
political inexperience by claiming he received intensive
"training" from Sadat, and that this gave him the
opportunity to benefit and learn "a great deal from a man
188with more than forty years of experience in politics". 
However Sadat's unpopularity in the last few years of rule 
and his subsequent fate at the hands of extremist opponents 
meant it was necessary for Mubarak to distance himself from 
his predecessor in order to cultivate the necessary support 
to consolidate his own position.
The success of such a strategy, one can argue, meant the 
new President had to deal with two levels of discontent. On 
one level was the opposition: Sadat's message of liberalism 
had fuelled greater expectations from opposition parties 
than was actually intended. And shortly prior to his 
assassination by Islamic extremists in 1981, Sadat had 
reverted to a wholesale crackdown on political opponents. 
Although assassination, as one analyst notes, "is a 
haphazard, individual act, and it's chances of success are 
random, not a barometer of the stability of the regime or
189 •the strength of the opposition", the experience
"Egypt: The Quest..." State Information Service, Cairo,
undated, P7 .
139 I.W, Zartman (1990), P239.
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nevertheless emphasised the mounting tension between 
government and political opponents.
On the other level, Mubarak had inherited what was 
potentially a turbulent civil society as a result of his 
predecessor's economic experiment. The open door policy 
(infita^h) introduced by Sadat had stimulated little 
investment in productive industries or for export. Instead, 
it produced a consumption boom that left the economy in 
deficit and debt.190 Reforms aimed at structural adjustment 
of economic imbalances were not only necessary, but could 
also produce overt popular hostility - as the food riots of 
1977 had previously illustrated. In view of these 
considerations, the new President could hardly continue the 
repressive tactics employed by Sadat prior to his 
assassination.
It would therefore appear that Mubarak's attempt to portray 
himself as a staunch supporter of democracy was 
predominately influenced by efforts aimed initially at 
containing both levels of discontent. By advocating 
democracy for example, it could be that the President was 
finding a way with which to distribute the responsibility 
entailed from the anticipated implementation of unpopular 
economic reforms. As he put it shortly after coming to 
power, "The philosophy on which we should all agree and 
which should guide our work is that Egypt stands above all. 
Egypt is not a society of a privileged minority which 
monopolises power... Egypt is for all her sons who, with 
their thought and toil build their own country on the basis 
of equal opportunity and equality in shouldering 
burdens."191 The same argument was also expressed in more 
explicit terms a few months later: "I believe democracy is 
the best guarantee of our future... I totally oppose the
190 See for example: R .A .Hinnebusch, (1993), "The politics of 
economic reform in Egypt", Third world Quarterly, Vol.14, Nol, 
PP159-171.
191 Address to the People's Assembly and Consultative Council, 8 
November 1981, State Information Service, Cairo,
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centralisation of power and I have no wish to monopolise 
decision-making because the country belongs to all of us
192and we all share a responsibility for it."
It should also be noted that Egypt, since the 197 9 peace 
accords with Israel, had come to depend upon substantial 
aid from its Western allies, and in particular from the 
United States. In view of the afflicted economy Mubarak had 
come to inherit, it would be fair to assert that the 
apparent advocacy of democracy was also a strategy aimed at 
safeguarding the flow of this much needed aid, which, from 
the United States alone is estimated to be approximately
193$2.1 billion per annum. As Owen notes; "The appeal of 
democracy (however limited in practice) bolsters the 
legitimacy of the regime both internationally and 
domestically. As far as the former is concerned, it [makes] 
it easier for the [the US] president and the US congress to
i . 194provide aid."
The President's attempt to prove his democratic intent was 
illustrated most prominently when he ordered the release of 
politicians arrested by Sadat and ordered the reinstatement 
of the university professors and journalists who had been 
dismissed as a result of their political activities to 
their former positions. Yet one can argue that the 
President's apparent courting of the opposition was not 
only an attempt to gain their support in the face of harsh 
economic conditions and a potentially turbulent society. It 
also seems to have been perceived as a useful strategy with 
which to avoid a two-front war with moderate and extremist 
opponents. That is, by proclaiming that terrorism "shall 
not affect our conviction that the reliable shield of 
democracy is the right of every citizen" nor would it 
"shake our belief that the problems of democracy can only
192 Public Address, April 1982, cf. "Egypt a Decade...," Egyptian 
State Information Service, London, 1991.
193 The Wall Street Journal Europe, 15 June 1993.
194 R. Owen (1994) , P190.
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• 195be solved with greater democracy", it would appear the 
President was hoping to cultivate support of the moderate 
opposition in his quest to isolate the radical Islamic 
groups (iJamJ_eya_t) which mushroomed during the Sadat
■ j  196period.
Mubarak's strategy appears to have achieved initial success 
for opposition resentment become replaced with almost 
unanimous support of the new President. On behalf of the 
Opposition, Ibrahim Shokri, leader of the Labour Party, 
publicly announced his optimism as he declared: "The
opposition welcomes the principles set forth by President 
Mubarak, particularly his call for political participation,
197spirit of initiative [and] adherence to democracy." More 
enthusiastic was Fu'ad Seraj al-Din, leader of the Neo-Wafd 
party, "One fact I am sure of now that I have full 
confidence in [Mubarak's] courage" he noted, "is that we 
will, together with God's help, surmount the plight of our 
country... because he respects the freedom of opinion... 
speech and political parties... President Mubarak wants to 
create a civilised democratic country in accordance with
198internationally established concepts." Judging from the 
tone of statements such as these however, the problem with 
Mubarak's advocating of democracy, was that, as with Sadat, 
it produced higher expectations on the part of the 
opposition than was intended.
Emergence of authoritarian views
The fact that Mubarak initially projected a commitment to 
democracy as a mechanism to stabilise the political arena 
and consolidate his own position rather than to expand 
political participation, can be detected more evidently 
post-1983. This period can arguably be regarded as the
195 Address to the People's Assembly and Consultative Council, 8 
November 1981, State Information Service, Cairo.
196 See for example Nemat Guenena (Summer 1986) , tvThe 'Jihad' An 
'Islamic Alternative' in Ecrvpt" . Cairo Papers in Social Science, 
Volume 9, Monograph 2.
197 Mayo, 9 December 1981.
198 October, 2 9 December 19 81.
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years when the real Mubarak era began and thus when his
real political views began to emerge. The signs that
Mubarak was consolidating his power post-1983 was evident
from several perspectives. For example whereas the
President acquired the formal position of head of the NDP
upon taking power, it is not erroneous to aver that it was
not until the party won the first parliamentary elections
under his leadership in May 1984 that his position as its
patron was actually established. Moreover, as the
President's control over the NDP and thus the legislature
was cemented, it is also worth noting that September and
October that same year witnessed the first food riot under
his rule. Due to the price of subsidised bread being
doubled, a food riot erupted in the Delta town of Kafr al-
Dawwar. According to official reports, one person died and
twenty eight were injured in the ensuing clashes with the
security forces.199 The fact that a riot of this nature was
swiftly contained before it spread on a national scale
undoubtedly accentuated Mubarak's confidence that he had
also established himself well in control the state's
200coercive powers.
In such a context it is not too suprising that the 
benevolent manner in which Mubarak believes the Egyptians 
perceive him and his assumption that his personal political 
priorities are one and the same as theirs, is more evident. 
For example, during his initial years in office, the new 
President attempted to avoid portraying himself in a 
patriarchal light and publicly stressed that there was "no 
ruler and ruled" and that all citizens were "equal".201 Yet 
later, the President's perceptions of himself appear to 
have been elevated to the extent that he believed the
199 N. Ayubi (1991) , P229.
200 This feeling was perhaps further reinforced after the 1986 
Central Security Forces (CFS) insurrection was promptly suppressed 
by the army during the first day of riots, hence indicating the 
military's loyalty to the President. Personal observation, Cairo, 
April 198 6.
201 For example see Mubarak's address to the People's Assembly and 
Consultative Council, 14 October 19 81, State Information Service, 
Cairo.
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"Egyptian people regard me as a father figure" and that
• i 20 2like himself, "[t]hey just want stability."
Mubarak's authoritarian inclinations and over-developed 
sense of importance however, are more prominently reflected 
in the events surrounding the annual opening of parliament. 
Usually held in November of every year, the official 
inauguration of parliament comprises the sole event which 
brings the President to the Assembly. The Assembly's 
debating chamber where the President gives his speech is 
naturally constricted in space since the event is attended 
by both Assembly and Consultative Council members. Although 
the event possesses a 'Presidential Monarch' aura because 
it is the President's sole annual venture to the Assembly, 
it is the humiliating treatment which the members endure 
that emphasises Mubarak's perception of his own position as 
President.
On the scheduled day, the deputies are expected to arrive 
between eight and ten o'clock in the morning. If anyone 
arrives later than ten o'clock, they are automatically 
turned away. For 'security' reasons, the army takes over 
from the police on that day the role of guarding the 
Assembly. And more poignantly, the army's duty includes 
searching each deputy thoroughly before allowing him or her 
entry into the chamber. Once inside the chamber, no-one is 
allowed out, even to visit the lavatory. As Mubarak himself 
is not expected until eleven o'clock, the deputies are 
subsequently locked inside the chamber for the one hour 
between the last deputy entering and the President's 
expected arrival.
Following Mubarak's speech, which on average lasts one 
hour, the President then joins the Assembly Speaker for an 
informal chat in the latter's office. In the meantime, the 
deputies remain locked inside the chamber until the
202 For example see Mubarak's interview to The Sunday Times. 24
April 1994, London.
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President departs from the Assembly's premises. Not 
surprisingly, the hours of confinement result in a number 
of casualties every year, as frail and elderly deputies 
faint from suffocation or bladder retention. However, even 
as deputies shout and bang on the chamber doors for 
assistance at these times, the pleas are ignored and the 
doors remain locked until the President's eventual
203departure. According to one veteran politician, this 
annual humiliation is not even a feature inherited from 
Mubarak' s predecessors .204
It must be noted that the above 'security' arrangements 
were first imposed immediately after Sadat's assassination 
as Mubarak was called to assume the presidency. As the 
political situation following Sadat's assassination was 
initially unclear, such precautions can arguably be viewed 
as an isolated precaution to ensure the safe accession of 
the new President. However, the fact that in Mubarak's 
second decade of power, this procedure continues to be 
practised, suggests the President not only regards himself 
above the legislature, but also views it with deep 
mistrust. Yet, as the majority of legislature incumbents 
are from his own party, it would seem that such 
'precautions' might be perhaps more directed at members of 
the opposition. Which in turn reflects an authoritarian 
instinct of insecurity when facing political opponents - 
even those playing by the formal rules.
It is a paradox therefore to note how Mubarak refers to the 
Assembly as though it was an independent and equal force in 
the political system. In a speech marking the start of a 
new parliamentary year for example, he thanked the locked- 
up Assembly audience for fulfilling the "task of 
legislation and control with admiration and appreciation" 
and for having "controlled and corrected [the] work of the
203 Personal interviews with Egyptian MPs, November-January 1994/5, 
Cairo.
204 Personal interview, Fikri Al-Jazzar, 3 January 1995, Cairo.
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205 iexecutive authority". On the basis of such comments, one 
can be led to believe that Mubarak's authoritarian 
perceptions are so deeply embedded that he regards the 
voice of a few powerless opposition members in the Assembly 
as genuine legislative participation.
This however cannot be the case, for the President is fully 
aware of what genuine political participation entails, and 
has himself remarked that it is futile to "ask me to follow 
the same democracy as the UK, France, the US or Germany. We 
want to reach that standard of democracy, but we cannot do 
so overnight."206 Furthermore, he even justified why this 
sort of democracy cannot by achieved by claiming Egypt is: 
"not a wealthy country. If we cease economic activity and 
grant freedom...we consequently place the people in an
207 *unstable state." And "without stability, there will be no 
democracy at all because instability leads to disorder 
which contradicts with democracy. . . [therefore] the first 
duty of those who advocate democracy is to be keen on the 
socio-economic stability, which is the only way for 
democracy. "208
Interpretations of stability 
and socio-economic development
Mubarak, as we noted previously, has not always been 
consistent in his claims as to whether he perceived the 
political arena under his rule as democratic or not. There 
is little doubt however, that since 1983, he has attempted 
to depict himself less as an advocate of democracy and more 
as the guardian of stability and order. This does not imply 
his intention is to abolish multi-party participation 
altogether. This would have been illogical, for as he 
himself admitted, political liberalisation "is our safety
205 State Information Service, 12 November 1994, Cairo.
206 Mubarak interview, cited in R. Owen (19 94), Pi89.
207 BBC SWB, 14 February 1987, ME/8485/A/2.
208 Mubarak's speech marking national Police Day, January 25, 1993, 
State information Service, 1994, Cairo.
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valve."209 Yet the shift of opinion can be detected by the
fact that whereas democracy was previously proclaimed as
the "most effective weapon with which we are resolved to
210meet the challenges facing us", the President began to
publicly concede that stability was more crucial a factor
21 i"for Egypt's present and future success." And that an
"overdose" of democracy "can be harmful" except in small
* . . 212 doses " m  proportion to our ability to absorb them" .
The advocating of socio-economic stability over political 
liberalisation in Egypt logically means the President can 
argue the necessity for responsible political 
participation, which in his view means not: "slipping into
the chaos of ideas or conflicting stances which could
213threaten the supreme interests of the homeland." ' This, in 
turn, means the President can justify challenges to his 
rule by discrediting any opposition forces who do not 
conform to his views by accusing them of being unpatriotic 
"saboteurs and evildoers"214 who "want a state of anarchy 
and chaos"215 in order to "weaken the domestic front."216
The President's attempt to project socio-economic 
development as a priority over political development, does 
not however appear to have been accompanied by overtly 
ambitious plans. Mubarak's first five-year plan for 
example, focused on the necessary yet hardly inspiring task 
of "consolidating the infrastructure". As he explained in 
1987: "We developed the infrastructure of electricity, road
209 Mubarak interview, Al-Ma.ja.lla, 12-18 July 1989.
210 Address to the People's Assembly and Consultative Council, 14 
October 1981, State Information Service, Cairo.
211 BBC SWB 7 April 1987, ME/8558/A/2
212 Ibid. .
213 BBC MSME, 31 May 1994, 405310291/DPAREN/940531.
214 President's May Day Speech 1988, State Information Service, 
Cairo.
215 The Financial Times, 23 January 19 86.
216 President's May Day Speech 1993, State Information Service, 
Cairo.
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networks, drinking water and sanitary drainage...Such is 
the importance of the infrastructure. It is impossible to 
build a house without water. Likewise, it is impossible to 
build a house without sanitary drainage. . . [or it] would
217flood an entire area." In 1994, he was still reminding 
the public of this "great achievement":
" You are all aware of what the situation 
was in 1982 when I took over 
responsibility; but now we have forgotten.
There is everything now: water, sewage,
telephones, railroads, more houses being 
built. . . Have we forgotten that none of 
this existed. . . Have you forgotten the 
telephone problem? I am only reminding you.
You are not young and you know all this; 
you saw all these things. . . If one can
remember where we stood and where we are 
today, then he can see how great this 
achievement has been."218
Perhaps Mubarak's perception that socio-economic 
development should take precedence over political 
development might have generated popular support if it was
conveyed through a particular vision for the future.
However, the President appears reluctant to do so, 
preferring instead to find justifications for the apparent 
lack of economic progress. Some of his justifications have 
in fact appeared to point the blame at the Egyptian
citizens, the most popular claim being: "the problem of
population growth, which exceeds economic and social 
development rates [and which] may prove too difficult for
t 219our capabilities to handle m  the near future."
Obviously, Egypt's economic situation is not simply the 
result of population growth, but also because of more 
significant factors attributed to the policies of the 
regime. As one American report states, for: "many years,
Egyptian economic policies, relying on state ownership, 
bureaucratic controls and protection from competition,
217 BBC MSME, 12 May 1987, 705127317/BINNZP/870512.
218 BBC SWB, 10 May 1994, MEW/03 32/WME/3.
219 BBC SWB, 10 May 1994, MEW/033 2/WME/7.
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stifled productivity, efficiency, and economic growth". 
Furthermore, the commitments of the state to "provide free 
public services, guaranteed employment, and subsidised 
goods... led to chronic fiscal and monetary indiscipline, 
generating excess demand, serious inflation, balance-of-
payments deficits, growing international indebtedness and
220foreign exchange shortages".
Yet it should be noted that these "commitments" which were 
implemented by Nasser, constitute a major mechanism of 
social control in post-1952 Egypt. It is therefore not 
unexpected that whilst Mubarak - with great push from 
amongst others, the World Bank and the IMF- had little 
choice but to continue Sadat's path of privatisation and 
economic liberalisation, he has acted like a reluctant 
participant. Indicative of this is the fact the 
constitution continues to declare Egypt to be a socialist 
state with a centrally planned economy and Mubarak has not 
shown any enthusiasm with regard to making appropriate 
amendments. Instead, when confronted with the question of 
constitutional amendments he has argued that such issues 
are "complex" and that "we are going through economic and 
social reforms, working very hard for the development of 
the country, looking for the stability of the 
country. . .when the time is suitable we will do what is 
needed. "221
The absence of reassuring legal change however, has made it 
difficult to attract significant private investment into 
Egypt's ailing economy. This is illustrated by the fact 
that of the three hundred and fourteen state-owned
enterprises officially targeted for privatisation in 1990,
. 222 only forty had been sold to private investors by 1996.
220 United States Embassy (Cairo). Foreign Economic Trends and 
Their Implications for the United States: Report for the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, 1992, Pi, cited in T. Parfitt (1993), P13.
221 Reu t e r  News Service, R E U T M E , 5 Oc tob er  1993, 
310052713/7LSXUA/931005.
222 Financial Times Survey: Egypt. 13 May 1997.
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That Mubarak is concerned about such a poor sale outcome 
however, is unlikely, for had it not been imposed as part
223 • >of Egypt's reform package agreement with the IMF, ' it is 
highly improbable that the President would personally 
initiate what he perceives as the dismantling of the public 
sector. As his earlier claims reveal: "I wonder about those 
who advocate selling the public sector, because this would 
be a dangerous step taken at the cost of the simple 
citizen...The public sector regulates the private one, thus 
offering goods to the public at reasonable prices, because 
state control is a must. Selling the public sector would
224create a socio-economic problem."
In the final analysis, Mubarak appears to constantly find 
some form of justification for initiating as little change 
as possible in the socio-economic front, even though he 
maintains that political liberalisation cannot be achieved 
without this. Such justifications range from his proclaimed 
concern for 'stability' which would be threatened as a
225result of the "workers [who] could burn things up", to
apparent 'humanitarian' considerations such as "the
226psychological aspect of the people". Moreover, the 
President has shown few qualms with regard to the 
exploitation of Western concerns regarding both the threat 
of political Islam and Egypt's strategic significance. 
Mubarak, for example, does not appear hesitant, when 
justifying the virtual absence of socio-economic 
development, to 'remind' the United States and Egypt's 
other official Western creditors (labelled the Paris Club), 
of the Islamic militants, whom he argues, will attempt "to 
take advantage of the hardships caused by Egypt's economic
223 For details on the IMF-Egypt reform package for years 1987/88 
to 1991/2 See H. Handoussa (1991), PP.10-15. For summary of 
Handoussa's work, see T. Parfitt (1993), P14.
224 Mubarak's words in 1987, cited in J. Waterbury (1993), P142.
225 Mubarak Interview, Newsweek. 19/6/95.
226 Mubarak Interview, The Financial Times, 22/4/93.
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227reform." An argument which in turn allows the President
to continue trading on Egypt's "role in the "peace process"
228for concessional aid and credit flows." In comparison to 
Turkey, Mexico and India for example:
"Only Egypt could collect rents from the 
Suez Canal, and only Egypt benefited from 
the enormous strategic rents paid by the 
United States in return for the Camp David 
Accords of 197 9 and for Egypt's continuing 
role in promoting overall Arab 
understanding with Israel. U.S. Economic 
assistance [alone] to Egypt totalled $13.2 
billion between 1975 and 1990, with an 
additional 3.2 billion through the 
Commodity Import Programme. Military 
assistance, began in 1980, reached $12.6 
billion by 1990. The total flow of U.S. 
assistance thus cumulated to $27.4 billion
229over fifteen years."
What this implies therefore, is that being in the unique 
position of having access to such avenues of financial 
assistance, one should expect to have seen some substantial 
developments on the socio-economic front. The fact that 
this has not been the case has led observers to question 
Mubarak's overall leadership ability. As Gauch notes, with 
his consolidation of power and thus:
"his increased confidence and pride, it 
seems Mubarak should be moving less 
cautiously now and taking bigger steps. Yet 
he continues to lack the ability of Sadat 
and before him, President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, to strategize, innovate and
230subsequently motivate the public."
Indeed, over the years, it seems that Mubarak has lacked 
the stature of a visionary leader. He has repeatedly 
proclaimed his intention to eventually achieve both 
political and socio-economic liberalisation. However, the 
fact that after nearly two decades in power, he continues
227 BBC World Service broadcast, 2 April 1993, cited in T. Parfitt 
(1993), P18.
228 J. Waterbury (1993), P60.
229 J. Waterbury (1993), P80.
230 S. Gauch (1991), P41.
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to maintain concern for stability as justification for the 
lack of any explicit development in either front, cannot be 
simply attributed to an inferior personal ability to 
strategize and innovate change. This circumspect attitude 
can instead be interpreted as a strategy aimed at 
safeguarding the system of personalised authoritarian rule. 
As Tripp noted with regard to contemporary Egyptian 
politics: "the legacy of authoritarian politics... has led
successive governments to give priority to their 
requirements for maintaining order within the state" and 
the pursuit of this objective "has thus led them not to 
question the end itself, but to concentrate on the means by
• « 231which that end can be achieved." ' It is along these lines 
therefore, that one can understand that Mubarak's 
interpretation of stability and his apparent endorsement of 
socio-economic development does not denote an intention to 
transform the existing political system. This assumption is 
in fact further reflected in the manner by which multi­
party participation under his rule is contained and 
controlled.
Strategies to contain and control 
multi-Partv participation
President Mubarak's decision to continue allowing some 
opposition presence within the People's Assembly shows, on 
the surface, some degree of flexibility. Logically, the 
broad considerations which Mubarak has taken into account, 
and which we discussed previously, means that to a certain 
extent, he had little alternative but to allow the 
continuation of a 'multi-party' legislature. Yet, it is 
difficult to depict this apparent flexibility as an 
indication of his intent to emancipate the Assembly from 
established presidential control. The President's 
continuous reliance upon emergency laws for example, is 
perhaps one of the most prominent indications of his 
attempt to maintain a tight grip on multi-party 
participation and hence entry into the Assembly.
231 C. Tripp (1991), P160.
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As we mentioned previously, the adoption of emergency laws 
has been justified by Mubarak as a necessary measure to
232combat terrorism and protect the country's stability. 
However, while the President plays up the threat of Islamic 
fundamentalism as justification for the implementation of 
emergency laws, he has also been known to concede that the
• ■ 233Islamic threat m  Egypt is not particularly dangerous. 
The fact that the President on occasion inadvertently 
undermines the reasons for placing emergency measures in 
the first place, is itself a strong indication that the 
enforced state of emergency is not simply focused on 
containing terrorist activities.
Indeed, this notion is extremely plausible because under a 
state of emergency, censorship is potentially exercised 
over all activities ranging from monitoring political 
action to limiting freedom of expression. Individuals can 
be arrested solely on the basis of suspicion of involvement 
in political crimes, and the gathering of five or more 
people or the public distribution of any political 
literature without official government authorisation 
provides the authorities with direct legal authority to 
arrest all those involved. Thus, in order to hold to hold 
gatherings, rallies, distribute pamphlets, or pursue any of 
the standard channels associated with the cultivation of 
supporters on the grass roots level, political parties are 
expected to apply for formal authorisation at the local
232 For example, with reference to opposition's objection to the 
continuous renewal of emergency law, Mubarak responded by arguing 
that such measures were necessary "in order to confront terrorism 
[and] protect democracy and stability in this country". His 
discomfort at the idea of ending the state of emergency is evident 
when he reminded critics of his position by adding "I am in charge 
and I have the authority to adopt [emergency] measures. .. I am in 
charge of the country's stability" see the President's 1988 May 
Day Address, State Information Service, Cairo.
233 For example in one interview the President claimed the 
fundamentalist problem in Egypt cannot be compared to that in 
Algeria and that he believed it to be so insignificant in Egypt 
that he expected it would be eradicated within a few months. See 
The Financial Times. London, 22 April 1993.
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police station, who then pass the request on to the 
Ministry of Interior for a decision. Except on specific 
occasions- namely during the month leading up to 
legislative elections, such permission has automatically 
been denied.234
One particular case which warrants a mention is an incident 
in 1992 involving RifJ_at SaJ_id, the TajammuJ_ Party's 
secretary general and the then Minister of Interior, AAbd 
al-Halim Musa. According to SaAid, he attempted to organise 
a small rally in which members of the intelligentsia, 
playwrights and popular television and film personalities 
agreed to participate in order to demonstrate their support 
for the government in light of the slaughter of fifteen 
Egyptian Coptic Christians in Upper Egypt by Islamic
militants. Although the presence of media personalities in 
an anti-Islamic protest could have provided the government 
with some popular support in its fight against the Islamic
fundamentalists, the Minister of Interior refused to
authorise SaAid's application by claiming that his refusal
was based on principle (mabda'): "if I permit the rally,
today you are demonstrating against the Islamists and maybe
* 235tomorrow you will demonstrate against us." Again, the 
Minister's reply appears to confirm that the state of 
emergency is not only aimed at terrorist activities, but 
perhaps more importantly at controlling legal political 
participation.
The enforced state of emergency also appears to be a useful 
mechanism with which to limit the role of the Egyptian 
judiciary in aspects relating to political participation. 
This is because during a state of emergency and under the
234 During the electoral period candidates have been known to 
bypass official channels of application and hold gatherings and 
small rallies without notifying the authorities for fear the 
applications would be rejected or formal authorisation would be 
intentionally delayed. Those who do work through the formal 
channels tend to be more constrained as a result of the deployment 
of security personnel infiltrating their gatherings. Personal 
observation & interviews during 1995 elections.
235 Personal interview with Rifyat Sayid, 9 January 1995, Cairo.
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pretext of national security, the forty-five days limit for 
holding an accused in custody for questioning could be 
extended indefinitely without a formal court hearing. In 
this respect, the judiciary does not have any role or 
influence over a case if the accused is not presented to 
court. Equally important is the 19 6 6 Law on the Military 
Judiciary which rules that "during a state of emergency, 
the President of the Republic has the right to refer to the 
military judiciary any crime which is punishable under the 
Penal Code or under any other law."236 As a consequence, the 
law allows the authorities a virtual carte blanche to 
detain and prosecute civilians in military courts 
regardless of whether or not their activity endangers 
fundamental interests. Moreover, while civilians condemned 
to death in a criminal court are permitted to appeal to 
Egypt's highest appeal court, the Court of Cassation, in a 
military court, there is no appeal once the three military 
officer judges pass verdict.
Once again there appears to be a pattern which suggests the 
use of military courts is targeted primarily at political 
activists whose main crime is rejecting the political 
status quo. The judiciary has for example, played an 
important political role in defending the right of 
political parties to be formed. Hence, while the government 
rejected the license application of a large number of 
political parties including that of the Nasserites and the 
neo-Wafd, once individual parties resorted to the courts, 
the government complied with adverse court rulings and 
granted the necessary permits. The judiciary also played a 
prominent role in the various electoral law battles between 
the opposition and government. And also, even though the 
rulings appeared to be in favour of its opponents, the 
government obeyed the court verdicts. Considering that 
Mubarak has consistently claimed that one of his most 
important aims is to "establish justice and... champion
236 cf. Military Courts in Egypt: courts without  CHRLA Report,
Cairo, September 1995.
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237rights and the supremacy of law" , the outcome of such 
public cases undoubtedly contributed towards verifying his 
apparent commitment of ensuring "We have no power exceeding 
that of law".238
Yet on closer inspection, such landmark verdicts were 
obeyed by the government because their implications for the 
political status-quo were, at best, minimal. The 
government, one can argue, eventually came to accept that 
particulars such as electoral laws were of little 
significance in view of the fact that it maintained 
complete monopoly over the state apparatus and its 
resources. Furthermore, all the political parties that the 
government licensed as a result of court rulings were 
relatively insignificant from many perspectives and thus, 
in the prevailing circumstances, cannot be perceived as 
potential challengers to power. Unlike religiously based 
political organisations, which Mubarak perceives as "very
239dangerous."
Hence, it is in situations where the regime's fundamental 
interests are thought to be at stake, that Mubarak's more 
poised claims such as: "confrontation of terrorism cannot 
be achieved by security techniques alone, but requires 
action on the part of society as a whole with its 
democratic institutions to combat terrorism politically, 
informatively and ideologically"240 is replaced by forceful 
assertions that he would not allow "human rights to become
241a slogan to protect terrorists." More importantly, m  
such situations, there appears to be little hesitation in 
by-passing the judiciary establishment and refering the 
political trials of civilians to military jurisdiction.
237 BBC MSME, 24 July 1993, 307240160/GV881E/930726.
238 BBC SWB 4 May 1993, ME/1679/A/7.
239 See Mubarak's Interview in The Sunday Times. 24 April 1994.
240 Mubarak's address before joint session of the People's Assembly 
and the Shura Council, December 15 1990, State Information
Service, Cairo.
241 Middle East Watch, Vol.5, Issue 3, July 1993.
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This was most prominently illustrated in October 1992 when 
Mubarak decreed two such cases be tried in the Military 
Court. The verdict for both cases, swiftly handed down 
within a month of trial, included eight defendants being 
sentenced to death. The harshness of the sentences was 
extremely evident in light of the fact that those: 
"sentenced to death were not charged with specific acts of 
violence but with planning the overthrow of the government
i i 242and the assassination of some leaders."
One can argue nevertheless that the adoption of emergency 
measures is officially implemented to combat the activities 
of political extremists working outside the legal 
framework. The fact that such measures also constrict the 
participation of those working within the formal arena, 
can, theoretically, be viewed as a price to pay for 
national security. Yet if we return to Mubarak's attempts 
to manipulate the electoral laws, one cannot perceive such 
actions in the same context as emergency laws. After all, 
legislative elections are of primary concern only to those 
who want to reach public office through legal means. Hence, 
the decision to change the electoral laws prior to the 
first legislative elections under his rule reflects the 
President's conception of political liberalisation and 
shows that it does not include losing power even through 
legal means. This manifestation was virtually confirmed 
when the then Prime Minister, Fu'ad Mohyi. Al-Din , 
personally admitted that under the new system, one of the 
clauses- which outlawed independent candidates- was 
intended to limit access to the legislature of individuals
i . 243who "might not be 'known' to the regime."
Although we will discuss the effects of the electoral law 
amendments in more detail in the following chapter, it is 
worth noting here that the unprecedented move by the
242 The Washington Post. December 4, 1992; cited from Middle East
Watch, Vol. 5, Issue 3, July 1993.
243 R. Owen (1994), P186.
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opposition to formally challenge the government through the 
Supreme Constitutional Court and have these laws annulled, 
reflects the extent to which the opposition viewed these 
laws as biased. It would seem that the opposition's 
reaction and perhaps more importantly, Mubarak's concern 
for his 'democratic' image impelled him to modify the law 
three years later. Striving to present the modified 1986 
version as evidence of his democratic intent, Mubarak 
called this a venture to "consolidate democracy" and mark 
Egypt's arrival "at a common understanding of the role of 
democracy" .244
The President's decision to amend the electoral laws and 
call for premature elections rather than wait for a court 
decision or ignore the legal outcome altogether, could be 
better understood in view of his own political 
circumstances. His renomination for a second presidential 
term was due at the end of 1987 and although his party's 
domination of the legislature meant his position was 
secure, an adverse court ruling could have tarnished the 
legitimacy of this nomination since it would have appeared 
that the president was elected under an unconstitutional 
Assembly.245
The electoral system did eventually revert to the old 
individual candidacy system in 1990. Yet as we mentioned 
above, and will discuss in detail later, reverting to the 
old electoral system, one can argue, was also the result of 
Mubarak's eventual realisation that electoral laws are of 
little significance when his consolidation of power 
provided him with other mechanisms such as patronage and 
electoral malpractice, to ensure entry to the Assembly 
remained stringently controlled.
244 Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XI, (1987), P324.
245 In May 1987 elections - one month after the elections- the 
Supreme Constitutional Court did in fact rule the 1983 electoral 
law incompatible with the constitution, but by then, a new 
Assembly under the amended electoral laws was already in session.
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The President's personal control of the legislature in
post-1952 Egypt, has, as we discussed previously, been
highly dependent upon the President's position as head and 
patron of the ruling party. Under Mubarak it is difficult 
to detect profound changes in this established pattern of 
control. In the absence of clear ideological orientations 
or financial independence, the NDP, as will be examined in 
the following chapter, remains dependent upon government 
resources to build its electoral bases. Moreover, the 
process of selecting NDP candidates for legislative 
elections continues to be highly controlled by the
President. Thus, while all members of the NDP are entitled
to personally apply for electoral nomination, the 
application short-list, as NDP assistant secretary-general, 
Kamal al-Shazli confirmed, is submitted "to President 
Mubarak so that he can make a final decision."246
As in most authoritarian regimes, electoral fraud in post- 
1952 Egypt has been a major tool used by the government to 
exclude certain individuals from gaining entry into the 
Assembly. More interestingly however is that in Egypt, it 
has also been used to control incumbent members of 
parliament. Under Nasser for example, Sharawi Gomma, the 
then Minister of Interior, regarded it more important to 
back electoral favourites through vote rigging, than less 
popular individuals who might actually need such irregular 
assistance to win. As he explained to one of our 
interviewees in 1967, rigging the votes of a popular 
individual who was most likely to win anyway, was crucial 
because if that person "felt that it was genuine votes that 
made him win, he will develop an ego and...we don't want 
anyone to develop any ideas of self importance, this might 
otherwise lead to independent thought."247
In his capacity as Vice-President and Vice-Chairman of the 
NDP, Mubarak undoubtedly became acquainted with the voting
246 Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 October 1995.
247 Personal Interview, RifJ_at Sa_Lid, 8, January 1995, Cairo.
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irregularities of his predecessors. Thus, as President, he 
asserted that: "the formation of the People's Assembly
through free and honest elections and multiple parties is 
the beginning of a new phase of responsibilities and 
duties, in which we shall renew all our capabilities and
248 . . .review our steps". However, it is interesting to note 
that one of the major bones of contention between 
opposition and government, has been the persistent 
manipulation of electoral results and Mubarak's refusal to 
take action. In response to claims by the opposition of 
government malpractice during the 1984 elections for 
example, Mubarak chose to deny the complaints by insisting 
"the people have spoken their word free of any
249restrictions, pressure, forgery or rigging". Furthermore, 
he implied it was the opposition who were at fault because 
they "did not accept the people's decision with a 
democratic spirit but sought to cast doubt on the integrity 
and honesty of the elections".250
Indeed, it is difficult to accurately measure the extent of 
electoral malpractice under Mubarak's rule. However, a 
prime indication that ballot rigging and electoral 
irregularities are rather widespread, was highlighted after 
the elections of 1987 when the opposition filed suit 
against questionable NDP winners. The Court of Cassation 
found enough evidence to declare seventy-eight of the NDP's 
three hundred and forty-eight winning seats null and void. 
More significantly perhaps, was the refusal of the then 
Assembly Speaker, Rifyat al-Mahjub, to comply with the 
court's ruling on the basis that "parliament was sovereign
• i i 251 *m  all matters concerning its membership." Since a 
decision of this nature cannot be taken without the 
President's approval in his formal capacity of party 
chairman,* the case evidently illustrates that Mubarak has
248 BBC SWB, 3 May 1984, ME/7633/A/10.
249 BBC SWB, 2 6 June 19 84, ME/7679/A/1.
250 BBC SWB, 26 June 1984, ME/7679/A/2.
251 Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 October 1995
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little hesitation in ignoring the law if he feels that some 
fundamental interests are at stake. In other words, it 
would seem, that the law in Mubarak's Egypt-as with his 
predecessors- is indispensable only when it serves to 
safeguard the interest of the regime.
Another example that indicates this to be the case is the 
fact that when the opposition's press freedom began to be 
viewed as a direct challenge to his authority, Mubarak 
sought to repress that freedom through the law. The case, 
again illustrative of the discrepancy between Mubarak's 
alleged views and actual practice, initially emerged as a 
series of attacks and counter-attacks in the form of 
accusations and warnings between the President and his 
opponents. The reason, it seems, stemmed from Mubarak's 
attempts to portray himself as an honest ruler who would 
not tolerate "hypocrisy, corruption or trading with the
252livelihood of the people" nor would he be willing to 
"abet or cover up any corruption, even if the person
253involved is my closest aide". Yet when the opposition 
press, relying on the President's claims of having "lifted 
all press censorship" and provided "a free national party 
press that writes what it wants without control or
254censorship", began to pursue and publicise cases relating 
to government corruption, Mubarak did not appear to take 
such concerns seriously. Characteristically, his reaction 
focused on attempts to discredit his opponents by accusing 
them of "falsifying the facts and spreading lies and 
provocation. "255
252 BBC SWB 15 October 1981, ME/6854/A/14.
253 BBC SWB 28 April 1993, ME/1674/A/3 .
254 BBC SWB 14 October 1993. It is worth noting that in view of the 
imposed participatory restrictions and the fact that the entire 
broadcasting media and a large section of printed media remained 
under direct government control, Mubarak must have perceived such 
a move as relatively harmless. Perhaps more so in context to 
Egypt's semi-literate population and the assumption that the 
poverty stricken mass majority are unlikely to pay fifty piasters 
for a newspaper.
255 BBCMS ME, 27 July 1992, 20720009/9MVC33 920728.
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The President, evidently believes the opposition's role in 
the "national march" is to "offer well considered views"256,
257"but not trade accusation". Hence, it is understandable
that such a critique of the government was perceived as
improper, unpatriotic and thus felt it his "duty to warn
against those who are increasingly talking about corruption
in Egypt" because they simply "seek to weaken the domestic
258front [and] want to see... some negative phenomena". Yet 
when such critique extended too near the President for 
comfort, it would seem verbal 'warnings' were not 
considered a sufficient response.
Indicative of this was when, in the summer of 1995, Mubarak 
was interviewed for an American news magazine, the 
journalist in question brought up the subject of general 
public corruption in Egypt. Interestingly, the President 
replied: "The whole story that my sons were agents for
Airbus for instance? Never. It came from the Muslim
259 ■ ■Brothers." The fact that Mubarak denied such accusations 
and instead chose to blame it on opponent defamation 
strategies is not unexpected given his customary pattern of 
response. The fact that he specifically mentioned his sons 
as an example, not only shows he was fully aware of the 
level such accusations had reached,260 but may also explain 
why Law 93 of 1995, which provides harsh penalties 
including prison sentences for the publication of false or
256 Al-Ahram, 23 October 1981.
257 Presidential Speech to a joint session of the People's Assembly 
and Consultative Council, 8 November 1981, State Information 
service, Cairo.
258 BBC SWB 4 May 1993, ME/1679/A/7.
259 Mubarak interview, Newsweek. 19 June 1995.
260 The "Airbus" scandal, as relayed to us during our 1995-6 stay 
in Egypt, was that Mubarak's sons had, in early 1995, made a huge 
commission by selling approximately twenty aeroplanes at inflated 
prices to Egypt Air on behalf the "Airbus" manufacturers. The 
scandal appeared to be compounded when it emerged that the 
president had at that time decided to extend the tenure of the 
Managing Director of Egypt Air, Muhammad al-Rayyan, for a further 
three years. Al-Rayyan was due for retirement in 1995, and the 
extension of his appointment was rather suprising in view of 
rumours about his alleged corruption. Personal interviews, Nov.- 
Jan. 1995-6, Cairo.
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malicious news, had been implemented at that particular 
period.261 On justifying the new law, Mubarak himself 
admitted "that for eight years I have listened to many 
complaints [and] accusations are growing unnecessarily."262 
Hence it is interesting to note that after such a long 
time, the decision to take direct action coincided with a 
widespread corruption scandal affecting members of his 
immediate family.
In fact, when the President attempted to justify the new 
law, he did not actually deny the existence of corruption, 
but instead pointed out: "Suppose someone makes a mistake, 
why should you involve his relatives, who might occupy 
respectable positions? what business do you have to do 
this? It is improper for you to do this".263 On the basis of 
such comments, it would seem the President was evidently 
less concerned about rectifying the actual problem of 
corruption which he himself inadvertently admitted exists, 
and more concerned to resort to the law to prevent such a 
misdemeanour being publicly exposed and thus tarnishing his 
rule. As he put it: "What else can I do as head of state? I 
do not want to prevent a writer from writing... But the law 
is there...[to] increase the punishment; nothing more and 
nothing less."264 It is also worth noting how Mubarak's 
authoritarian vision emerges again through his perception 
that protecting his interests as President constitute one 
and the same as protecting the interests of the citizens. 
Hence his claim that the media law was imposed, not to 
"touch the freedom of the press" but to "rectify the 
mistakes that harm the interests of the citizens".265
261 Moreover, to ensure this controversial law would be passed with 
minimal publicity, it was rushed through the Assembly on a 
Saturday, when most MPs were absent, and was not even mentioned on 
that day's parliamentary agenda. See Strangling the Press. Middle 
East International, 9 June 19 95,
262 BBCMS ME, 30 May 1995, 505300330/5W8RC/950530.
263 BBCMS ME, 30 May 1995, 505300330/5W8RC/950530.
264 BBCMS ME, 30 May 1995, 505300330/5W8RC/950530.
265 BBCMS ME, 30 May 1995, 505300330/5W8RC/950530.
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The implementation of such a stringent media law, in the 
final analysis, is just one of several strategies which 
appear aimed at containing and controlling multi-party 
participation in Mubarak's Egypt. As we have discussed, the 
reliance on emergency measures, the various attempts to 
restrict electoral participation including the 
implementation of biased electoral laws, the prevalence of 
electoral malpractice and the President's personal 
involvement in selecting electoral candidates for the NDP, 
also constitute strategies which appear intended 
predominantly for such a purpose. What this means 
therefore, is that on the basis of such strategies, there 
exists little indication to suggest, on President Mubarak's 
part, genuine intentions to relinquish the prevailing 
personalised system of rule.
Furthermore, the assumption that Mubarak's aim is not 
simply to contain and control multi-party participation, 
but also to utilise it to reaffirm and expand the 
clientelist structure which has assisted Egypt's successive 
Presidents maintain the post-1952 personalised system of 
rule, is reflected in the fact that Mubarak, like his 
predecessors, continues to maintain stringent personal 
control over the allocation of state resources.
Mubarak's control of the NDP and hence the People's
Assembly for example, means he has been in the position to
demand (and obtain) under the 'Delegation Act', sole
responsibility for the purchase and sale of military
266hardware, as well as for the entire military budget. The 
President's monopoly of such a major part of the decision 
making process, which is justified on the grounds of 
national security, seems not only to imply that Mubarak 
regards himself above accountability, but also that he 
perceives the legislature as untrustworthy to partake in 
'sensitive' matters concerning national security. The point
265Personal interviews with various MPs and ex-MPs, Cairo, Nov.-
Jan., 1994/5/6.
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here however, and in view of the military's long-standing 
role as ultimate protector of Egypt's post-1952 regime, it 
is not contentious to argue that the President's personal 
control over the military's budget might be based less on 
'national security' concerns, and more on efforts to 
safeguard the political status-quo. Indeed, if Mubarak 
shared decision-making powers with an independent 
legislature, it would difficult for him to justify 
allocating an annual budget of US$ 3 .5 billion for the 
military. Especially in view of other pressing matters such 
as foreign debts which, although reduced by US$24 billion 
after Egypt's role in the Gulf War, still stood at US$26 
billion in 1994.267
Even if Egypt's foreign debts are disregarded, the amount 
spent on the military is still enormous if compared to the 
amount spent on other sectors of the economy such as 
unemployment (which is estimated between 17-2 0 percent of 
the working population). In dealing with that sector, which 
can arguably be viewed as a breeding ground for militant 
extremists, an annual budget allocation for job creation 
schemes is slightly less than three quarters of a billion 
US dollars. In other words, with over half a million people 
a year entering the workforce, such a meagre allocation is
"barely sufficient to provide employment for 10 percent of
268[these] new entrants".
It should be noted that it was Mubarak who declared shortly 
after assuming power: "We opt for peace in order to prevent 
the continued wastage of funds used for the purchase of 
arms and ammunition. Such funds could now be spent for the 
welfare and prosperity of the Egyptian people, who have 
long suffered from the horrors of war in both psychological
269and material terms." Hence that heavy military spending 
has subsequently been justified by emphasising the
261 The Wall Street Journal Europe, 15 June 1993.
268 Cassandra, (1995), P12.
269 Mubarak interview, October magazine, 1 November 1981
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significance of the military in protecting "our freedom,
■ 270sovereignty, values and leading role m  the region", 
appears paradoxical. What is implausible however is 
Mubarak's claim that the budget allocated to the military 
simply: "goes to pay the wages of the men, while the other
half is spent on the maintenance of military equipment,
271food, and lodging, and clothing." In fact, a patent 
example that the President diverts enormous funds into the 
military establishment to cover more than just the basic 
necessities, can be found in the case of Factory 2 00.
Factory 2 00, a tank assembly plant which, after nine years 
construction, was officially opened in 1992, constitutes 
the largest industrial installation in the Middle East. 
Apart from the fact that its economic viability has led it 
to be described by an Egyptian banker as "a big white
272 • *elephant", more significantly it is funded and maintained 
primarily through foreign aid. Thus if Mubarak can divert 
US$2.5 billion of American aid and an estimated US$450
273million of state funds, into a project such as this, then 
it is evident the President's priority is not simply to 
sustain the military establishment, but to ensure he 
preserves the position of the President as its ultimate 
patron. Even if this seems to be at the expense of Egypt's 
social and economic development.
Another indication suggesting that the clientelist 
dependence of the major political and state apparatus on 
the President constitutes a major strategy of Mubarak's 
rule is the fact that like his predecessors, he continues 
to maintain direct control of the national budget. It 
should be noted that the People's Assembly is not excluded
270 BBC SWB, 1 July 1986, ME/8299/A/1.
271 BBC SWB, 1 July 1986, ME/8299/A/1.
272 Contracts to supply tanks to buyers apart from the Egyptian 
army has been very difficult in view of the fact that each tank 
costs double that of its $2 million American made counter-part. 
See: The Wall Street Journal Europe, 15 June 1993.
273 Ibid, .
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from overseeing the annual budget to the same extent it is 
excluded from the military budget. However, whilst the 
general budget is presented annually to the Assembly for 
official 'approval', its presentation format is described 
in the words of one member, as resembling "one of the
274President's public speeches," In other words, while the 
Assembly is presented with a broad outline of the 
government's policy proposals and overall budget estimates 
for approval prior to the start of each fiscal year, 
details such as specific resource allocations to the 
various ministries has remained solely the prerogative of 
the President. In preserving such an important role, it 
would seem that Mubarak has had little intention but to 
ensure that ultimately, the entire governmental and state 
apparatuses are no less dependent upon him, than was the 
case under his predecessors. Moreover, the preservation of 
such an important role within a multi-party context, means 
that political opponents also have little choice but to be 
dependent upon President Mubarak for their allocation of 
state resources. Indeed, as we examine in the following 
chapters, electoral participation within the government 
defined area makes it almost inevitable for the 
participating opposition to seek a share of these 
presidentially controlled resources.
2. 4 Conclusion
We have attempted to show the major factors which allow the 
President to constitute the ultimate source of power and 
authority in post-1952 Egypt. Mubarak's main concern, we 
have argued has been to safeguard this system of personal 
authoritarian rule. To do so, it seems the President's
274 Personal Interview, Fikri al-Jazzar, 3 January 1995, Cairo: 
Apparently to prove his honesty and to show "we are not giving you 
fictitious figures", Mubarak does seem to refer regularly to 
government spending in his major national speeches. Understandably 
it is presented in a vague manner - hence the comparison- such as 
"Industry requires replacement and modernisation.. Some machines 
have been in existence since 1938, and some since 1960. . .Some 
1. lbn pounds is allocated in the 1985-6 budget for replacements 
and modernisation. The public sector really needs a good push in 
this regard." - See: Mubarak's Mayday Speech, 14, May 1985, BBCMS 
ME, 505147 319/GC7WD6 850514.
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strategy has focused upon imposing disparate constraints on 
the embryonic multi-party system, which, as Vice-President, 
he inherited from Sadat. Mubarak has attempted to justify 
such an approach on the logic that instability would arise 
if a greater measure of political liberalisation took 
priority over socio-economic development. Apart from the 
fact that there is no evidence to suggest genuine political 
liberalisation would set back socio-economic reform, 
Mubarak's argument appears even less sincere in view of his 
reluctance to initiate major socio-economic reforms. 
Reforms which amongst other things, would ultimately reduce 
the state sector and thus a major part of his own power 
base. That minor economic reforms have actually been 
undertaken cannot, as we have argued, be considered 
government initiatives, but token gestures to the 
international creditors whose assistance provides Mubarak 
with the necessary funds to uphold the clientelist 
structure which, along with the enormous legal- 
constitutional powers vested in the presidency, play an 
important role in the preservation of the prevailing system 
of personal rule.
The process of allowing for the continuation of multi-party 
participation within this tightly controlled political 
arena therefore, appears to suggest that the aim is not to 
provide political opponents with the opportunity to emerge 
as potential challengers to power, but to incorporate them 
into the same structure of clientelist dependence that is 
used to control the President's own party, and indeed, all 
the major institutions and groupings within the Egyptian 
polity. That transformations within the authoritarian 
polity inherited by Mubarak, were not, realistically, on 
his list of priorities is in fact reflected in one of his 
early interviews as President. As he put it:
"Egypt would go to hell if I listened to 
some nervous people who say "change, 
change!" because then what? You run and run 
and then the troubles begin... Do you want 
me to change everything? do you want me to 
replace an entire generation? ...The method
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of electric shock is futile now. If I were 
to apply it, there would never be stability 
in the country."275
Whether the imposed constraints we have discussed here have 
actually contributed towards shaping the role of multi­
party elections as a tool with which to reaffirm and expand 
the regime's clientelist structure, cannot, however, be 
properly understood without first examining the effects of 
these constraints on political parties in contemporary 
Egypt and hence their response to electoral participation 
as defined under the Mubarak regime. This is our main focus 
in the following chapter.
275 Mubarak interview, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 22 January, 1982.
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Chapter Three 
Political Parties in 
Non-Competitive Elections.
3.1 Introduction
Our primary concern in this chapter will be to examine how 
the arena of political contest is utilised under the 
Mubarak regime as an instrument with which to co-opt and 
subsequently control individuals representing disparate 
political parties. Our aim here will be as follows. We will 
first look at the nature of the President's National 
Democratic Party (NDP). The aim is to show that in spite of 
the fact the party is controlled by the President and his 
designated men to the extent it lacks compelling ideology, 
charismatic leadership and autonomous access to resources, 
its participation in legislative elections still allows it 
to attract and hence co-opt prominent individuals who 
appear to possess extensive networks of support on the 
parochial level.
As we previously stressed, Mubarak like his predecessors, 
does not appear institutionally bound to formal political 
organisations who share in the setting of policy. In such a 
context, election to the People's Assembly is not intended 
to confer the opportunity for such individuals to 
participate in the formulation, or arguably the 
deliberation, of public policy. Instead, what we will 
attempt to illustrate is how election as a member of the 
President's party confers the opportunity to achieve 
alternate gains. Namely direct access to a share of the 
resources that the President and his government commands. 
Resources, which do not simply provide those elected to the 
Assembly with the potential to enhance and expand their 
prestige and influence in their respective localities. But
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also emphasises their role as intermediaries between 
central authorities and their respective localities.
The implications, as we will subsequently argue, are 
advantageous to the regime from two perspectives. The most 
evident being that the electoral process allows the 
President's party to recruit individuals and define their 
roles as clientelist linkages binding the periphery to the 
centre. On another level, it seems that his party's 
cohesion is hindered as a result of election to the 
People's Assembly being defined on such a clientelist 
basis. This situation is arguably ideal for the President 
since an organised and cohesive party, even if he is its 
chairman, still constitutes a potential challenge to his 
personal consolidation of power.
In the second part of the chapter we will focus our 
attention on members of the opposition who participate in 
the arena of political contest. As we discussed previously, 
the presence of opposition parties was, from a number of 
perspectives, viewed by Mubarak as beneficial to his rule. 
However, it was evident from the way in which the President 
imposed various impediments such as emergency measures and 
stringent press laws, that their presence in the formal 
political arena was not intended to challenge the political 
status quo. In the case of elections, it seems this too was 
also intended to act as a mechanism of control. Yet rather 
than blatantly suppress the activities of opponents, as in 
the case of emergency measures for example, we will argue 
that by granting opponents the opportunity to compete in 
the arena of political contest, the primary aim was to 
incorporate them into the same clientelist linkage that is 
utilised to control NDP members.
The extent to which elections have contributed towards 
defining the role of the opposition as clientelist linkages 
that bind the centre to the periphery, will be assessed as 
we look at their strategies and performance during the 
periods surrounding the four legislative elections of 1984,
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1987, 1990 and 1995. The six "major" opposition parties - 
the Neo-Wafd, the NPUP, the Labour Party, the Liberal Party 
the Nasserite Democratic Party, and the technically illegal 
Muslim Brotherhood - will be used as examples.
What we will aim to emphasise is that initially, elections 
did not appear to influence how opposition parties 
perceived their role. Rather, opposition parties pre-1990 
appeared generally united in perceiving participation in 
electoral contest as a process which would eventually lead 
to genuine competition for power. Since 1990 however, we 
will attempt to show the extent to which such an attitude 
began to change. In particular, we will argue that the 
function of elections as a mechanism of clientelist 
recruitment that defines and thus controls the role 
political activists perform, appears to have become 
increasingly applicable in the case of political opponents.
3.2 Elections and the National Democratic Party
The National Democratic Party, as we have pointed out 
previously, has, since its creation by Sadat in 1978, 
systematically occupied no less than three quarters of the 
seats in the People's Assembly. We have also noted that the 
NDP, like the previous 'organisations' under Nasser's 
single party system, was not only created by a President, 
but was, and continues to be, headed by a President. 
Another point which should be reiterated here, is that 
bearing in mind the NDP was created by Sadat to replace 
Nasser's Arab Socialist Union, the fact remained that the 
majority of ASU parliamentarians and senior party members 
swiftly 'converted' to Sadat's new party. In view of these 
factors, and in particular, in view of the President's pre­
eminent position in the political arena, it would be 
difficult to expect the NDP to differ extensively in terms 
of autonomy from previous parties that had been created and 
subsequently eradicated by their respective chairmen in 
post-1952 Egypt.
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That the NDP represented a change in direction in terms of 
its official ideological stand and the socialist position 
of past parties, cannot, on its own, be perceived as a 
fundamental indication of change. In fact, it seems the 
party does not actually possess a clear ideological stand. 
The NDP's programme for example, is formally based upon the 
principles of promoting "democracy, fostering Egypt's 
affiliation to the Arab world, [and] venerating . . . 
economic liberalisation that encourages private
276 •investment" . However, that the party's official 
ideological stand is rather vague and open to 
interpretation does not appear unintentional. As Hinnebusch 
points out, whilst the party was, by the end of the Sadat 
era, cleared of left-wing elements and had thus become 
established "firmly to the centre-right", the fact that the 
official programme was vague meant the party would be able 
to "accommodate a fairly heterogeneous spectrum of
277 »political attitudes". Equally important perhaps, is that 
the absence of a rigid and confining ideology means on a 
more symbolic level, the party can support virtually any 
policy decisions the President and his government pursues 
without it appearing as an overt compromise to its 
'official' standing.
Organisational structure: an overview
To judge from NDP's overwhelming majority in the Egyptian 
legislature, it is logical to assume the party constitutes 
an intense and complex organisation. In reality however, 
the 'ruling' party appears to be structured along very 
simplistic lines. In terms of financial resources for 
example, the NDP officially controls only £E20 million in 
capital. This sum was raised by Sadat in 197 8 from four 
main sources. The National Bank, Banque Misr and the Bank 
of Alexandria contributed a quarter of the amount 
respectively. The final quarter of this amount was donated 
by a few private party subscribers, probably eager to
276 Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 October 1995.
277 R, A. Hinnebusch, Jr., 1981, P161.
134
Political Parties in Non-Competitive Elections
illustrate their support of the president and his new 
party. At the same time, Sadat also established the 
National Development Bank (NDB).
The purpose of the bank was, and continues to be, primarily
for investing the secured £E20 million capital and using
the proceeds to finance the NDP and its development
projects. In addition to its bulk capital, the party is
also formally subsidised by an annual amount of
approximately £E250,000 from the sale of its official
publications including its daily newspaper Mayo. The
party's final source of official income is an annual grant
of £E100,000 obtained from the Consultative Council- an
amount distributed by the Council to all registered
278political parties in Egypt. As such income suggests, the
NDP, as Egypt's dominant party, controls a very limited 
amount of direct funds. Yet one can argue that this is 
reflective of the President's attempts to ensure it does 
not develop into an autonomous and thus potentially 
challenging entity.
The President's efforts to control the NDP is also 
reflected in the nature of party leadership. Mubarak, upon 
assuming the chairmanship of the three year old party, 
ensured that certain individuals were promptly expelled 
from membership. The individuals in question included NDP 
deputies such as Rashad yothman, Mustafa Khalil and Mahmud 
So layman. Described as a breed of "parasitic
279 . . .  . . .bourgeoisie" , such individuals were initially encouraged 
by Sadat to join his new party. The late President, it 
would seem, intended for them to constitute the foundation 
of the party. Indicative of this is the fact Sadat allowed
278 Information derived from personal interviews of NDP members, 
Cairo, 1994-5 and also; Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 October 1995.
279 The term "parasitic bourgeoisie" is used by Springborg to 
describe a wide range of individuals whose common ground is that 
they profit "principally though the subversion of the state and 
the conversion of its resources into private wealth", R. 
Springborg, 1989, P81. As a group, their presence emerged most 
prominently after Sadat introduced his economic 'open door policy'
(inf,ita.h) .
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a quarter of the £L2 0 million capital secured for the NDP
• 280 in 1978 to be privately donated by one individual. That
person being 'Othman 'Ahmad 'Qthman, the then Minister of
reconstruction, father-in-law to one of Sadat's daughters,
and as a construction contractor, arguably the richest of
Egypt's parasitic bourgeoisie.
It should be noted however that 'Qthman published a 
controversial book on Nasser in 1980. The result of which 
caused public outcry, forcing Sadat, shortly before his 
assassination, to remove 'Othman from the reconstruction 
Ministry. Mubarak, it would appear, thus found a suitable 
pretext with which to ease 'Othman out of the party. Those 
closely connected with ' Q thman also appear to have 
experienced a similar fate. Illustrative of this was the 
predicament of Mustafa Khalil, a senior party leader when 
Mubarak came to power. Khalil's close association with 
Sadat and 'Qthman, as Springborg notes, resulted in him 
being "jettisoned a year [after Mubarak came to power] and 
replaced by Fuad Muhyi al-Din, who was independent of 
Osman" .2S1
The potential influence of lesser 'parasitic bourgeoisie'
within the party was also swiftly curtailed. Under the
pretext that the new President would not tolerate
"hypocrisy, corruption, or trading with the livelihood of 
282the people" , the most discernible tactic employed almost 
immediately after Mubarak assumed the Presidency, was the 
removal of a number of these individuals from the Assembly 
and thus the party on corruption charges. In December 1981 
for example, Rashad 'Qthman. who was at the time the NDP's 
deputy for Alexandria, was stripped of Assembly immunity 
and party membership to face charges for illegal 
profiteering of timber sales. Mahmud Solayman, the NDP's
280 Financial donations quoted from Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 Oct. 
1995 .
281 R. Springborg, 1989, P158.
282 BBC SWB, 15 October 1981: ME/6854/A/18.
136
Political Parties in Non-Competitive Elections
deputy for the electoral constituency of Rosetta also 
encountered a similar fate when he found himself abandoned 
by the party he represented to face charges of drug- 
trafficking. NDP deputy for Kom 'Ombo, Salah 'Abu al-Majd, 
constitutes yet another example of the "parasitic 
bourgeoisie" whom Mubarak managed to eradicate from the 
party shortly after coming to power. In this instance, on 
charges for trading in state land.283
If the NDP had been established for a longer period of time 
prior to Mubarak assuming the presidency, it is doubtful 
that the removal of individuals such as these would have 
been as straightforward an affair. This is based on the 
assumption that had these multi-millionaires been party 
members for a longer period than just the three years 
before Mubarak came to power, it is likely they would have 
had more opportunity to build within the party a 
clientelist base of support. Whilst such clientelist 
networks do not necessarily denote protection against 
Presidential aversion, one can argue that with such a base 
of support, it would have been difficult to implicate one 
individual without implicating many others within the 
party. A similar predicament for example, was faced by 
Sadat when he attempted to prevent ASU leader, _\Ali Sabri 
and his shilla, from using the ASU as an instrument of 
mobilisation and control. Indeed, Sabri was unable to use 
the ASU for such purpose due to the "chain of command 
[being] weakened by the defection of apparatcheki who 
stayed loyal to Sadat."284 Yet the clientelist base of 
support which Sabri had cultivated over the years, meant 
that by removing Sabri, Sadat also had to remove Sabri's 
allies within the party. This, in the final analysis, was a 
major factor which contributed towards the eventual 
dismantling of the ASU.
283 Al-Shayb, 18 May 19 81; Al-Ahram, 22 May 19 81.
284 R. A. Hinnebusch, Jr., 19 88, P44 .
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Perhaps not wishing to witness a repeat of such events, 
Mubarak's swift move against the most discernible of these 
'parasitic bourgeoisie' appears to show the new President 
had little intention of allowing them to become too 
embedded in the party so as to have the opportunity to 
build a clientelist power-base which could potentially 
challenge his personal grip on the party. On another level, 
it is also worth viewing such a tactic as a warning to 
other party members that escaped Mubarak's minor round-up, 
but who, prior to this may have harnessed grandeur 
expectations of their role within the party.
Mubarak's efforts to prevent the emergence of powerful and 
thus potentially challenging leaders within the NDP, is 
further reflected in the fact that all senior posts within 
the party continue to be presidentially appointed. This 
includes the thirteen seats that comprise the party's 
Politburo, the twenty-three positions which constitute the 
party's General Secretariat, and the fifteen chairman posts 
that overlook the party's fifteen Standing Committees. That 
such appointments allow the President to maintain 
centralised control over the party and ensure its senior 
members do not emerge as independent leaders and thus 
potential challengers to power, is reflected, as we 
discussed in the previous chapter, in the type of people he 
appoints.
Legislative elections and the NDP: an overview 
In the absence of a compelling ideology, autonomous access 
to resources, or even independent party leaders, the NDP 
appears to depend upon its links to the President as its 
major source of propaganda. During the period leading up to 
the 1995 legislative elections for example, the official 
NDP posters we saw located around Cairo and in the 
buildings where we attended formal gatherings of NDP 
candidates all depicted enlarged photographs of President 
Mubarak waving (as though to the nation), and the party's 
name al-Hezb al-Watani al-Dimoqrati, written simply at the 
bottom of the poster. The message which seems to emerge
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from the party's official poster is that by supporting the 
NDP, one is being 'nationalistic' and supporting the 
President.
NDP candidates on an individual level, when officially 
referring to the party they represent, also seem to focus 
primarily on the Presidential link. In particular, by 
stressing to the voters how grateful they should be for 
such an 'association' and the 'privileges' which are 
derived as a result. Illustrative of this type of attitude 
for example, was evident during a formal NDP gathering we 
attended for the public sector workers of the industrial 
governorate of Helwan wa al- Tibbin. The four NDP 
candidates for the governorate's two electoral 
constituencies were in attendance, two of whom were cabinet 
ministers. The Minister of Religious Endowments, Dr 
Muhammad Mahjub, and the Minister of War Productions, 
General Muhammad al-Ghamrawi. The guest speakers comprised 
various senior NDP members including the Minister of Public 
Enterprise, Dr lAt.ef J^Obayd, and the Governor of Cairo, 
General fOmar J_Abd al - ' Akhar.
Whilst these prominent individuals were attending in the
official role of senior representatives of the NDP, this
aspect seemed to be overlooked when Mahjub introduced them
in the following words: "Today, President Hosni Mubarak has
sent his men to Helwaji. This is because Helwan is an
important part of Egypt. It is the production centre of
Egypt. . . We thank the President and we thank our prominent
28^guests for coming." ‘ The address of the Governor of 
Cairo, lOmar _\Abd al-'Akhar. seemed even more direct:
"...Yes the problems of Helwan continue to 
exist... what I say is that problems exist 
everywhere, all the time in life. This is 
what life is all about. However in the last 
four years, the NDP has already spent 6 00 
millions pounds on Helwan wa al-Tibbin 
areas alone. Therefore I think that the
285 NDP gathering for industrial workers, held at the Helwan Youth 
Club, 25 November 1995, Cairo.
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government and the NDP deserve your respect
and gratitude for what has been done for 
,,286you.
During a similar gathering held for the two NDP contestants 
in the electoral constituency of Nozha wa 'Almaza, the same 
type of tone can be detected. The veteran of the two 
candidates, Dr Hamdi. Al-Sayyed for example, thanked the 
prominent party speakers for their attendance. In 
particular, he thanked Deputy Governor of Cairo, General 
'Ahmad Hasan Al-Jawahirgi, whom, he told the audience 
"refused an invitation to a five star hotel with the
ambassador of Oman. He refused a five star meal and five
287star entertainment to come to you." That the audience, 
who consisted primarily of factory workers on the outskirts 
of Heliopolis, and whose problems included the absence of 
electricity in their homes, should be 'grateful' for the 
Deputy Governor's 'sacrifice', appears rather 
condescending. Yet, this type of attitude illustrates how 
NDP candidates have little alternative but to focus upon 
the significance of being linked to the most senior members 
of the state apparatus. Especially when such links 
eventually lead to the patronage of the President. As Al- 
Sayyed concluded to the audience in his address:
"You must remember that ma.s_laha.ta.kom fe 
hezh al-hokuma, al Hezb al-Watzani. (your 
interest lies in the government party, NDP)
You must also remember that al~Dawla (the 
state) is not stingy, it helps you. It does 
everything it can for you and you must not 
forget that. Finally, I will not forget, 
and you must not forget, that the NDP, 
headed by President Mubarak, has paid for
-i -i • ,,288all your services.
That one can detect in senior party members a lack of 
commitment to the party as an autonomous entity, is further 
reinforced in private interviews. Muhammad Al-Sayyed, an
286 ibid.
387 Electoral gathering for NDP candidates Dr Hamdi Al-Sayyed and 
Muhammad Rajab, held at Markaz Al-Shaib, Hike Step, Nozha, 18 
November 1995, Cairo.
288 • *iIbid.
140
Political Parties in Non-Competitive Elections
NDP member of the Assembly for the urban constituency of 
Hada'iq al-Qobba since 1990, summarised his views on the 
significance of his party's position as follows:
"The NDP is good. But I am not talking 
about ideology or anything like that. This 
is not important. I do not think any of us 
[NDP deputies] care about that. What I mean 
is that it provides access to the services 
needed by the people. This is because it is 
the President's party. I or anybody else in 
the NDP would join any party that is in the 
NDP's position. This is because it would be 
able to provide the necessary services to 
the constituents."289
It is worth noting that the political analysts and 
academics whom we interviewed also portrayed little 
hesitation in stressing the NDP's deficiencies as a party. 
As Wahid J_Abd Majid, an editor at Al-Ahram's Centre for 
Political and Strategic Studies, noted:
"One cannot talk of a political agenda when 
referring to the NDP. It is evident from 
general elections that its overall 
political agenda is weak. That is why the 
party resorts to provincial style
.... „ 290politics."
Indeed, the NDP, as a party, appears to depend primarily 
upon its links to the government when attempting to attract 
electoral support. This however, is arguably an intentional 
strategy on the part of government. If the party was an 
independent entity, it would be difficult for elections to 
function either as propaganda tool for the regime or as a 
clientelist mechanism of recruitment to link those on the 
periphery to the centre. In fact, it would be difficult for 
elections to function in such a manner if the government's 
hold over the party did not extend to an input in the 
selection of candidates. This is because if elections are 
to perform its intended functions, then it is necessary not 
only to ensure the party does not emerge as an independent
289 Personal interview, 26 November 1995, Cairo.
290 Personal interview, 2 9 December 19 94, Cairo.
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entity, but also that 'suitable' candidates can be selected 
for the party.
Electoral candidates for the NDP
Formally, NDP members who aspire to reach legislative 
office are required to submit an application for nomination 
to the party's local secretariat- of which there is one in 
each of Egypt's twenty-six governates. The local 
secretariat is subsequently expected to pass all the 
applications along with his personal recommendations to the 
party's headquarters in Cairo. Prior to the President's 
final decision, the applications are first short-listed. 
This is done under the supervision of the party's 
secretary-general and assistant secretary-general. 
Formally, the short-list is determined on the basis of the 
individual merit of each applicant. According to the NDP's 
assistant-secretary general, Kamal Al-Shazli, for example: 
"members of the outgoing Assembly who are running for re- 
election [are] chosen on the basis of their record - the 
services they extended to their constituents, and more 
importantly, their effective participation in parliamentary
291debates and the legislative process." In case of new 
applicants, Al-Shazli maintains that: "the criteria for
choosing NDP candidates are a good reputation, hard work
292and commitment to the party."
The mechanism of electoral candidates being chosen by a few 
senior party members headed by the President, in his 
capacity as party chairman, is indicative the centre's 
attempts to maintain overall control of the party's 
internal dynamics. Realistically therefore, it would be 
difficult for the centre to maintain control over the party 
if potential candidates actually showed signs of intending 
to pursue effective legislative participation and 
commitment to the party as an autonomous political 
organisation. This is why in reality, electoral nominations
291 Interview in Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 October 1995.
292 Interview in Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 October 1995.
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appear to be determined upon informal factors that relate 
more to the personal status rather than the ideological 
position of an individual. Put differently, it seems that 
NDP electoral candidates are nominated, not on the basis of 
dedication to the party, hard work, political capability or 
the like. But on whether a person, on the basis of his 
personal influence and social networks within the 
community, merit co-option into the system. As one vetran 
NDP deputy explains:
"The NDP depends on choosing people who 
have a good local reputation. Sometimes 
that person with a good local reputation 
might not be the best man for the job. But 
he is usually the most popular person with 
a lot of family support and recognition
293from the local people."
Illustrative of such individuals is Hamdi Fays_al Al- 
Sharqawi., incumbent NDP' deputy for the constituency of 
Nahtay.
. 294A standard NDP recruit: Hamdi Al-Sharcrawi
The population of Nahtay, according to Al-Sharqawi, 
comprise approximately half a million people, most of whom 
work in the production and commerce of agriculture. 
Moreover, Nahtay, which is situated in the governorate of 
Gharbeyya, is typical of predominantly rural Egypt in that 
it lacks sufficient infra-structure and services such as 
electricity, water supplies, paved roads and schools. The 
local peasant population therefore, is inclined to turn to 
the established or 'notable' families in the community for 
various forms of assistance and favours. Al-Sharqawi, who 
originates from an established middle range land owning 
family, is, in his own right, a successful businessman 
trading in agricultural related equipment. In addition, Al-
293 Personal interview, Hamdi. Al-Sayyed, 1 January 1995.
294 The material for this example is based on personal interviews 
conducted with Al-Sharqawi and his brother 'Ahmad, during visits 
to the People's Assembly, Cairo, 3 and 4 January 1995.
295 In our view middle range landowners are those whose overall 
agricultural land holding is between 20 and 100 feddans.
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Sharqawi holds a Ph.D. in engineering and as a result, also 
lectures at the local state-owned university.
Amongst the predominantly peasant inhabitants of Nahtay, 
Al-Sharqawi's stature was not unnoticed. Aware that someone 
of his position would have better connections and access to 
the authorities than they, the locals sought Al-Sharqawi7s 
assistance in both personal and communal matters. It became 
a matter of routine for example, for Al-Sharqawi to bail
296out locals held in custody. On a more communal level, he 
would be approached by locals including village headmen 
(_fomdas) , to intervene on their behalf with the authorities 
in matters for example, concerning the construction of a 
local school and medical centre.
The electoral law amendments implemented prior to the 1984 
legislative elections contributed, according to Al- 
Sharqawi., in a dramatic rise in the number of locals 
requiring his assistance. This, it seems, was because the 
electoral law amendments {which will be discussed later in 
the chapter) resulted in large areas being represented by 
individuals with whom the locals were unfamiliar. 
Consequently, rather than approach these parliamentary 
representatives directly, each community became ever more 
dependent upon prominent locals such as Al-Sharqawi to act 
as an intermediate between themselves and these strangers 
who had come to be their parliamentary representatives. 
Hence, in the period between the electoral law amendments 
being implemented, in 19 84, and when election rules 
reverted to the original system, in 1990, Al-Sharqawi was 
no longer regarded simply as a prominent member of the 
community. Rather, his expanded involvement in local 
welfare, meant, intentionally or not, he had developed an 
admirable reputation within the area and hence extensive 
personal networks.
296 Apart from minor crimes such as household or livestock theft, 
Egyptian peasants tend to find themselves in police custody when, 
for example, physical fights over water distribution in respective 
agricultural plots results in some serious injuries.
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It should also be noted that, when the electoral system 
reverted to the original style of individual candidacy in 
1990, and the number of electoral constituencies expanded 
again, this time from forty eight to two hundred and twenty 
two, the area of Nahtay became in itself, an independent 
electoral constituency. Al-Sharqawi, probably accustomed to 
his prestigious role as an intermediate between the locals 
and the authorities, was undoubtedly aware that the 
decrease in the size of electoral constituencies would also 
affect his role. The decrease in the size of electoral 
constituencies logically increases the possibility of the 
locals being familiar with their Assembly representatives. 
This in turn, increases the chances the representatives 
would be sought directly in times of need.
Al-Sharqawi was therefore aware that the extensive personal 
networks cultivated over the years in the area of Nahtay, 
would most probably diminish with the re-introduction of 
smaller sized electoral constituencies. And in such an 
event, a future application to be placed on the NDP 
electoral list, would have a lesser chance of being 
accepted. It seems that Al-Sharqawi. thus decided it was in 
his interest to seek NDP nomination whilst his personal 
base of support in the area of Nahtay was at its peak. That 
the NDP swiftly accepted Al-Sharqawi's application, is thus 
a strong indication that such an assumption was not 
erroneous.
This brings us to the reason a prominent local such as Al- 
Sharqawi wanted to enter elections as an NDP candidate. 
Acknowledging he had no previous history of party activity 
and had formally applied for party membership only shortly 
before seeking electoral nomination, Al-Sharqawi's response 
was because he felt he could: "help more people as a
297deputy, than as someone asking favours from deputies." 
As, this response appears to suggest, Al-Sharqawi had
297 Personal Interview, 3 January 19 95, Cairo.
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little illusion about what election to the Assembly will 
confer on an individual in his position. Election to the 
Assembly as an NDP member, as he was apparently aware, 
would provide him with direct access to resources that will 
assist him to maintain his eminent position within the 
community. His role is subsequently to act as a link 
between his community and government, not to be a 
legislator. As he put it: "how can I criticise government
policy and then ask them the next day to fund a new school 
in my constituency?"298
The above example is intended to illustrate the exchange 
which elections appear to define in the middle level of the 
clientelist chain. That is, Al-Sharqawi. through elections, 
and hence his subsequent access to governmental resources, 
was able to maintain and perhaps expand his prestige and 
influence in his local community. In exchange, it seems he 
was aware and willing to support the government. This 
support appeared to imply overlooking the checks and 
scrutiny of government policy, which his role as legislator 
formally entails. It also meant that on the parochial 
level, the channelling of state resources to his 
constituency, he was reinforcing the clientelist ties that 
link those in the centre of power to those on the grass 
roots.
That elections can define the role of NDP deputies on such 
terms, appears therefore dependent on two important 
factors. First, that a candidate is of sufficient 
prominence within his community, so that his co-option into 
the clientelist chain would be advantageous to the regime. 
Advantageous in that he would also, theoretically, channel 
his supporters and personal contacts into the clientelist 
chain. The second important factor is that a candidate's 
personal economic resources are not sufficient to undermine 
his dependence upon state resources. This is because if the 
status of a local notable flowed not only from his social
298 Personal Interview, 3 January 1995, Cairo.
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standing and prestige, but also from extensive personal 
wealth, then it would be difficult to ensure that elections 
would define the role of NDP deputies in the manner 
discussed above. The following example is intended to 
clarify this point.
The effects of economic independence on the role 
of elections:the case of Ibrahim Kamel
Ibrahim Mustafa Kamel, a millionaire businessman and former 
member of the NDP. 299 Kamel, who was running for re-election 
in the 1995 legislative elections as an Independent 
candidate in the constituency of Menufeyya, first entered
the People's Assembly in 1990. Since graduating from 
university, Kamel lived abroad until 1988. First in Paris, 
then in New York where he studied a business course. 
Thereafter, Kamel resided in Switzerland where, in 
collaboration with Saudi and other Gulf rulers, he built an 
Islamic based financial empire, with the largest of his 
companies being Dar al-Mal al-'Islami. On his return to 
Egypt, Kamel, along with his brothers began to venture into 
business investments in Menufeyya. Investments such as the 
construction of seven clothes factories, which alone, 
employ two thousand people. Kamel's vast wealth also 
appears to have been rather useful in allowing him to build 
an extensive local base of support. Constructing a local 
Zakat300 fund in 1990, Kamel maintains that through this 
fund, he has managed, amongst other things, to provide 
medical assistance for 50,000 people, finance the repair 
and modernisation of several hundred local schools and 
mosques and, finance the construction and maintenance of 
five preparatory schools.
299 Information on Kamel's history derived from an extensive 
profile by James Exelby, "Independent Delta Force", in Middle East 
Times Egypt. 10-16 December 1995.
300 Zakat constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam. It is based 
upon the principal that Muslims should donate at least one percent 
of annual income to charity.
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It should be noted however that constructing in Menufeyya 
an extensive base of support in what appears to be such a 
relatively short period of time, was not simply the 
consequence of Kamel's vast wealth and subsequent 
charitable contributions. Rather, Kamel belongs to a 
prominent family whose origins in the area date back 
centuries. One of the local schools was in fact, the family 
home. However it was confiscated during Nasser's social 
reforms. What this means, is that Kamel was neither a 
stranger nor an outsider to the area. His personal and 
family links within the community were already established 
prior to his emigration. Hence, by investing part of the 
fortune accumulated abroad into his place of origins, Kamel 
appears to have simply strengthened and expanded personal 
networks that already existed.
It is not too suprising therefore, that a person of Kamel's 
stature and extensive local networks appeared a highly 
suitable electoral candidate for the NDP. It is perhaps for 
this reason that the Governor of Menufeyya actually 
approached Kamel to enquire whether he was interested in 
participating in the 1990 legislative elections. Kamel was 
indeed interested, and to the apparent good fortune of the 
NDP, he saw no objection in contesting the seat as the 
party's formal candidate.
That Kamel won the seat was subsequently not unexpected. 
What was rather unexpected however, was that Kamel, as a 
member of both the NDP and People's Assembly, began to show 
signs of active legislative and party participation. As an 
international businessman, his views were particularly 
evident in legislative matters concerning the economy. The 
four decades in which the state has maintained control of 
the economy for example, meant that from his perspective, 
genuine economic reform would not be possible unless 
President Mubarak first took: "his big red pen to the
40,000 odd laws passed in the last forty years. Then we'll
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h 3oi , ,
know were we are." Regarding the party's organisational
A
structure, Kamel also made his dissatisfaction clear. His 
bone of contention focused in particular on the fact that 
the party was internally structured along the lines of 
appointment, rather than voting. The consequence of which 
led to his expulsion from the party after only two years of 
membership.
What the above case shows is that Kamel's prominent 
position in the Menufeyya area initially rendered him a 
potential asset to the President's NDP. He was therefore 
swiftly approached by the party. Yet Kamel, it is not 
erroneous to contend, differs from the majority of other 
local people of prominence and influence in Egypt, not only 
in the enormity of his fortune, but also because such a 
fortune is not directly tied to Egypt. What this means is 
that Kamel was, to a large extent, able to maintain his 
influential position within Menufeyya with relative 
independence from the authorities. This, as we mentioned 
above, is because a proportion of his vast wealth is 
sufficient to look after the employment and welfare of a 
large number of locals.
Moreover, the fact that his primary assets and investments 
were located in Switzerland, meant his livelihood was not 
subject to government interference. This, in turn, further 
reinforced his independence. He thus appeared unwilling to 
surrender active political participation as a legislator in 
return for state resources which would not necessarily 
elevate his parochial power and influence any more than 
existed. What this shows therefore, is that extensive 
economic resources in personal hands hinders elections from 
being utilised to co-opt and control the participation of 
local notables who possess political aspirations.
301 Cit. in James Exelby, "Independent Delta Force", P14, in Middle 
East Times Egypt. 10-16 December 1995.
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It should be noted however that the Kamel case constitutes 
the exception rather than the norm in this respect. This is 
because majority of NDP members who reach public office 
cannot lay claim to the type of economic independence 
exercised by Kamel. Indeed, the NDP appears to focus upon 
the social standing, influence and prestige of those it 
attempts to co-opt through elections. Yet the large 
majority cannot, in terms of personal wealth, be compared 
to an international financier such as Kamel. What this 
means is that whilst their local prominence might assist 
the regime in terms of linking it to the mass majority, 
economic constraints virtually ensures such individuals are 
willing, sometimes eager, to enter the clientelist chain of 
elections.
This, as we will discuss in the following chapter, is 
largely linked to the absence of genuine multi-party 
competition. An absence which appears to have been affirmed 
the majority of Egyptians who judge their parliamentary 
representatives on the basis of the services and goods 
provided, both on an individual and parochial level. Yet 
for now, the point of concern is that in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, providing such goods is not only 
dependent upon subordination to government, but also on NDP 
membership. This in turn, appears to produce advantageous 
consequences for the regime. The most prominent of which is 
the undermining of group cohesion within the party. The 
following example depicts an interesting situation that 
occurred during the 1990 legislative elections which 
illustrates this point.
Elections and Intra-Partv Competition
The case involves Hamdi. Al-Sayyed, a prominent heart 
surgeon, Head of the Doctors syndicate in Egypt, and a
302member of the NDP since its creation m  1978. Hamdi Al- 
Sayyed entered the People's Assembly for the first time in
302 Information regarding this case was derived primarily from 
personal interviews with Hamdi. Al-Sayyed, 27 December 1994, 1 and 
2 January 1995 and; Muhammad Fahmi, 18 November 1995.
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1979. He had joined the NDP and subsequently the People's 
Assembly as a result of Sadat's personal encouragement. 
According to Al-Sayyed, this was because the President had, 
at the time, wanted to attract professionals from diverse 
fields into his newly constructed political forum. Hence, 
whilst visiting the headquarters of the Doctors syndicate 
and meeting its new head, al-Sayyed, Sadat "was impressed 
by the way we conducted our affairs and decided I would be
303a useful addition m  parliament."
Al-Sayyed thus came to fill one of the seats for the 
constituency of Nozha wa Almaza, and continued to do so 
after Sadat's death in both the election of 1984 and 1987. 
The two million inhabitants of Nozha wa Almaza constitute 
diverse groups of people including labourers connected to 
public sector factories, unplanned settlers on the 
outskirts, and wealthy middle and upper class people 
residing in urban areas such as the neighbourhood inhabited 
by Al-Sayyed and his immediate family.
Between 1979 and 1990, Al-Sayyed main preoccupation in the 
constituency had been the problems encountered by 
inhabitants of the poorer areas. Maintaining an open office 
twice a week, the inhabitants of Nozha wa Almaza were 
provided with direct access to their parliamentary 
representative. Factory workers, unplanned settlers, and 
other individuals routinely turned up to ask for his 
assistance or enquire about the progress of their latest 
concern. During our presence at one of these open days for 
example, a couple of workers had been sent by their 
colleagues to enquire when the electricity supply would be 
connected to their new homes. Homes which coincidentally 
were situated within the precincts of their factories in an 
isolated desert area a few miles from Cairo airport. Al- 
Sayyed responded by assuring them he had information from 
the Ministry of Electricity that the power supply would be 
in working order by the end of the week. Another person, a
Personal interview, Hamdi Al-Sayyed, 27 December 19 94, Cairo.
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young handicapped man, had as a result of Al-Sayyed's 
intervention managed to obtain a free public transport 
travel pass. On that particular day, he had come not only 
to thank his parliamentary representative, but also to ask 
for a note of reference to present to a potential employer. 
Al-Sayyed promptly obliged. By one^'c|^  the following 
morning, Al-Sayyed, with the help of his assistant, had 
seen at least forty people regarding individual or 
parochial problems of such nature.304
Our point at present however, is not the nature of 
assistance that the constituents receive from their 
representative, but that constituents, as a result of the 
routine surgery, had direct access to Al-Sayyed on a 
regular basis. This in itself is not a common phenomenon. 
For a start, unlike Al-Sayyed whose constituency is based 
on the suburbs of Cairo, the majority of deputies represent 
distant constituencies, yet are based in Cairo during the 
parliamentary season. Therefore they cannot meet personally 
with constituents on such a regular basis.
Such accessibility logically expanded Al-Sayyed's personal 
networks within the constituency as locals and their 
leaders became personally acquainted with him. This, one 
can argue was an important accomplishment considering that 
Al-Sayyed was not himself a local man. Rather, Al-Sayyed 
originates from rural Egypt, studied post-graduate medicine 
in Britain and subsequently resided there until the mid­
seventies . He therefore had few previous personal relations 
within his adopted constituency prior to representing it in 
1979 in the People's Assembly. In retrospect, it is 
difficult to imagine that Al-Sayyed, could have won his 
parliamentary seat in 1979 if the encouragement and 
'support' of Sadat had been absent. Yet the point is that 
whilst Sadat may have arguably 'imposed' Al-Sayyed upon the 
constituency of Nozha wa Almaza initially, in an effort to
304 Personal observation at Al-Sayyed's constituency office, 2 
January 1995, Cairo.
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establish the NDP and a few of its new members in the 
political arena, Al-Sayyed, through his accessibility and 
work for the constituents, managed to gain, in his own 
right, their respect and support. In doing so, one can 
argue this also reflected well on the NDP since it showed 
the party comprised individuals of high calibre.
It was not simply the relationship Al-Sayyed built with his 
constituents that appears to have rendered him an asset to 
the party. Rather, Al-Sayyed, since entering the 
legislature, has been active in other roles such as serving 
on the Health Committee, one of eighteen Minister chaired 
committees that discuss legislation before it is proposed 
to parliament. To reach such a position is itself 
indicative of the extent to which Al-Sayyed occupied a 
senior status within party ranks. The personal contacts he 
told us he maintains with Ministers and President Mubarak 
himself, is also reflective of this assumption. 
Furthermore, verification of this claim was possible during 
one of our first meetings with him. He received a phone 
call which, to judge from his tone of voice, and his use of 
the word "ya fandem" (sir) , when addressing the caller, 
indicated that he was talking to someone of even higher 
authority than himself. The assumption was reinforced when 
Al-Sayyed presented his view on a current political issue 
and asked the caller to reconsider the matter in question 
since it was likely to provoke more trouble than it was
. , 305worth.
What we have been attempting to emphasis therefore, is that 
Al-Sayyed, on the basis his long-standing membership of the 
NDP, his active participation on its behalf both inside the
305 Conversation overheard (and briefly commented upon with al- 
Sayyed) during personal interview on 1 January 1995. Al-Sayyed was 
in fact referring to the then current detention of J_Adel Husayn on 
alleged charges of distributing anti-government literature abroad. 
As editor-in-chief of Al~Sha_l_b, Husayn's arrest received front 
page coverage in the national newspapers and the apparent 
injustice of the charge resulted in the journalist syndicate 
publicly backing the accused. The charges were subsequently 
dropped a few weeks later.
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legislature and outside in his constituency, his regular 
interaction with members of the Presidential inner circle, 
all suggest him to be an established member of the party. 
Hence, it seems curious, at least on surface, that Al- 
Sayyed' s attempt to seek his party's re-nomination for the 
legislative elections of 1990 was rejected. The formal 
reason as expressed to him, was that the party had simply 
"decided against nominating an official candidate" to 
compete in the constituency of Nozha wa Almaza. 306 That the 
NDP refused to nominate a formal candidate in one of 
Egypt's largest constituencies even though one of its most 
capable and prominent members had successfully represented 
it for over a decade, and was evidently intent on re­
nomination, indicates the party's justification as feeble.
Indeed it does appear a feeble justification, because in 
reality it seems the party's refusal to nominate its 
veteran member appears to have been linked to the fact that 
another prominent resident of the constituency had decided 
to contest Al-Sayyed's seat. The resident in question, 
Badri Al-Din Khattab was a lecturer at the University of 
Cairo. In addition, he was also a very wealthy businessman 
with a number of commercial investments such as shops and 
restaurants situated in the constituency. It would appear 
that Khattab. on the basis of his status and business 
activities, managed to develop a popular base of support 
amongst the locals in the area. It is alleged for example, 
that Khattab's restaurants are known to regularly donate 
substantial quantities of food to the impoverished citizens 
of the district and due to his extensive commercial
307activities, he was also a large employer m  the area. In 
addition, one would assume that as a highly educated member 
of the community, it is likely the less educated locals 
regularly approached him, as in the case of Al-Sharqawi in 
Nahtay, for assistance in situations concerning themselves
306 Personal interview, 27 January 1997.
307 Information on Khattab was derived from Al-Sayyed's assistants 
during the 199 5 electoral campaign.
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and the authorities. It should be noted after all, that due 
to the electoral law amendments which were imposed between 
1984 and 1990, Al-Sayyed's constituency had expanded in 
size to the extent it encompassed what were, and since 
1990, reverted again to be, seperate electoral 
constituencies for the areas of Madi_nat Nasr and 
Heliopolis.
What this means is that Al-Sayyed became one of six 
representatives in this enormous constituency, and although 
his regular surgeries rendered him accessible to 
constituents who sought his assistance, it is conceivable 
that the sheer number of demands on his time compelled 
locals in the relatively distant areas to seek alternative 
assistance from prominent locals such as Khattab. In this 
respect, it seems the enormous size of the constituency 
between 1984 and 1990, may also to a certain degree, have 
been advantageous to Khattab in that it allowed him the 
opportunity to further expand his personal networks within 
the area of Nozha wa Almaza. Whilst Al-Sayyed on the other 
hand was busy attempting to meet the additional and diffuse 
demands entailed from the annex of Madinat Nasr and 
Heliopolis. That Al-Sayyed did not approve of the electoral 
law amendments of that period appears to verify this
308presumption.
The refusal of the NDP to nominate an offical candidate for 
Al-Sayyed's legislative seat subsequently resulted in Al- 
Sayyed, Khattab, and other less prominent individuals in 
the constituency all competing with each other as 
independents. The official results as confirmed by the 
Ministry of Interior declared Khattab the winner and he
Al-Sayyed claimed his disapproval of the electoral law 
amendments was because he saw it as "unfair to the smaller 
opposition parties and Independents." Personal interview, 27 
December 1994, Cairo. However, considering that during that 
period, he represented neither category, his opinion, genuine as 
it appeared, may have also been influenced by the huge expansion 
in constituency size. An expansion which was arguably debilitating 
his energy focus and perhaps diffusing his personal networks which 
he had previously constructed in the community.
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subsequently entered the People's Assembly as a member of 
the NDP. Al-Sayyed however, suspicious of Khattab' s 
victory, and without the NDP's consent, took the matter to 
the Court of Cassation. Whilst Khattab's popularity in the 
community was not in question, Al-Sayyed felt the total 
amount of votes for Khattab was too great to be considered 
genuine. In fact, Al-Sayyed believed the results had been 
manipulated because Khattab allegedly "bribed the chief of
* 309the election c o m m i t t e e . I n  court, the judge decided upon 
an administrative error verdict, since in his opinion, the 
signatures of those who registered to vote in the 
constituency were unclear. The result was a court order for 
re-election. Al-Sayyed won, and hence re-took his seat in 
the Assembly in August 1991, registering as an NDP member. 
Perhaps not wishing to witness a repeat occurrence of the 
1990 events, the NDP chose to officially nominate Al-Sayyed 
as its candidate in the legislative elections of 1995.
The rivalry between the two party members did not however 
end with Al-Sayyed's official nomination in 1995. Rather, 
Khattab decided to register as an independent contestant, 
presumably with the intention of registering as an NDP if 
he won the Assembly seat. Attempting to lure Al-Sayyed's 
supporters in the constituency, Khattab resorted to various 
campaign techniques. The most highly publicised was 
offering voters free meals in his restaurants in the month 
leading up to the elections.
Whilst Al-Sayyed won yet again, the implications of such 
rivalry is not insignificant. On the individual level, such 
type of competition between members of the same party does 
little to enhance their loyalty to the party as an 
organisation. It is evident for example, that the party, or 
to be more accurate, those appointed by the President to 
run it, were aware of Al-Sayyed's admirable capabilities in 
the Assembly and whilst serving on legislative committees. 
What they were not sure about was whether Al-Sayyed or
309 Personal interview, Hamdi. Al-Sayyed, 27 December 1994.
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Khattab possessed a more extensive network of support 
within the constituency. Hence, by not formally nominating 
a candidate during the elections of 1990, it would appear 
the party wanted to leave its options open with the aim of 
embracing the winner into its sphere, once the seat was 
filled. Such a strategy means that logically, party 
candidates are not left with feelings of obligation or 
pressure to support each other. The post-election court 
battle between Al-Sayyed and Khattab illustrates this well.
In view of the above, party membership cannot be viewed as 
binding in the categorical sense. Individual candidates are 
tied to the party because their personal base of support 
appears conditional upon the downward flow of resources. 
Resources which candidates aim to receive through party 
membership. Yet because of prevailing (and not discouraged) 
intra-party competition, party membership appears 
structured upon various individual candidates and their 
personal followings. This, one would argue, is advantageous 
for the government because the implications are that 
individual candidates are preoccupied with the effort of 
safeguarding their own careers, which in turn is based upon 
safeguarding their personal network of supporters. What 
this means is that the NDP candidates are less likely to be 
concerned with party programmes and policies not only 
during electoral campaigns, but also once elected to 
office. Thus allowing the government even more freedom in 
such matters. This, in the final analysis, appears to 
reaffirm the clientelist role of elections.
3.3 The Opposition Parties and Elections
The role of elections as a clientelist mechanism of 
recruitment and control appears, under Mubarak's rule, also 
a strategy intended to incorporate political opponents. 
This strategy is arguably viable because the constraints 
imposed on opposition parties are not too dissimilar from 
the constraints imposed upon the President's own party. 
Whilst certain opposition parties for example, hold more 
distinctive ideological stands than the NDP, the fact
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remains that such ideologies are rendered almost futile if 
not simply for the fact that the imposed state of emergency
« * • 310prevents the widespread promotion of such views.'
As in the case of the NDP, financial constraints are 
imposed in apparent efforts to ensure opposition resources 
do not pose a potential challenge to the regime. It is 
illegal for example, for political parties to accept 
donations or funding from foreign institutions or 
individuals. If a donation from an Egyptian individual or 
organisation exceeds two thousand Egyptian pounds, the 
party in question is obliged by law to print notification 
of the exact contribution and details of the contributor in 
its newspaper. This legality, as _\Abd Al-_l.Aziz Zayyan of 
the Neo-Wafd noted: "might encourage private donations to 
the NDP because the donors have nothing to fear and much to 
gain by publicly pledging support to the President's party. 
But what businessman would want that sort of publicity for 
financing the opposition? He will find his business faced 
with a lot of bureaucratic hassle the next day. "311
It is of course difficult to assess the extent of private 
donations received by political parties in Egypt. This is 
because the parties may use covert methods to avoid the 
above law. On the formal level for example, opposition 
parties depend on three formal sources of income. There is 
the annual £LE100,000 received individually by each 
registered party from the Shura Council. The membership 
fees and donations of party members, and finally, the 
income derived from the sale of party newspapers. On the 
basis of such income, one would assume that all opposition 
parties would be on a roughly equal level in terms of 
economic resources. This however does not appear to be the 
case.
310 Even the Muslim Brotherhood, as we illustrate in the following 
chapter, depends upon more than its religious ideology to attract 
electoral support.
311 Personal Interview, 8 January 1995, Cairo.
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The headquarters of the Neo-Wafd for example, is situated 
in a multi-million pound villa in central Cairo, whilst the 
Tajammul, whose headquarters is also situated in central 
Cairo, occupies a run down office. In relative terms 
however, the economic disparity between all political 
parties is perhaps not too extensive in view of the 
government imposed constraints. The difference, one can 
argue, is largely the fact the NDP is granted more direct 
(not autonomous) access to government controlled resources 
than its opposition counterparts.
The point we are attempting to emphasise here, is that the 
function of elections as an instrument of clientelist 
recruitment and control for the NDP can logically be 
extended to opposition parties. The main reason being that 
the opposition face an even greater level of participatory 
constraints than the President's party. Hence, the 
possibility of viewing election to the People's Assembly 
from a similar perspective as NDP members is viable and can 
be detected gradually over the periods incorporating the 
four legislative elections beginning in 1984.
Participating in the legislative elections of 1984 
The first legislative elections under Mubarak can be viewed 
as significant for opposition parties from two 
perspectives. On one level, the Tajammud, the Liberal Party 
and the Socialist Labour Party were joined by the Neo-Wafd 
and the Muslim Brotherhood in the electoral arena. The 
presence of these organisations was not insignificant 
because both political entities originated in pre-1952 
Egypt and more importantly, both maintained considerable 
support from some sections of the population respectively.
The origins of the Neo-Wafd for example, can be traced back 
as early as 1919. Between that period and 1952, the Wafd, 
as it was called then, occupied a dominant role in Egyptian 
politics and was actually in government shortly before the 
Free Officers took power. The Muslim Brotherhood on the 
other hand, has never actually gained formal party status.
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Yet it emerged only nine years after the Wafd and also
played an important role in Egyptian politics during the 
fhrfc
first of this century,
A
In terms of ideological platforms and bases of support, 
these two organisations were, and continue to be, at 
opposite ends of the spectrum. The Muslim Brotherhood, with 
its belief in the implementation of an Islamic State ruled 
by Shari_la, has to a large degree, depended upon the links 
and support of those in the population at lower end of the 
social scale. In contrast, the Wafd, a champion of free 
enterprise and political liberalisation, appears to have 
systematically attracted upper and upper middle class 
Egyptians into its ranks of support. Formal ideological 
differences aside however, both organisations had found 
early support at the grass roots of society as a result of 
their respective contribution in arousing national 
awareness, anti-British and anti-Israeli sentiments.
To have been able to reach the masses and subsequently 
arouse sentiments of this nature, one can argue, is an 
indicator of the efficient- albeit different, 
organisational capabilities of both entities. It is 
therefore not suprising to find that when Sadat decided to 
allow a formal multi-party arena, two of the stipulations 
of Law 40 of 1977, the law which continues to govern the 
formation of political parties, appeared directly aimed at 
both organisations. One of the stipulations being that 
political parties cannot be established on a religious 
basis. The second was that the re-establishment political
• • • • 312parties which existed m  pre-1952 Egypt was forbidden.'
Initially the Wafd overcame the latter stipulation by 
amending its pre-1952 platform and changing its name to the
312 Information derived from various sources including personal 
interview with J_Abd Al-Ghaffar Shokr, assistant secretary-general 
of the TajammuL and author of Al-Tahalufat al_siyasiyya wa al- 
J_amal al-Ishteraki fi Mis_r: 197 6-1993 (Al-'Ahcili Press, Cairo, 
1994); 15 January 1996, Cairo.
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Neo-Wafd. Yet, the extent to which the Neo-Wafd was still 
considered a challenge to the regime was further reflected 
in Sadat's decision to issue, in 1978, a decree forbidding 
those who held high positions in the pre-1952 regime from 
holding party membership. The move produced the desired 
affects. The party decided to freeze its activities in 
protest at the decree. The reason being that a number of 
its leaders including its chairman, Fu'ad Seraj Al-Din, 
held high governmental positions prior to 1952. It was not 
until the Neo-Wafd resorted to the courts and gained, in 
1983, a favourable ruling that it was able to resume its 
activities and hence legally participate in the then 
anticipated elections of 1984.
The fact that these potentially challenging groups were 
both intending to participate in the 1984 legislative 
elections leads us to the second reason these elections 
were significant from the perspective of the opposition. 
Mubarak it would appear, was so apprehensive of the 
potential outcome of the first legislative elections of his 
rule that he decided to amend the laws governing electoral 
competition. The fact the implementation of Electoral Law 
114/1983 was influenced by the presence of these two 
organisations in particular, can be detected from two 
perspectives. First, because the Muslim Brotherhood did not 
possess legal party status, it was intending to nominate 
its candidates under the independent category. This would 
have been possible under the previous individual candidacy 
system. Mubarak's new law however revoked this system and 
replaced it with a system of election by party list. 
Consequently this meant the Muslim Brotherhood could not 
resort to that option.
It should also be noted that the party list system also 
meant the small group of genuine independent candidates who 
depended upon the support a local power base had to join a 
political party or abstain from political participation. 
The implications of both choices were clearly detrimental 
to these candidates, in particular those with extensive
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power bases and previously assured seats. This is because 
if they chose to abstain, they faced the possibility of 
losing their influence and status within the local 
community. However, if they chose to participate, the most 
assured way they could preserve their place in the Assembly 
under the new law would be to join the government backed 
NDP. A move which would ensure their co-option into the 
party on government terms. Another, less apparent 
consequence of adopting a party-list system was its role in 
controlling NDP members . Previously, an NDP member had the 
alternative option to enter the electoral race as an 
independent and then re-register as an NDP member upon 
taking his place in the legislature. The new law however 
terminated this option. Hence, the implications point at a 
reinforcement of control over incumbent members of the NDP, 
as the risk being dropped from the official nomination list 
would mean an almost certain end to the individual's 
political career.
Second, with the new electoral law came the reduction of 
the number of electoral constituencies from 17 6 to 48. Thus 
the average province that had previously had some 15-2 0
» 313constituencies became readjusted to possess only 3-5. 
Moreover, all participating parties were required to obtain 
a minimum of 8% of the nation-wide total votes to be 
represented at all in the Peoples Assembly. Should a party 
not achieve the 8% line, its votes would then be 
automatically credited to those of the largest party - in 
other words, the President's NDP,
Mubarak justified the new law by claiming the change was 
intended to provide voters with the "opportunity to choose 
among a number of different programmes and methods".314 This 
comment however, could hardly be considered convincing in 
the context of- as will be discussed in the following
313 See Legislative Elections in Egypt, CHRLA Report, October 1995. 
Also see: R. Springborg, 1989, PP160-61.
314 Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS), Volume VIII, 1983-4, 
P357 .
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chapter- the highly parochial and personalised voting 
patterns of the population. Rather, the adoption of such 
measures reflects the President's efforts to limit the 
electoral participation of parties who depend upon its 
prominent candidates. Candidates who, by virtue of their 
local standing and networks, could achieve electoral gains 
on behalf of their respective parties. The opposition party 
that was intended to be most affected by this, was arguably 
the Neo-Wafd.
The above assumption is based on the premise that the Neo- 
Wafd, unlike its fellow opposition parties, has 
historically been linked to wealthy and influential members 
of society. And the fact the party was resurrected by its 
veteran members on a similar ideological platform to the 
original, indicated the party would again attract 
individual members that fit this category. In other words, 
individual members who would possess favourable prospects 
of election in their local communities. An example of which 
is senior Neo-Wafd member, 'Ahmad 'Othman 'Abaza. 'Abaza 
originates from one of the oldest and most influential 
families in Egypt's governate of Sharqiyya. Hence, if the 
Neo-Wafd nominated 'Abaza, by virtue of his family networks 
and standing in the area, 'Abaza's nomination could have 
theoretically provided the Neo-Wafd with a legislative 
representative in that area. However, the expansion of 
constituencies under the new law meant he would not only 
have had to compete against other prominent individuals on 
their local territory and vice-versa. But also, if 'Abaza 
did manage to surpass his competitors in the elections, the 
nation-wide 8% minimum required by his party to enter the 
Assembly could have still barred him from acquiring a seat. 
In this respect, it is not surprising for one opposition 
newspaper to declare that:
"The government only wants an opposition 
with no power so that it can boast to 
international public opinion and give the 
people at home the impression that they are 
being democratically represented in the 
Assembly... There will never be the chance
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of government alternation. The single party
« 315will forever rule."
Implications of 1983 electoral law amendments 
The extent to which the new electoral system helped to 
achieve the intended objectives was, in certain 
perspectives, paradoxical. The 8% hurdle prevented the 
relatively new and subsequently unchallenging Labour, 
Liberal and Tajammul from entering the Assembly. Prominent 
individuals such a Tajammul leader Khalid Mohvi al-Din was 
unable to provide his party with token representation in 
the Assembly. Even though his personal chances of election 
were high in view of his local standing and networks in his 
rural home constituency of Kafr Shokr.316 In this respect, 
by changing the rules for political participation, Mubarak 
did succeed through what appeared as legal and therefore 
theoretically legitimate means, in preventing certain 
sections of the opposition from entering parliament. 
However, they were not the opponents the President arguably 
had in mind.'Ahmad 'Abaza did in fact compete on behalf of 
the Neo-Wafd in his family's home constituency of 
Sharqiyya. He also won the seat. Equally important, he was 
able to take his seat in the legislature because his party 
surpassed the imposed 8% hurdle. He was subsequently joined 
in the Assembly by forty-nine fellow Wafdist and eight
* 317Muslim Brotherhood members. The reason for this was that 
the Neo-Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood overcame the 
restrictive technicalities of the new law by forming an 
electoral alliance. An alliance which entailed candidates 
from both entities competing under the formal Neo-Wafd 
banner.
315 Al-Shalb, 26 December 1983.
316 According to several sources within the Tajammul, the 8% 
barrier was in fact the impediment preventing Mohvi Al-Din's entry 
to the Assembly: the party only managed to acquire 4% of nation­
wide votes. Sources include personal interviews with Riflat Salid 
and _VAbd Al-Ghaffar Shokr, Nov.-Jan. 1994-5, Cairo.
317 Sources include: Members of the People's Assembly Directory.
People's Assembly Printing and Publication Dept., Cairo 1985 (in 
A rabic). Also, personal interview with J_Ali Salama, Deputy 
Secretary-General of the Neo-Wafd, 8 January 1995, Cairo.
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The fact that this alliance overcame the imposed 
restrictions of the new electoral law is not symbolically 
insignificant. Rather than weaken potentially threatening 
opponents, the new law weakened the already fragile smaller 
opponents, but served to unite and strengthen the regime's 
two main adversaries.
It should also be noted that the new electoral law produced 
the unforeseen consequence of strengthening opposition 
unity from several other perspectives. Ideological 
differences aside, one such consequence was its role in 
uniting the opposition's public views on the government. 
Using their respective newspapers, the opposition parties 
increasingly condemned the government and its policies. 
Writing in Al-Sha_fb, the Labour party's newspaper for 
example, the secretary-general of the party, Hilmi. Murad, 
conceded what was perhaps apparent for a while, namely that
318"The Government needs an opposition with no power". 
Although the Neo-Wafd went on to achieve relative electoral 
success in comparison to the other parties, this did not 
prevent it from calling the election law "aa evil scheme
319intended to attain results contrary the people's views"' 
and that the government was basically a "legal heir" of the 
old Nasserite dicatorship because it is restricting
democracy and is only prepared to recognise an opposition
• 320which was docile.'
Although the opposition's use of their respective
newspapers to criticise the government did reflect the
extent to which freedom of expression had expanded in
comparison to Nasser and Sadat's rule, it is worth noting 
that there was perhaps very little Mubarak could do at that 
particular time without substantiating opposition 
accusations. And more importantly, without appearing as an
318 Al-ShajLb, 26 December 1983 .
319 Al-Wafd, 19 April 1984.
320 Al-Wafd, 24 April 1984.
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outright oppressor. In other words, in view of both the 
State of Emergency constraints affecting political activity 
and the particularly severe electoral barriers instigated 
prior to the 1984 elections, attempts to prevent the 
publication of negative newspaper articles would have more 
likely resulted, not in containing political participation, 
but in the termination of the main "safety valve" available 
for opposition participation- short of resorting to
321underground activity.'
On another level, the restrictive nature of the elections 
did not appear to act as a catalyst in pressuring the 
opposition into co-option. It is interesting to note for 
example, that using Presidential prerogative to appoint ten 
members into the Assembly, the President nominated several 
members of the opposition. Ibrahim Shokri, leader of the 
Labour Party (at this time called Socialist Labour Party) 
and two other colleagues were amongst the chosen opposition 
members. So too was Milad Hanna a senior member of the 
Tajammuh.. Dr Hanna refused the offer, a decision that 
reflected both his and his party's opinion on the matter at 
the time. Ibrahim Shokri and his colleagues on the other 
hand, accepted.322
The reason one party refused the President's offer, whilst 
the other accepted, cannot however be regarded a split in 
opposition decision to co-operate with government. Rather, 
it can best be understood as a difference in strategy. The 
Tajammu_l refused because it felt that by accepting the 
offer, it would be sending the wrong signals to government, 
i.e. that they accept the current political conditions. On
321 To substantiate this point of view, it should be noted that 
under different circumstances (i.e. the return to the more 
opposition friendly individual candidacy electoral system) the 
President did in fact resort to a "penal code amendment" . This 
vaguely worded law (implemented in May 1995) provides the 
government with a virtual carte blanche to prosecute journalists 
for defamation or spreading "false information". Penalties include 
heavy fines and up to five years imprisonment. See previous 
chapter.
322 Personal interview, _VAbd Al-Ghaffar Shokr, 27 December 1995.
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the other hand, it would appear the Labour party accepted 
the offer with the main aim of securing an additional 
avenue to air its discontent of the current political
323situation. In other words, judging from the choice of 
these appointments and the constrictive manner in which the 
elections were held, Mubarak intended to obstruct the 
political participation of opponents through formal means 
with the aim of subsequently enticing them into his 
patronage system and hence his informal control. Yet, that 
such an attempt proved futile can be regarded as evidence 
of the unwillingness of opponents to adhere to the 
President's clientelist strategy of control.
The third and final major outcome of the 1984 electoral law 
amendments, was the fact that it provided the opposition 
with ammunition to appeal to the Supreme Constitutional 
Court. Citing the inability of an individual to nominate 
himself in elections as a breach of public right, equal 
opportunities and equality guaranteed to all citizens by 
Article 8, 40 and 62 of the Constitution, the opposition
contested the amendments to the Elections Laws as
. . 324unconstitutional.*
Again, the opposition's willingness to overtly challenge 
the President through appealing to the Supreme 
Constitutional Court in order to annul the electoral 
amendments can be regarded as symbolically significant. 
This is because such a move indicates the imposed 
constrictions did little in terms of pressuring opponents 
into accepting the political status quo. Instead, the 
situation provided them with the determination to demand- 
and be granted- change. The President was eventually
323 An indication that the Labour Party's acceptance of appointed 
places in the 19 84 Assembly did not suggest its Co-option into the 
President's clientelist system of control is reflected in it's 
decision form an electoral alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood 
during the premature elections of 1987.
324 See "The Constitutional and Legal Framework for Legislative 
Elections in Egypt" in Legislative Elections...." CHRLA Report. 
October 1995.
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propelled, at the end of 1986 to amend the electoral law, 
dissolve the Assembly by referendum, and set a premature 
election date for April 1987. Indeed, Mubarak's decision, 
as we discussed in the previous chapter, was also 
influenced considerations concerning his upcoming re­
nomination. Nevertheless, the underlying factor was that a 
unified opposition front was instrumental in initiating the 
change.
Electoral law amendments of 1986 
and legislative elections of 1987
Indicative of the President's determination to use the 
electoral process as a formal instrument with which to 
contain political participation, is the fact that the new 
amendments affected the electoral law in relatively minor 
aspects rendering negligible the improvement of the chances 
of competitors. The most significant feature of the 
amendments was the amalgamation of both a party list and 
an individual candidate system. Independent candidates were 
allocated one seat in each of the forty-eight 
constituencies and the winning independent candidate was 
required to obtain the largest number of votes of all 
competing independents. A figure which should be no less 
than 20% of the total votes in the constituency.
Although the number of candidates who stood for the forty- 
eight allocated numbered as many as 1,93 7 candidates, it 
appears the main beneficiaries of the independent category 
were not genuine independents. Neither were they opposition 
members like Khalid Mohyi al-Din who decided to run under 
that banner to overcome the constrictive 8% limit placed on 
participating parties. Instead, of the forty-eight 
independent places acquired in the 1987 elections, only 
nine seats were won by independents with opposition or no 
party affiliation. The majority of seats - thirty nine 
seats in total, were won by individuals identified as NDP
325members.' The large number of contestants competing m
325 Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XI, P3 28, 19 87.
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this category therefore, suggests the provision of an 
independent category inadvertently produced an additional 
safety valve by providing the opportunity for disparate 
individuals with political aspirations to participate. 
However, as the electoral results suggest, this safety 
valve was rather superficial in that it expanded electoral 
participation, but the role of elections as a protective 
shield against a legitimate political threat remained 
intact.
The remaining constituency representatives under the
amended electoral law were elected through the old party
list system. However, the amended law stipulated that the
votes of parties who did not obtain the 8% nation-wide
votes be distributed among all the successful parties in
direct proportion to their scores in the elections, rather
326than be credited to the largest party as in the old law. 
The consequences relating to the electoral amendments and 
the 1987 elections itself were in most aspects similar to 
the previous elections. However, the Neo-Wafd decided to 
compete in the elections without entering an alliance. 
Subsequently, the Muslim Brotherhood joined forces with the 
Labour Party and the Liberal Party to form a coalition. As 
a result, there was an overall increase in opposition 
incumbents in the legislature, as the Neo-Wafd gained 
thirty-six places and the coalition sixty.
While the NDP still maintained its 75% domination in the 
Assembly, the electoral outcome did appear to indicate 
signs of a strengthening opposition in the face of 
adversity. Moreover, the opposition remained united in its 
condemnation of the electoral system which it regarded as a
327 * *"fake democracy"" and "a horrible and violent repetition
325 The law also abolished the 30 seats allocated for women in the 
1983 law: "Legislative Elections in Egypt...." CHRLA Report.
October 1995: and also see "Legislature in Egypt" State
Information Service, Cairo.
327 A1 -Masa, 7 April 1987, cit.. MECS, P329, XI, 1987.
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328 •of the 19 84 farce"' and subsequently decided to return to 
the Supreme Constitutional Court to contest the amendment, 
citing it as an "infringement upon the right to 
[individual] nomination and a breach of the principals of 
equal opportunity and equality contrary to Articles 8, 40
329and 62 of the Constitution." The final outcome appeared 
in May 1990 when the Supreme Constitutional Court did in 
fact rule the 1986 electoral law unconstitutional. Thus 
pressuring the President to issue a decree abolishing the 
party-list system altogether and returning to the 
individual candidate system of election by absolute 
majority for the premature elections of 1990.
Return to individual candidacy
Apart from the abolition of the party-list system, another
important change in the electoral laws was the increase in
the number of constituencies from forty-eight to two
hundred and twenty two. The implications of such a change
were that it was now theoretically easier for non-NDP
members devoid of state resources and support to compete in
the elections. It must be noted however that the
President's decision to return to the individual candidacy
system was perhaps more influenced by political strategy
than by the court ruling. Obviously the President was aware
of the Muslim Brotherhood's electoral coalitions in the
previous elections of 1984 and 1987 and its penetration
into the Assembly in both instances. As he later noted:
"The door is now wide open for all political forces to
participate... certain controls have even been by-passed,
letting certain groups infiltrate - groups that the
constitution and laws have banned from political activity
330to safeguard the homeland."" In this context, the 
President perhaps felt the individual candidate system was 
after all preferable in that it would allow fewer
328 Al-Wafd, 7 April 1987, cit.. ibid.
329 Legislative Elections in Egypt: Rights . . . , P 4 , CHRLA, Cairo
1995 .
330 Mubarak address marking start of his third term as President, 
BBCMS ME/ 310140275/96E982/931014, 14 October 1993.
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restrictions for individual candidates and consequently 
separate and weaken organised opposition groups.
Elections of 1990 and the manor implications
Although it was an opposition initiative that led to the 
premature elections of 1990, the elections were boycotted 
by the Neo-Wafd, Muslim Brotherhood, Labour Party and 
Liberals, leaving only the Tajammul. to participate against 
the government's NDP. According to party members who 
boycotted those elections, the decision to abstain was 
related to two main issues: (i) objection to the Ministry
of Interior's tradition of supervising polling stations and 
ballot count and; (ii) the continuation of Emergency Laws 
and its constricting effect on political participation. 
These issues were -and remain- genuine bones of contention 
with government. However, that the majority of leading 
opposition parties intended to pressure Mubarak into 
conceding to these demands by taking the unprecedented step 
of withdrawing from the elections, suggests that perhaps 
the opposition had overrated its gravity in the political 
arena.
The fact the opposition succeeded in its court battles with 
the government and obtained a constitutional court ruling 
invalidating both the electoral laws of 1983 and 1986 was 
perhaps instrumental in enhancing its confidence in 
confronting government with these additional demands. The 
opposition's enhanced perception of its power to pressure 
Mubarak was perhaps further enhanced by another factor. The 
President had decided to remove the then Minister of 
Interior, Zaki Badr, in January 1990 after he publicly 
admitted tampering with the results of the 1987 elections. 
It is worth noting, however, that the President's decision 
to remove Badr was also influenced by other considerations. 
Badr for example began to emerge as a political liability 
as a result of other factors such as the University of
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• • 331Banha incident." Yet, the opposition did not appear 
willing to interpret Badr's dismissal as perhaps a token 
concession on the part of Mubarak and acknowledge that the 
decision was also influenced by Mubarak's dissatisfaction 
with the Minister's political shortcomings. Rather, it 
seems the majority of opposition preferred to interpret 
Badr's removal as measure of their influence over 
government.
The decision of the opposition to stand firm in respect to 
its proclaimed demands appears to have been influenced by 
an additional factor. It believed the President would be 
embarrassed into concession if he felt an all-out 
opposition boycott would undermine his image. Especially in 
view of the fact that a boycott would mean the President's 
anticipated third term re-nomination in 1993 would be 
supported by a one party legislature - his own party. This 
feeling appeared more confirmed when the President 
attempted to persuade them to abandon the boycott. Mubarak 
did not actually make personal contact with the opposition 
leaders during that period. However indirect contact in the 
form of informal meetings and telephone conversations 
between senior presidential advisor, 'Osama Al-Baz, and 
representatives of the opposition did take place. Al-Baz's 
attempts to be mediator and dissuade the parties from 
boycotting the elections did not include promises to meet
• • 332their demands. Subsequently his efforts appeared futile.
It is possible Mubarak could have been embarrassed into 
some form of compromise with the opposition had it not been 
for the fact the Tajammuj. eventually decided to abandon the 
boycott. The party's official opinion was that boycotting 
the elections was not a sensible form of demonstration
331 A few days before his dismissal, the Minister was invited to 
give a speech at the University of Banha. During the speech he 
unleashed a stream of abuse against senior officials and public 
figures including fellow ministers, resulting in an uproar as 
lawyers and university staff threatened to strike. See Al-Shafb, 9 
January 199 0.
332 Personal Interview, _\Abd Al-Ghaffar Shokr, 17/12/1994.
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since Emergency Laws are temporarily and unofficially 
lifted during that period thereby providing politicians a 
better opportunity to communicate with the public and 
recruit supporters. The Tajammul therefore argued it unwise 
to pursue such action as it would merely isolate the
333parties from the electorate. " On the surface, it would 
appear the argument presented by the Tajammul was both 
practical and logical. After all, the other parties who 
pursued the boycott found themselves without direct access 
to the Assembly and were unable to communicate with the 
public for the following five years except through their 
respective newspapers. The Tajammul. on the other hand, 
gained at least some form of direct access to both 
parliament and the inhabitants of the constituencies it 
came to represent after gaining a token five seats in the 
elections.
Beneath the argument put forth however, there appears to 
have been another more covert issue dividing party members 
on the boycott issue. According to several sources within 
and outside party realms, Khalid Mohyi Al-Din, the Tajammu_f 
leader, had been quite resentful of Neo-Wafd leader, Fu'ad 
Seraj Al-Din, for assuming the role of Opposition 
spokesman. The reason for such resentment possibly 
originates from a personal rivalry between both men as a 
consequence of disparate political origins. A government 
minister under King Faruq, and a member of one of the most 
prominent and aristocratic families in pre-revolutionary 
Egypt, Seraj Al-Din was amongst the pre-1952 elite who lost 
considerable wealth and influence under the Nasser regime 
and has subsequently never recognised the Revolution as 
more than a coup d'etat.
In contrast, Mohvi Al-Din - whose origins were more modest, 
was one of the original Free Officers responsible for the 
1952 Revolution. Moreover, under Nasser, he became a member
333 Personal Interviews with senior Tajammul members including: 
LAbd Al-Ghaffar Shokr, 17/12/1994, Dr Rifyat Saiid, 8/1/95, 'Abu 
Al-yiz A1-Hariri, 28/12/94 and Lutfi Wakid 4/1/9 5.
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of the new ruling class which replaced the likes of Seraj 
Al-Din. In this respect, it was probably humiliating for 
Mohyi Al-Ddjn to find himself and his party being 
represented by the same individual and party who had been 
brought down as a direct result of his actions. Seraj Al- 
Din was also not attempting to abate this personal tension. 
For example, the ageing Wafd leader took the initiative to 
approach the government with the final decision to boycott 
the elections without informing the leaders of the other 
parties. Although the Opposition was aware the boycott 
appeared inevitable, the fact that Seraj Al-Din officially 
informed the government without prior warning took them all 
by suprise.
It is at this point Mohvi Al-Din decided to call upon the 
members of the Tajammuy Committee to inform them of his 
decision to participate in the elections. Almost half the 
Committee initially disagreed with the decision. They felt 
such actions would be a betrayal to the other parties and 
it would also signal defeat in their confrontation with the 
President. However, the Tajammuj_ leader insisted he could 
not, in principle, allow the party to participate in a 
boycott determined by Seraj Al-Din. The party, he argued, 
was independent, not a branch of the Neo-Wafd. Seraj Al-Din 
therefore had no right to inform the authorities of a final 
decision which involved any party apart from his own 
without the prior knowledge and consent of the respective 
leaders.334
Most of the Committee eventually came to agree with their 
Chairman. This move subsequently suggests a turning point 
for the Tajammu_! leader and his party in terms of an 
emergence of clearer set of role expectations. That is, it 
would appear the Tajammuf. leader had come to a point where 
a preference to mend fences with the government and accept 
his party's role as a permanent opposition outweighed the
334 Derived from personal interviews, January 199 5, Cairo. Identity 
of interviewees can be obtained from author.
174
Political Parties in Non-Competitive Elections
motivation to continue a battle led by a personal arch­
rival .
The decision of the Tajammul to participate in the 1990 
elections can therefore arguably be regarded as a 
significant factor which influenced both the outcome of 
the boycott and the subsequent nature of President- 
Opposition relations. The party's presence in the electoral 
arena divided an opposition that had previously been united 
primarily on the basis of its unanimous stance against 
Mubarak and his form of democracy. The result of such a 
division was that a valid and potentially effective 
opposition protest became diluted to the advantage of 
Mubarak. This for example, put him in the position to claim 
that "an opposition is part and parcel of the State system" 
and that any party which was seeking to separate itself
• • * * 335from the system was "wasting its constitutional role." ~ As 
this statement suggests, the presence of just one 
opposition party contesting the elections and gaining entry 
to the Assembly contributed towards preventing the boycott 
from appearing as a wholesale rejection of the system. 
Instead it seems to have allowed Mubarak to depict the 
affair as the choice of individual, disconcerted parties.
By participating in the 1990 elections, it is not erroneous 
to suggest the Tajammul became the first opposition party 
to enter into the regime's clientelist structure. Prior to 
the 1990 elections for example, there was little evidence 
to suggest the existence of clientelist relations between 
the regime and any of the opposition parties. However, as 
the result of the boycott, one can detect an emergence of 
informal links between the regime and the participating 
Tajammul. Such links emerged primarily in the form of 
indirect assistance received by the Tajammul from the 
government. During the elections for example, a number of
335 Mubarak's comment on the 1990 elections, "Egypt, A Decade...". 
State Information Service, Cairo, July 1991, P10.
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NDP candidates were allowed to collaborate with Tajammul 
candidates, rather than with other NDP candidates.
This form of collaboration basically involved the process 
of vote-exchanging between candidates. A mechanism which is 
made possible as a result of the one man-two votes 
electoral procedure which emerged under Nasser to ensure 
workers and peasants achieve fair representation in 
parliament. As the current constitution (Article 87) 
continues to stipulate 50% of the legislative Assembly must 
consist of workers or peasants, office seekers in each 
electoral constituency are subsequently categorised into 
two groups, Fe'at and darnel. To register as a fe'at is a 
straightforward procedure with the main requisite being the 
potential candidate is a university graduate or equivalent. 
The lamel on the other hand is theoretically a peasant or 
worker with less than degree level education. In reality, 
such candidates are rarely workers or peasants, but wealthy 
landowners or merchants.
The point here, however, is that as a result, each voter is 
allocated one vote to elect a representative in the fe'at 
category and the other for the selection of a deputy in the 
J_amel category. Subsequent vote exchange is basically a 
system whereby a candidate in the fe'at category co­
operates with a candidate in the darnel category in the same 
constituency such that the supporters of each vote for the 
other with the aim of doubling each candidate's total 
number of votes on election day.
While in theory, each voter utilises the one man-two votes 
system to choose his two representatives, in practice, this 
procedure revokes the whole objective of the one man-two 
votes system since supporters are exchanging their 'second' 
vote for the opportunity to double one candidate's 
electoral chances. This, as will be examined further in the 
following chapter, does not prevent vote-exchanging from 
being common, albeit, clandestine, practice. What was 
unusual prior to the 1990 elections however, was for
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government nominated candidates to contemplate pursuing 
electoral collaboration of such nature with opposition 
candidates.
In view of this collaboration, it is interesting to note 
that the Tajammul won five seats in 1990. Such token gains 
are not insignificant if we consider the fact the Tajammu_L 
last gained entry to the legislature in 197 6 when it was 
still confined to a platform within the ASU. Even more 
significant is the fact that all five winning candidates, 
including the chairman of the party, Khalid Mohyyi Al-Din, 
participated in vote exchange with their opposite NDP 
numbers in their respective constituencies. The Tajammu_l 
deputy secretary-general,'Abd Al-Ghaffar Shokr, justified 
this informal 'partnership7 on the basis that the NDP 
candidates sought the alliance with his party's five 
winning candidates because they possessed well established 
power bases in their respective constituencies. 336 There is 
little reason to question the validity of the individual 
power bases of the winning Tajammul candidates. All five 
for example, were local people well-known throughout the 
community, with a long history of political activity. And 
in at least one.case (Mohyyi Al-Din), a national political 
figure. Yet it is implausible to assert, given the 
Tajammul's poor electoral record, that it was the NDP 
candidates who needed the Tajammul. alliance in order to 
better their electoral chances.
The rural constituency of Kafr Shokr is one example of the 
five places in which the Tajammul. won a seat. The major 
competitors in the constituency consisted of three 
prominent locals: an NDP candidate in the _lamel category; 
and an NDP candidate and the Tajammul. candidate both in the 
fe'at category. Due to the boycott, the other candidates 
were locals of minor stature competing as independents. To 
illustrate the centre's indirect assistance of the 
Tajammul., the opposition candidate, in this case, Khalid
336 Personal interview, 16 December 1995, Cairo.
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Mohyyi Al-Din, was given precedence over his NDP 
counterpart. J_Abd Al-Rahman Mosayr, the NDP _\amel candidate 
was allowed the freedom to join forces with Mohyyi Al-Din 
in a vote-exchange pact. Although the exact figures could 
not be confirmed, it is understood Mohyyi Al-Din and Mosayr 
shared roughly the same number of supporters in the 
constituency. The number of voters supporting l_Abd Al- 
Rahman Sarhan, the NDP fe'at and hence Mohyyi Al-Din's 
competitor was considerably less, estimated at perhaps half 
that of Mohyyi Al-Din or Mosayr.
Assuming there was no government interference during the 
elections, it would appear that it was Sarhan, not Mosayr 
who needed a significant vote exchange alliance in order to 
win a place in the Assembly. In this respect, had Mosayr 
joined forces with his NDP colleague, Sarhan, both NDP 
members would have won a seat in the elections. This is 
because their combined votes would surpass that of Mohyyi 
Al-Din and one of the minor independent candidates whom 
Mohyyi Al-Din could have contemplated an alliance. 
Therefore, while it is doubtful the government was directly 
involved in instigating the Mohyyi Al-Din-Mosayr alliance, 
the fact that the NDP candidate exchanged his supporters 
votes with that of the Tajammui leader, at the expense of 
his NDP colleague, would be considered a risky career move 
unless the President, in his capacity of NDP leader, had 
not indirectly signalled his consent. Ultimately, the vote- 
exchange alliance of the other Tajammul winners can be 
understood in the same context.
That participation in the 1990 elections eventually led the 
Tajammui to publicly enter the regime's clientelist 
structure can be detected on another level. The party as we 
mentioned earlier, refused the President's 1984 offer to 
appoint one of its senior members into the legislature. In 
early 1995 the Tajammui. accepted the Presidential 
nomination of its Secretary-General, Dr Rifayt Saiid to the 
Consultative (Shura) Council. This decision appears 
indicative of the role which the party has come to accept
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for itself. Prior to 1990, the Tajammui., in the words of
337Sal_id "totally rejected the system." ' What this means is 
that like the other opposition parties, the Tajammui did 
not accept the government's dominant position and its aim 
was to fight for a democratic multi-party system in the 
broad sense that all parties would be given equal 
opportunity to compete for government. In view of such 
highly ambitious expectations, opposition parties and in 
particular the respective party leaders did not accept 
Mubarak in the role of their patron. Mubarak's efforts to 
appoint members of the opposition into the People's 
Assembly therefore, was considered patronising and 
subsequently rebuffed.
The President's unsuccessful attempt to appoint the 
Tajammul/s Dr Hanna in 1984 illustrates this to be the 
case. The fate of those opposition members who were tempted 
to accept a Presidential appointment also appears to affirm 
this. The Neo-Wafd's Mona Makram GObayd for example had her 
party membership withdrawn. The reason was because she 
accepted in 1990, a Presidentially nominated seat to the 
legislature. Fahmi Nashed, another Wafdist, also faced the 
same predicament after he accepted a Presidential
338nomination to the Shura Council in the same year.
What this means is that the decision to participate in the 
1990 elections, collaborate with members of the President's 
party, and formally accept a Presidential appointment for 
one of it's party leaders, the Tajammul. was evidently the 
first opposition party to enter the clientelist structure 
of the Mubarak regime. As the Tajammul. Secretary General 
Rifl_at Sal_id explained, the party changed from 
confrontation to co-operation in its relationship with the
government because: "it was crazy to isolate ourselves from
339the system of which we are part." ‘ What the comment
337 Personal Interview, Dr Rifalt Sayid, 8 January 1995, Cairo.
338 Personal Interview, lAli Salama, 8 January 199 5, Cairo.
339 Personal Interview, 8 January 1995, Cairo.
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suggests, is that the temptation to nominally contribute 
towards the diversity of power through electoral 
participation appears to have became regarded as preferable 
to challenging the dominant power and achieving no 
electoral gains in the process. When for the first time 
under Mubarak's rule, the People's Assembly completed its 
first full five year term, it would appear the other 
opposition parties arrived at a similar conclusion to the 
Taj ammuf.
Return of the opposition to 
electoral participation: 1995
The boycott did not produce the widespread support the 
parties had expected, nor did it pressure Mubarak into even 
partially conceding to their demands. This meant the 
parties who participated in the boycott were left in need 
of reassessing both their position and political strategy 
in the context of their limited influence in the political 
arena at large. Moreover, Mubarak's insistence on upholding 
a State of Emergency, one can argue, intentionally 
constricted their activity to the extent that elections 
constituted the single most important avenue for activists 
to make contact with the public and formally recruit new 
members and supporters. In this respect, by withdrawing 
from electoral participation, the parties recognised they 
had inadvertently alienated themselves rather than their 
intended target of government. No longer prepared to 
continue the boycott and risk total obscurity, the 
opposition parties prepared to enter the 1995 electoral 
race on their own accord. Whilst the Neo-Wafd for example, 
rather meekly justified its decision on the basis that it 
had particpated in elections since 1924 and had no 
intention of stopping now, 340 the Labour party was more to 
the point:
"We boycotted the last elections to 
pressure the government into allowing free 
and fair elections. The government, 
however, ignored us. This time, we are
340 Al-Wafd, 13 July 1995.
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participating with no illusions... we are 
aware that this time around government 
malpractice will be even more intense. 
However we decided in spite of their 
careless and short-sighted approach not to 
continue the boycott. This is because we 
care about the constitution and the 
stability of the nation and we do not want 
to leave the government with a free rein in 
these elections. This can only be achieved 
by our participation."341
The fact Mubarak did not feel the need to dispatch advisors 
to informally persuade them to participate indicates the 
President was already aware of the opposition's 
predicament. And as such, was conscious of their intentions 
to return to the arena of political contest. From an 
alternate perspective, the absence of communication between 
the President and the opposition prior to the latest 
elections could also suggest the effects of the previous 
boycott on the President's image was so negligible that he 
was no longer apprehensive should a second boycott take 
place. In either case, the decision to return to the arena 
of electoral contest indicates how the opposition had come 
to regard elections- even in its non-competitive form, as 
important.
It is arguably for this reason that a shift in attitude can 
be detected during the 1995 electoral campaigns. To the 
obvious advantage of the government several opposition 
parties began to proclaim a shared identification with 
certain goals and values of the regime. Indeed, efforts to 
cultivate the local support of workers and urban poor 
during electoral rallies may have focused on the rejection 
of specific regime policies such as the privatisation of 
state owned factories or the Rent Law amendments. Yet 
allegiance to the regime in general did appear to become a 
prominent theme amongst several of the leading opposition 
parties.
341 Al-Sha_lb, 29 September 1995.
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Illustrative of this is main strategy by which opposition 
parties attempted to indicate such allegiance focused 
primarily on efforts to adopt anti-Islamist conviction. A 
move compatible with the President's conviction that "a 
correct party obliges all its members to adhere to its 
principles and not change their slogans and principles 
daily for temporary gain...or establish an alliance with 
undemocratic forces that hire the party's platforms and
342mouthpieces to circumvent law and order."' Heeding this 
warning was the Tajammu_l_ party for example, who used the 
campaign slogan "Al-Din Lillah Wa al-Watan Lil Jami_L" / 
"Religion is for God, The Nation is for All" throughout the 
1995 elections. Evidently, this was to emphasis its 
rejection of those mixing politics with religion. In fact, 
at a press conference held by Tajammui. chairman, Khalid 
Mohyyi Al-Din prior to the elections, he stated that the 
participation of the other opposition parties was 
important, not, as one would assume, to defend their 
position against government domination. Rather, so as to: 
"defend ourselves from the threat of religious
343fundamentalism and terrorism."
In view of the party's link with government during the 1990 
elections, it is not altogether suprising that the Tajammuj. 
wanted to separate itself from the Islamists and reaffirm 
its loyalty to the system. What is interesting however, is 
that the two parties whose previous association with the 
Muslim Brotherhood went as far as forming electoral 
coalitions, the Neo- Wafd and the Liberals, 1984 and 19 87 
respectively, also, as we will see, adopted similar 
strategies in efforts to distance themselves from the 
Islamist taboo.
342 President's Address to Parliament, BBCMS, BBCME, 15 Nov. 1994: 
411150292-AM33 68 941116.
343 Formal Press release, Tajammul Party, 14 October 1995.
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The Neo-Wafd's shifting attitude
When in 1984 the neo-Wafd became the first party to form an 
electoral alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, it would 
appear both groups mutually benefited. In defiance of the 
government's imposition of the party-list electoral laws, 
the alliance constituted the sole opposition victory in 
those elections. In addition, it is interesting to note 
that the Muslim Brotherhood, unlike the Tajammul, supported 
the Neo-Wafd's initiative to officially announce a general 
opposition boycott even though its leaders were also not 
informed prior to the public statement.
In view of such comradeship in face of the Mubarak regime, 
the Neo-Wafd's 1995 electoral propaganda does suggest 
intentional efforts aimed to discredit the Brotherhood and 
consequently appease the government. For example SaJji _\Abd 
Al-Nur, the Neo-Wafd's Secretary-General declared in an 
interview during the 1995 elections: "In 1984 the Muslim
Brothers were like orphans. They were a small family. . . 
they needed to ally themselves with a political party".344 
_VAbd Al-Nur, it would seem, was attempting to justify the 
Wafd-Brotherhood alliance by hinting it was a Brotherhood 
initiative and that his party conceded to the alliance 
because they regarded the Muslim Brothers as a harmless 
entity. More to the point however, was J_Abd Al-_i_Aziz 
Muhammad, a prominent lawyer and senior neo-Wafd member. 
During a discussion with senior party colleagues in which 
an 'Ahali journalist attended, he stated that: "it is not
in our interest to co-operate [in 1995 elections] with an 
organisation [i.e. Muslim Brotherhood] that is targeted by 
the authorities."345
The manner in which the party began to overtly endorse 
Muslim-Coptic ties was reflective of its attempt to 
distance itself from the Islamic trend. .VAbd Al-Nur, it
344 Interview in Al-Ahram Weekly, 19-25 October 1995.
345 Al-'Ahali, 4 October 1995.
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should be noted, is a Coptic lawyer who was personally 
chosen for the post by Fu'ad Seraj al-Din in early 1995. 
The 1995 elections also witnessed the nomination of thirty 
Coptic candidates- the largest proportion of Christian 
nominations by the Neo-Wafd since its 1978 revival. As if 
to further emphasise its non-Islamic tendencies, the 
illustrations on the Party's electoral posters for example 
depicted four figures holding hands in unison: a peasant in 
jalabeyya, an urbanite dressed in Western clothing and an 
Imam and Priest wearing their respective religious garb. 
The slogan above the posters read: "Al-Wafd al-Jadid: Hezb 
Al-Wehda Al-Wa_t aneyya" / "The Neo-Wafd: The Party of
National Unity". It would appear the poster was aimed at 
attracting four major social bases within Egyptian society: 
peasants, workers, Muslims and Christians.
However, on closer inspection, it is possible to argue it 
was not necessary to include the characters symbolising 
Muslims and Christians with those representing workers and 
peasants since the former groups are not separate and 
distinct from the latter. In this respect, the neo-Wafd's 
nomination of a large number of Coptic candidates and the 
inclusion of symbols representing the unity of Islam and 
Christianity in electoral posters were all point at the 
Party's attempt to publicly denounce the political 
ambitions of the Islamic opposition and subsequently gain 
Presidential favour. This assumption appears to be 
reinforced by the potentially appeasing comments of _\Abd 
al-yAziz Muhammad who claimed that his party was not 
seeking, nor does it: "want power... all we want [from
elections] is to spread the Wafd ideology."346
It is also worth noting that Fahmei. Nashid whose dismissal 
from the Neo-Wafd was the result of his acceptance of a 
Presidential nomination to the Shura Council was reinstated 
to his former position within the party in 1995. What this 
implies is that the party no longer considered Presidential
346 Al-'Ahali, 4 October 1995.
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appointments and hence co-option into the regime an 
unacceptable option.
The liberal response
Although the Liberal Party's electoral efforts to distance 
itself from the Muslim Brotherhood were less conspicuous in 
comparison to the Neo-Wafd, certain factors indicate the 
Party was also attempting to dissociate itself from the 
Islamic connection and instead publicly identify with the 
regime. In contrast to the third member of the 1987 
tripartite alliance, the Labour Party, there was no 
evidence to suggest a direct association between the 
Liberals and the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1995 
electoral campaign. According to Brotherhood spokesman 
Ma'mun al-Hudhaybi, the tripartite alliance was not 
necessary during the 1995 elections because the change in 
electoral laws meant Brotherhood members could participate 
as independent candidates. However, he did stress although 
the three parties constituted separate entities, co­
operation between them continues to exist despite the 
return to the individual candidacy system. Such co­
operation included "members of the coalition not running 
against each other in the same constituency" and a mutual 
exchange of "manual assistance during the electoral
,,347campaign."
Evidence that the existence of Liberal-Brotherhood co­
operation is dubious however, is reflected paradoxically, 
by the fact that Al-Hudhaybi nominated himself in the Cairo 
constituency of Doqqi and was subsequently competing 
against, amongst others, Hamza De_f.be s, a high ranking 
official within the Liberal party. According to Al- 
Hudhaybi, the decision to enter the electoral race in Doqqi 
was not to compete against any of the candidates, but
^48
simply to spread the Islamic messaged However, this 
remark appeared in complete contradiction to the earlier
347 Personal interview, Ma'mun Al-Hudhaybi, 11 Nov. 1995, Cairo.
348 Personal interview, Ma'mun Al-Hudhaybi, 11 Nov. 1995, Cairo.
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public views of Deybes who believed competition did exist 
and he was not aware of any co-ordination between the
349Liberal party and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Indications that the Liberal party's inclination was to 
integrate itself within the system and distance itself from 
the Muslim Brothers can perhaps be poignantly illustrated 
through the electoral campaign of Mustafa Bakri, the 
editor-in-chief of Al-Ahrar, the Party's official 
newspaper. Bakri. competed in the fej_at category against 
Muhammad Mahjub, the Minister of Religious Endowment in the 
industrial constituency of Helwan wa_al- Tibbin. Bakri's 
opponent, Mahjub, originates from Helwan and is thus 
considered ibn al-balad (a term used to describe a "local 
son") . His family connection to the area is maintained 
through the large number of relatives who continue to 
reside there.
Moreover, since 197 9 MahJ ub has represented the 
constituency's fe'at category as an NDP deputy. Through his 
senior status in government he has been able to provide 
much funding for his constituency over the years from which 
the residents have benefited. Consequently, this working 
class constituency can claim subsidised housing, surfaced 
roads, schools and youth centres as amongst the benefits 
attained by Mahjub. Subsequently, through the merits of 
being ibn al-balad and due to the extensive services he had 
been able to provide for his constituency as a result of 
his senior position in government, Mahjub's power base was 
inherently more extensive than that of relative newcomer 
Bakri. In fact, Bakri's upper Egyptian (Sayidi) origins and 
current residence in the middle class suburb of Maf_di. 
meant that he did not possess any ties to the constituency 
until the summer of 1995 when he helped to establish a 
local independent newspaper Sawt Helwan.
349 Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 October 1995.
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Helwan wa al-Tibbin however is home to a large number of 
Sa^_idi migrant workers and their families. Bakri therefore 
hoped he could challenge Mahjub's virtual safe seat by 
cultivating the support of his fellow upper Egyptians by 
using ibn al-balad sentiments. To attract as wide an 
audience as possible, Bakri.'s electoral strategy also 
focused on revealing Mahjub's misappropriation of state
350resources and corruption.' What was interesting about 
Bakri's accusations however, was that he publicly attacked 
the political shortcomings of Mahjub in a manner which 
reflected negatively on his opponent, but not the regime 
itself. An excerpt noted from his rally speech in Helwan's 
'Arab Rashed neighbourhood illustrates this point:
"The Minister attempted to prevent this 
rally from taking place today through 
bribery and blackmail [of the voters], but 
these methods can't work all the 
time. . . .why hasn't he responded to my 
accusations [of corruption] or taken me to 
court? We are not afraid of him, we don't 
care about life or death, what we do care 
about is the property of the orphans and 
the poor ending up in his pocket [loud 
applause] . . .why doesn't he respect the 
constitution, respect the people and 
respect ’amn al-dawla (state security)? I 
was speaking to a member of al-'amn 
(someone from the Interior Ministry) and he 
assured me election day will be clean and 
honest. If Muhammad Mahjub thinks the State 
will interfere to help him, he is insulting 
the Ministry of Interior, insulting the
• * 351State and insulting the President."
350 The Ministry of Religious Endowments is responsible for the 
distribution of property and money bequeathed (voluntarily and 
usually in a will) by individuals to the State for the purpose of 
assisting society's poor and underprivileged. When an individual 
leaves no will and relatives cannot be traced upon his death, the 
Ministry is automatically entitled to his Estate. Bakri.'s 
accusations are that Mahjub distributes the Ministry's spoils to 
his relatives and friends rather than the poor, whose entitlement 
it is. In particular, he claimed that he held documentation 
proving that Mahjub acquired for one of his two wives an apartment 
overlooking the Nile worth an estimated L.E. one million that was 
in fact the Ministry's property.
351 Personal attendance of i_Arab Rashed rally, 16 November 1995, 
HeIwan, Egyp t .
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Although a government minister was being publicly 
denounced, the President's appointment of, and subsequent 
connection to Mahjub, was never in question. Bakri it 
seems, elevated the President above the fray thus 
indicating a public acceptance of the existing political 
order. Moreover, as personal communication between members 
of the opposition and the security apparatus would not 
exist without both the knowledge and approval of the 
President, Bakri's reference to a cordial conversation with 
a member of the Ministry of Interior can thus indicate the 
development of such links.
With reference to the vote-exchanging process, the same 
case can also be used to illustrate the extent to which the 
Liberal party sought to distance itself from the Muslim 
Brotherhood connection. The main contenders in Helwan wa 
al-Tibbin's J_amel category comprised three individuals; 
Muhammad Mustafa, (NDP) , _\Ali Fathi Al-Bab, (Islamist) , and 
Mustafa f_Abd Al-Ghaffar, (Independent) . The NDP candidate 
can be considered the least popular of the three opponents. 
This was because as an employee in Sharikat al-Harir, one 
of the many state owned factories in Helwan, Mustafa's 
short political career began as an Independent in 1990 to 
protest against the government and resulted in his 
defection to the NDP in that same year. The series of 
worker's strikes in Helwan in 1989 resulted in the death of 
three workers during clashes with the police. Infuriated, 
the workers took an anti-government stance in the 19 9 0 
elections by grouping to support one of their own workers 
rather than the NDP nominated _!amel. On entering the 
People's Assembly however, Mus_tafa joined the ruling NDP. 
Thus letting the workers down and at the same time flying 
in the face of the reason he had been elected in the first 
place.
In view of his betrayal of the Helwan workers, Mustafa 
could not cultivate popular support within the constituency 
during the 1995 elections despite the vast administrative 
and financial assistance at his disposal as an NDP
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candidate. Understandably, as the point of entering a vote- 
exchange pact is to accumulate as many predetermined votes 
as possible, neither Mahjub nor Bakri. wanted an alliance 
with the unpopular candidate. The other two candidates were 
considerably more popular in comparison to Mustafa, 
although it must be noted, the size of their respective 
power-bases appeared to differ substantially. The 
independent Gafaar, was, like Mustafa before him, a public 
sector employee from the same silk cloth factory and the 
1995 elections comprised his first attempt to enter 
electoral competition.
According to several sources however, Mustafa's networks 
with fellow workers was limited primarily to those with 
direct contact with him in the factory. In contrast, the 
Islamic Al-Bab, another local, was in a position to claim a 
more extensive power-base, especially in the densely 
populated Mayo and Tibbin districts of Helwan. This was 
primarily a result of the loss of workers faith in secular 
co-workers stemming from Mustafa's actions in 1990. 
Moreover, unlike Ghaffar, who was not associated with any 
particular political group, Al-Bab relied upon the 
organisational skills of the Muslim Brotherhood to 
cultivate and expand his power-base. In view of the fact 
that Bakri. needed a well established partner to overcome 
the veteran minister's extensive power-base in Helwan, he 
chose not^ally with the Islamic Al-Bab. Instead he 
preferred to be associated with the relative newcomer and 
independent, Ghaffar.
While Mahjub formed a victorious pact with Al-Bab, the 
actions in this case are a further indication of the 
Liberal party's reservation to continue it's Islamic 
alliance and hence risk offending the regime. It is worth 
noting that Mubarak removed Mahjub from the cabinet 
immediately after the elections. It is not erroneous to 
suggest that this move was primarily influenced by the fact 
that the minister, to the President's disapproval, formed 
an alliance with a Muslim Brother and hence inadvertently
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helped that organisation achieve its sole electoral 
victory.
Co-operating with the authorities: 
some implications
The outcome of the 1995 elections witnessed the Liberal 
Party win only one seat. The Tajammuf. and the Neo-Wafd 
fared little better with five and six seats respectively. 
The poor results did not however, appear to reflect overt 
government interference with the three party's electoral 
results. On the contrary, as the 1995 elections showed the 
Liberal party and the Neo-Wafd followed the Tajammu_fs lead 
and shifted their stand to complement rather than challenge 
government position. The government, in turn, accommodated 
their electoral participation to the extent that deliberate 
obstruction directly pointing at government involvement was 
not apparent. In fact, it has been noted that in some 
constituencies with prominent members from these parties, 
the NDP nominated minor and hence unchallenging candidates. 
A "low key" candidate for example, was nominated by the NDP 
to compete against Yasin Seraj Al-Din, brother of the Neo- 
Wafd's chairman, in the Cairo constituency of Qasr Al-
352 • •Nil.' Seraj Al-Din, it is worth noting, won the election, 
and judging from his post-election comment that his
353success:"was the best evidence of democracy and freedom" , 
it would also appear that he had decided to enter the 
regime's clientelist structure in return for an electoral 
gain.
In general, however, co-operating with the authorities does 
not suggest that electoral competition was equal and fair. 
After all, the disparity between opposition and government 
resources remained evident, as did electoral malpractice. 
But as we will elaborate in the following chapter, 
electoral malpractice was primarily oriented to the 
individual level of the participating candidates.
352 Al-Ahram Weekly, 9-15 November 1995.
353 The Egyptian Gazette, 8 December 1995.
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Implications for remaining opposition
Conversely, it appears that those parties which did not 
adjust their roles and expectations to fit within the 
existing system found little freedom to participate in the 
1995 elections. The Muslim Brotherhood, the Labour party 
and the Nasserite party comprise such opposition. The 
unwillingness to compromise their position and aspirations, 
is evident in the manner in which they attempted to 
undermine the government during the electoral campaign. 
Perhaps the most provocative of which was the platform 
adopted by the Nasserite party.
In view of the fact that the current regime stems from the 
1952 Revolution, the Nasserites' electoral campaign 
appeared to have been focused on attempts to erode the 
regime's legitimacy through promoting themselves as the 
real guardians of Nasser's ideology. The prominent 
electoral posters plastered around the constituencies 
appeared with the large photograph of Nasser beside an 
extensive quotation from one of his speeches in which he 
warns the nation to be wary of "impostors" and "deceivers", 
and to protect the revolutionary gains: "the nation is
yours, the fields are yours, the factories belong to the 
citizens, the national economy is your home and 
shelter. . .be careful not to lo^ J’se it. . .be careful. . . be 
careful...be careful." The poster's message appears to be 
intent on portraying the regime's 'formal' economic reforms 
and privatisation plans as incompatible with the socialist 
policies of Nasser and subsequently suggesting that the 
Nasserite party, not the regime, are the true guardians of 
Nasser's revolutionary achievements. As Jaber J_Abd Al- 
fAziz, a Nasserite electoral candidate, declared to a group 
of working class voters in Cairo's Mohandesin area:
"Nasser is not dead, we are here fighting 
to keep his ideology alive, [the 
government] is causing the public sector to 
disintegrate, graduates from 19 84 onwards 
are unemployed...the pasha's sons get the 
jobs and the gap between the rich and poor
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is widening*..capitalism is not for us, it 
is for Europe, it is for America but it is 
not for us...America wants to eliminate the 
Arabs, Nasser knew this, he was not fooled 
by them!"354
Moreover, while the Neo-Wafd and the Liberals were 
refraining from allying with the Islamists in an attempt to 
appease the government, the Nasserites did not appear to 
adopt such conceptions: "The general feeling in the party
at the moment" declared J_Abd Al-Halim Qand.il, a senior 
member of the Nasserite Party, "is not only that there 
should be much more solidarity with the Islamists, but that 
the Muslim Brotherhood should be allowed to operate as a 
political party... The Islamists can organise and gather 
people. We can't. But after they have gathered, they ask
355
'where now?' . . . They need us as we need them."'
It would appear from such remarks that the Nasserite party 
was not only appearing to question the legitimacy of the 
regime in its electoral campaign, but it was also willing 
to contemplate an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
Nasserites' position was perhaps most unexpected. It should 
be noted that the party, under the leadership of Dhiva Al- 
Din Dawud applied for a formal license in 1988. It was not 
unexpectedly rejected by the government controlled party 
license committee. What is interesting however is that 
Dhiva Al-Din Dawud and two other members of his yet to be 
formalised party entered (as independents) the elections of 
1990 and won. Presumably, the government felt the 
Nasserites were following the example of fellow opponents 
the Tajammui and thus left them to participate unhindered. 
This assumption appears further verified when in 1991, the 
government did not contest the court ruling granting the 
Nasserites formal party status. The Nasserites on the other 
hand, appear not to have shared the government's
354 Personal attendance of gathering, 12 November 1995, Cairo, 
Egypt. Bakri also mentioned to us that he actually has regular 
contact with Hasan Al-'Alfi, the then minister of interior.
355 Middle East Times Egypt, 10-16 December 1995.
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perception. Hence its decision to take an overtly anti­
government stand in 1995. In this context, the fact that 
the party won only one electoral seat in the 1995 elections 
indicates the consequences of the party's refusal to adhere 
the President's conception of opposition role expectations.
The Muslim Brotherhood and the Labour Party
The Labour Party and the Muslim Brotherhood appear to have 
faced more or less similar consequences for apparently the 
same reasons. In fact, since the informal alliance of the 
two groups continued and can thus be regarded as a more 
powerful challenge to the regime than the newly formed 
Nasserite party, efforts to prevent fruitful participation 
in the elections appeared to be more evident.
One of the most conspicuous strategies employed by the 
government was the arrest of eighty-three prominent Muslim 
Brotherhood members on the alleged grounds of initiating 
"illegal activities". 356 This move was apparently intended 
to prevent the Islamic organisation from nominating its 
leading candidates in the forthcoming elections. One of 
those arrested was _lEsam Al-IErycm, one of our first 
Brotherhood contacts and secretary-general of the Doctors 
Association. During an interview conducted the previous 
year, it was clear why the Brotherhood gave the government 
cause for concern. As one of the organisation's prominent 
leaders, Al-JJEryan stressed the reason the Muslim 
Brotherhood participates in legislative elections is to 
compete for power. A view he maintained would continue 
regardless of whatever obstacles the government placed in 
their way. The point he argued is that "if we are allowed 
to gain power through elections, we will be willing to also 
lose power through elections. However, if we gain power
356 Ma'mun Al-Hudaybi, Personal Interview, 11 November 199 5, Cairo. 
Also see: "New Blow to Muslim Brotherhood" in Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-
18 October 1995.
193
Political Parties in Non-Competitive Elections
through other means, then of-course we will not leave 
through elections. "357
That the Muslim Brotherhood have the potential to win in
the event of competitive elections, is extremely likely
according to Hala Must.afa, a specialist on the 
158organisation.' Hence, the fact that the organisation 
appeared unwilling to adhere to the government's concept of 
elections, even after being given the "green light" to 
compete in previous elections, meant in the words of 
Mustafa, that the government "was not getting anything in 
return."359 That the Muslim Brotherhood was apparently not 
willing to be recruited into the electoral chain of 
clientelism and control implied that the government did not 
want them to compete in elections at all. This, for example 
was evident not only in the arrest and military trials 
faced by some of its members in election year, but in the 
fact a military court ordered on 22 November the immediate 
closure of the Brotherhood's official headquarters in 
downtown Cairo.360
Moreover, the government's attempts to accommodate 
opposition figures such as the Neo-Wafd's Yasin Seraj Al- 
Din, was evident in reverse for the Muslim Brotherhood 
members who did manage to compete in the elections. Ma'mun 
Al-Hudhaybi, the Brotherhood's official spokesman for 
example, was competing in the Cairo constituency of Doqqi. 
Al-Hudhaybi competed in elections for the first time in 
1987 and thus came to represent Doqqi in the Assembly 
between 1987 to 1990. Apart from the fact Al-Hudhaybi 
depended upon the support of his organisation, Al-Hudhaybi
357 Personal Interview, 13 December 1994, Cairo. On 2 3 November 
1995 the military court passed verdict on fifty-four of the 
detained Muslim Brotherhood members. Most were sentenced to three 
years imprisonment with hard labour. Al- AEryan was sentenced to 
five years imprisonment with hard labour. See: Middle East Times 
Egypt, 3-9 December 1995.
358 Personal Interview, 21 December 1994.
359 Personal Interview, 21 December 1994.
360 See: Middle East Times Egypt, 10-16 December 1995.
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also found support in Doqqi as a result of his family's 
deep-seated roots in the area. The Hudhaybi family, it is 
alleged, own a large proportion of Ibn al-Walid Square, a 
renowned area in Doqqi. Hence the locals presumably 
regarded him in the vibn al-balad' context.
When Al-Hudhaybi and most of the other opposition members 
boycotted the elections in 1990, Al-Hudhaybi's seat was 
taken by 'Amal AOthman, Egypt's long-standing Minister of 
Social Affairs. Yet as Al-Hudhaybi returned in 1995 to re­
contest his seat, it would seem that iOthman wanted to be 
transferred to an easier seat in Khanka, Cairo. Yet it was 
apparently Kamal Al-Shatheli, the NDP's electoral co­
ordinator who insisted J_Othman remained. The point was that 
with a minister competing for the seat, and with the 
resources of her Ministry at her disposal, Al-Hudhaybi 
would have little chance of re-election.361
Prior to the elections the Labour Party, it would appear, 
was targeted in a similar manner by the government. This, 
however, was surprising in view of the claim that the 
government had "warned" the Labour Party of the potential 
consequences of allying itself with the Muslim Brotherhood 
in the then forthcoming elections.362 Obviously this warning 
was not heeded, because using its mouthpiece, the Labour 
Party indicated that the decision to participate in the
elections was not only an alliance decision, but also one
which was based on the governmentally provoking view that:
"The Muslim Brotherhood and the Labour 
Party are aware of the nation's support for
them and it is therefore the duty of the
alliance to change its strategy and
361 Personal Interview, 11 November 1995, Cairo. In further efforts 
to ensure his campaigning did not run smoothly, he was constantly 
monitored by the security services. For example, during the same 
interview, he mentioned how the previous day the Ministry of 
interior dispatched five full police vans to the mosque where he 
was performing Friday prayers simply to ensure he did nothing more 
than pray.
362 Al-'Ahali, 4 October 1995.
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participate in the forthcoming 
elections. "363
Although not to the extent of its Brotherhood allies, the 
government did in fact attempt to detain several senior 
party leaders. Magdi. Husayn, the editor in chief of the 
party's newspaper Al-Shajfb, was charged in October 1995 
with having published in his paper an article that accused 
a minister's son of impropriety. Husavn, it appears, 
approved an article in January 1995 alleging that an 
unnamed son of an unnamed minister dined at a five star 
hotel with friends and subsequently refused to pay the 
bill. When the manager approached the young man in 
question, he was allegedly beaten up.364 Due to the charges 
being brought to court, it emerged that the young man was 
the son of Hasan Al-'Alfi, the Minister of Interior. The 
point here is that the decision to sue Husayn during the 
electoral period put intense pressure on the newspaper 
editor to abstain from competing in the elections.
Magdi Husayn's uncle, and Secretary General of the Labour 
Party also found himself in a similar situation in early 
1995. Returning from a trip to Turkey, JAdel Husayn was 
arrested at Cairo airport. It was alleged that he left on 
his plane seat hand-written anti-government papers, which 
the authorities argued constituted evidence of the anti­
government propaganda he had distributed abroad. The 
absurdity of the charge and the Journalist Syndicate's 
extensive coverage of the case appears to have forced the 
government to back down and release i_Adel Husayn, without 
charge at the end of January 19 9 5 . 365 Thus being unable to 
prevent JAdel Husayn from participating in the elections, 
he proceeded to contest the fe'at seat in the constituency 
of Madinat Nasr, Cairo.
363 Al-Shajb, 29 October 1995.
364 Various sources including personal interview with Magdi. Husayn,
12 November 199 5, Cairo.
365 Various sources including personal interview with JAdel Husayn,
13 November 1995, Cairo.
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What is worth mentioning here is the apparent efforts of 
the government to prevent J_Adel Husayn from winning. 
Similar to the tactic of placing a Minister opposite the 
Muslim Brotherhood's Ma'mun Al-Hudhaybi, _VAdel Husayn found 
himself competing against NDP candidate J_Abd al-Mon_tim 
J_Imara, chairman of the Higher Council for Youth and Sport. 
Yet, in a more blatant tactic to gain advantage i_Imara, 
using his position of authority, was allowed to register 
fifteen thousand non-resident young adults on to the voting 
register of the constituency. Arguing that fifteen thousand 
voters "are not enough to ensure success in a constituency 
of sixty-four thousand registered voters", _LImara publicly 
added that: "I had promised to revive young people's
interest in civic action...Why should I deprive them of the 
opportunity of electing members to the People's Assembly? 
This is not an accusation. If I had found half a million 
young people to participate in electing their 
representative, I would have done it."366
Evidently, the government approved this logic, because it 
did nothing to prevent dlmara's manipulation of power. This 
was left to the Labour Party who filed a lawsuit contesting 
hlniara's nomination. The administrative court did not rule 
against Jflmara's nomination, but it did rule the 
registration list of non-residents was illegal. 367 J_lniara in 
the final analysis, won the seat. It is interesting to note 
here that whilst the President removed Muhammad Al-Mahjub, 
the Minister of Religious Endowments from the Ministry 
after he collaborated in the elections with a Muslim 
Brotherhood member, J_Imara was not officially reprimanded 
by the President for what was evidently a serious abuse of 
power.
366 Al-Ahram Weekly, 9-15 November 1995.
367 Al-Ahram Weekly, 30 November-6 December 1995.
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3.4 Conclusion
That elections are utilised to recruit into the regime's 
clientelist system of control political parties apart from 
the President's own 'ruling' party does appear evident in 
Mubarak's Egypt. The point, however, is that multi-party 
elections can only perform such a role if the government 
can ensure that opposition parties are constrained to the 
extent they become like the President's party, dependent 
upon the government and its patronage. In such 
circumstances, they are compelled to accept the political 
status-quo and hence to acknowledge that participation in 
elections is not to compete for power but to gain access to 
a share of the resources controlled by the centre. To a 
large degree, this concept appears to have emerged, albeit 
gradually, amongst the opposition.
However, if the government cannot use elections for such an 
advantageous mechanism of recruitment, then it seems that 
there is little point in allowing opponents space in the 
electoral arena. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic 
oriented Labour Party for example, have not appeared 
willing to be pressured into the government's clientelist 
chain. This, from the government's perspective, would 
appear to have two negative implications. First, it means 
the government is unable to use elections to persuade them 
to accept the existing political system. This in turn, 
means that the participation of these opponents in 
elections provides them with the opportunity perhaps to 
recruit more followers- followers who like their leaders, 
are unlikely to enter the clientelist chain linking the 
centre to the periphery. This constitutes a potentially 
serious threat to the regime.
It is therefore not suprising that the government 
eventually conceded by the time of the 1995 elections that 
it was not in their interest for these opponents to 
participate in elections. As both the Ministers of Interior 
and Information, Hasan Al-'Alfi and Safwat Al-Shari_f
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respectively, publicly vowed: "there will be no room [in
the 1995 elections] for political groups who use religion
368as their platform." This position was later reinforced by 
President Mubarak during a television interview. As he put 
it:
"Dialogue with the Islamists is no longer 
an option. The late President Sadat tried 
this and he got nowhere so he got rid of 
three quarters of them. We have tried 
dialogue with them but as soon as they 
started to get strong they no longer wanted 
dialogue so I took the decision in 1993 to
369have no more of that."
The importance of elections as we mentioned above, is of 
course not simply to recruit politicians into the regime's 
clientelist system of control, but also to implicate the 
followers who support them. Hence, in the following 
chapter, we will examine the role of voters. In particular, 
the way in which the individualistic and hence controllable 
approach to political participation appears to be further 
reaffirmed as a result of non-competitive multi-party 
elections.
368 Middle East Times Egypt, 10-16 December 1995.
369 Mubarak Interview, Egyptian Satellite Channel, 2 3 November 
1997 .
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Chapter Four
Contestants; Voters and; the Significance of 
Personalistic Methods of Voter Recruitment.
4. 1 Introduction
Non-competitive multi-party elections as we have been 
arguing, appear to be utilised by the Mubarak government 
primarily as a tool with which clientelist control over 
political participation can be reaffirmed and expanded. On 
the party level, we attempted to show how formal and 
informal factors within Egypt's contemporary political 
arena seem to have contributed towards shaping the role of 
elections in such a manner. In this chapter, we will turn 
our attention to the lowest tier of the clientelist chain 
and thus examine the nature and implications of contestant- 
voter relations.
It would seem that one of the most prominent features of 
Egypt's multi-party electoral arena is the inclination of 
contestants to adopt campaign strategies that appear 
predominantly personalistic in nature. In other words, 
whilst the relaxing of emergency laws during the one month 
campaign period prior to elections formally offers 
political parties the opportunity to promote their links 
with the masses, party nominated contestants appear to use 
this period to concentrate more upon cultivating their own 
personal networks of electoral alliances.
The adoption of such personally oriented political 
participation appears significant from two main 
perspectives. The most obvious being that because it is 
predominantly personalistic in nature- i.e. the cultivation 
of voter support is primarily directed at individual 
candidates and not necessarily the parties they represent- 
party development and thus group cohesion is further 
hindered as a consequence. In turn, what this means is that
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multi-party participation is even more unlikely to 
constitute a threat to the prevailing system of rule 
because such forms of electoral participation do little to 
encourage the recruitment of party supporters at the grass 
roots level- a necessary function if links between 
political parties and the masses are to expand. Instead, it 
appears to reinforce the structure of political parties as 
controllable entities comprising conglomerates of 
personalities each of whom possess their own personal 
followers.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the function of 
elections in defining the role of politicians officially 
representing disparate political views as intermediaries 
between central authority and their respective localities 
appears also to be reinforced as a consequence. This is 
because the personal assurances of support cultivated by 
electoral candidates are primarily conditional upon the 
downward flow of patronage, most of which can realistically 
only be channelled from the centre. In such a context, if a 
candidate is to expand his network of supporters and thus 
increase his chances of gaining office, then emphasis upon 
his links to, and hence dependence on, central government, 
predominantly overrides issues of party programmes or 
ideologies.
Logically, the adoption of personalistic methods of voter 
recruitment by party candidates is advantageous to the 
regime because, in the final analysis, it appears to 
reaffirm the clientelist function of elections as 
articulated from above. Yet, in order to understand why 
electoral participation at the lowest tier of the 
clientelist structure appears to correspond, in general, to 
governmental expectations, it will be necessary to start 
with an in-depth examination of the reasons party 
candidates resort to such tactics in the first place.
During the elections, NDP candidates enjoy one particular 
privilege unavailable to their opposition counter-parts.
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This is the organisation of formal events in which senior 
government officials demonstrate their support for the 
candidates through attendance as guest speakers, and which 
public sector employees are 'encouraged' to attend as 
supportive members of the public. However, as we examine 
the nature of such events, our aim will be to stress that 
whilst these events are significant in that they constitute 
the main form of assistance provided by the NDP to its 
candidates {apart from ballot malpractice perhaps), such 
events are not as advantageous as they may appear in terms 
of strengthening and expanding the party or the candidate's 
base of support.
In the case of public electoral campaigning as adopted by 
opposition candidates we will show how government imposed 
constraints prevent opposition candidates from organising 
large electoral events on the scale of their NDP rivals. 
However, we will also point out a less obvious impediment 
generally faced by opposition candidates. Namely that like 
their NDP rivals, they too appear to lack adequate support 
from their own parties during election campaigns. This, as 
we will argue, is the underlying factor which leads 
candidates to adopt individualistic campaign strategies 
independent of the parties they officially represent. 
Strategies which in turn, make it less difficult for the 
government to utilise multi-party elections as a 
clientelist mechanism of co-option and control.
In contrast to the above, one of the main reasons the 
Muslim Brotherhood constitutes a threat to the regime, is 
because the above issue is not a problem evident within the 
Organisation. Instead, the support and assistance which 
Brotherhood candidates appear to obtain from their 
organisation means that electoral campaigns are 
consequently regarded as an opportunity to focus 
predominantly on the recruitment of 'party' supporters 
rather than on the construction of personal networks of 
alliances. Logically, this type of electoral participation 
contributes towards the expansion and strengthening of
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group cohesion. This in turn, makes it even less likely 
that the regime can utilise elections to pressure the 
Brotherhood, and arguably those who ally themselves with 
it, into co-option and hence control.
4.2 Formal Electoral Participation:
NDP candidates
As the President's party, the NDP constitutes the sole
party whose candidates have direct access to state
resources. NDP candidates therefore are in a prime position
to organise unhindered public gatherings in state owned
properties such as schools and youth clubs. As if to
emphasise their prestigious connections and show they are
supported by the government, NDP candidates also have
access to senior state and government personnel who attend
such campaign gatherings as guest speakers. In a joint
gathering held by NDP candidates Hamdi. Al-Sayyed and
Muhammad Rajab in Hike Step, Heliopolis, for example, the
contestants were provided not only with a newly constructed
hall, spacious enough to hold a seated audience of
370approximately three hundred/ but also with an impressive 
selection of prominent guest speakers.
Formal NDP event at Hike Step
Hike Step, which is situated on the desert outskirts of 
Heliopolis, can best be described as an industrial village. 
This is because the area, which has been inhabited for less 
than a decade, is predominantly occupied by workers 
employed in the surrounding state owned chemical and 
military factories. Due to the relative isolation of the 
area, the journey to work from Cairo would be quite 
strenuous if not impossible on public transport. Rather 
than travel therefore, the workers and their families were 
provided within the industrial precincts with state 
subsidised housing and other amenities such as shops. What 
this means is that whilst it is difficult for opposition
370 Personal guess derived during personal attendance, 18 November 
1995 .
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candidates to penetrate what can be regarded as an 
exclusive state-owned compound of this nature, NDP 
nominated contestants seem to have little difficulties 
gaining direct access to the inhabitants of such areas.
In the case of Al-Sayyed and Rajab, the NDP nominated 
contestants were not only provided with the spacious hall 
to hold their gathering, but were also provided with 
prominent guest speakers. The speakers included General 
Muhammad Wajih, the administrative manager of the local 
military productions factory; General Muhammad _VAfifi, head 
of security at the same factory; TAzjLz Fathallah, local 
treasurer of the NDP; General Karam Torraya, presidentially 
appointed Head of Heliopolis; and General 'Ahmad Al- 
JawahirgjL, the deputy governor of Cairo.
The NDP backed gathering appears to have attracted a 
significant crowd to the extent that the seats in the hall 
were all filled. Moreover, a large proportion of the 
audience was standing and even spilling onto the outside 
pavement. Judging from the atmosphere of the audience 
however, the extensive turn-out was less a demonstration of 
electoral support and more a result of a need to 
communicate with those in authority. This for example was 
reflected when members of the audience publicly questioned 
the speakers on matters relating to the local community. 
Matters arose such as the inadequate supply of water and 
electricity in the residential areas.
It was also clear from the enormous crowd which gathered 
around the speakers platform that at least one hundred 
members of the audience had also come to present personal 
petitions to individual officials. Saber Shawwa, an 
employee in one of the factories for example, managed in 
the scramble to present a petition intended for the deputy 
governor. In his petition he was asking for intervention 
because his mother who had been widowed for a year, had not
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■ 371yet gained access to her entitled state widows pension. 
The fact that the majority of the audience were present 
primarily to question and petition the state officials on 
communal and personal matters rather than to listen and 
support electoral propaganda, was difficult to ignore. Even 
the deputy governor was eventually led to declare angrily 
to the audience: "don't expect to throw a thousand problems
372in my face and expect me to solve it all tomorrow!"
Since Hike Step can be considered a newly established and 
relatively isolated community, one can argue that it is 
perhaps not too suprising for the inhabitants to use NDP 
electoral events to communicate their personal concerns 
with the authorities. However, the presence of senior state 
and government officials at electoral events appears to 
attract an audience primarily for this reason even in the 
most established of communities. Indicative of this is the 
fact some of the inhabitants of Helwan, Egypt's largest and 
most established industrial area for example, utilised a 
major NDP electoral event for purposes not too dissimilar 
to the inhabitants of Hike Step.
373Formal NDP event at Helwan Youth Club~
The event in question was arranged for the four NDP 
contestants nominated for Helwan's two electoral 
constituencies (electoral constituency twenty four and 
electoral constituency twenty five). As an NDP event, the 
candidates were provided with exclusive access to the 
pleasant, state-owned, Helwan Youth Club. The four 
candidates representing the two consituencies comprised the 
Minister of War Productions Muhammad Al-Ghamrawi, the then 
Minister of Religious Endowments Muhammad Mahjub in the 
fe'at category. The two _lamel candidates were Mustafa Munji
371 Personal Interview, Hike Step, 18 November 1995.
372 Deputy Governor Muhammad Al-Jawahirji to audience at Hike Step 
gathering, 18 November 1995.
373 The following information all derived from personal attendance 
of the electoral event held at Helwan Youth Club on 25 November 
1995 .
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and Muhammad Mustafa. The guest speakers supporting these 
four candidates included senior government and state 
officials such as Mohyi Al~Din J_Abd Al-Latif, Treasurer of 
the Cairo branch of the NDP, the Minister of Public 
Enterprise, Dr _lAt.ef _10bayd, and the Governor of Cairo, 
General J_Omar j_Abd Al-'Akahar.
In a similar situation to that witnessed at the Hike Step 
event, the stage where the guest speakers were seated 
became surrounded with individuals attempting to pass 
written petitions to the official guests. The crowd, which 
comprised no less than one hundred people, not only blocked 
the view of the front seat audience, but delayed the start 
of the electoral propaganda speeches by approximately one 
hour. It would seem the ministerial security and the 
attending members of the NDP Women's Group accelerated the 
process by collecting most of the petitions and promising 
to pass them to the relevant official. Illustrative of the 
petitioners was a worker who had been employed in a 
military parts factory for the last fifteen years. 
Discovering the Minister of War Productions would be 
campaigning that day, the worker decided to come and 
present to the Minister a petition. According the worker,
A
he was requesting the Minister's authorisation for his 
unemployed, diploma holding, twenty year old son to be
• 374recruited at the factory where he is employed.*
Apart from individual petitions, members of the audience 
brought up communal concerns which were not directly linked 
to the issue of the elections. One example of this was the 
opening hours of the local subsidised bakeries. The 
subsidised bakeries in the area, it would appear, had began 
a curious policy of closing at two o'clock in the 
afternoon. The main consequence being that the workers were 
unable to buy their bread on the way home from work. The 
formal electoral gathering in the Helwan Youth Club
374 Personal Interview with the petitioner "Abu Ahmad", 25 
November, 1995, Helwan.
206
Contestants; Voters and; the Significance of Personalistic Methods of Voter Recruitment
therefore, appears to have been viewed by the workers as an 
opportunity to air their concerns on the topic to those in 
authority. The Minister of Religious Endowments as it 
turned out, promised the audience that the bakery problem 
"would be solved by tomorrow". The Minister of Public 
Enterprise also reaffirmed the Bakery problem would be 
swiftly resolved.
In view of the type of public communication and interaction 
illustrated above, one can argue that the privileges 
conferred upon NDP candidates during electoral campaigns is 
advantageous in that it allows the party to expand and 
strengthen its links with the masses. This however, does 
not appear to be the case. The written petitions that are 
submitted to candidates and senior officials during 
electoral campaigns for example, are predominately 
straightforward applications for jobs, transfers, or simply 
individuals seeking an authority figure to intervene in a 
bureaucratic problem on their behalf. In other words, 
requests which can contribute extensively towards enhancing 
the party's links with the masses and which require little 
effort on the part of officials. Yet, it would appear that 
the officials to whom the petitions are directed, are not 
inclined to respond with even a letter of acknowledgement 
to the claimants.
This, it would seem, is because such petitions are 
predominantly thrown away without even being read. During 
the NDP gathering at the Helwan Youth Club for example, one 
member of the NDP Women's Group confided the petitions 
which she and her colleagues helped to gather on behalf of 
the senior attending officials were to be discarded as soon 
as the event was over. Asked if they could get into trouble 
with their superiors for discarding the applications in 
their possession, she laughed as did a colleague sitting 
next to her. In fact, the middle aged bureaucrat proclaimed 
that this was part of their duties during such events. In 
her words:
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"Do you think we all come to these events 
by choice? There is no choice. We came 
because the organisers needed the front 
rows occupied so that there is a buffer 
between the workers and the Ministers... We 
are also here to help collect the petitions 
because there is always a lot of them at 
these election events. After we collect 
them we throw them away . . , We don't like
» • 375doing that, but this is how it works."
The point therefore, is that strategies of this nature do 
little to assist the campaign efforts of a candidate. 
Indeed, such unresponsiveness on the part of senior 
government and state officials does not seem to deter many 
individuals who are perhaps extremely desperate for 
assistance. This however, does not imply the majority of 
voters are oblivious to governmental tactics of this 
nature. This, one can argue, is perhaps why it seems 
necessary to lure them into attending formal NDP electoral 
campaigns.
Ensuring an audience
In view of the above assumption, it would seem that the 
luring of an audience predominantly takes two forms: 
employment pressure and financial inducement. In the first 
instance upper public sector managers are 'invited' to 
attend and support to NDP candidate(s) at electoral 
gathering held in their respective localities. In turn, the 
managers inform the middle level bureaucrats whom they 
manage to show their support by also attending. What this 
means is that the majority of those informed turn up, not 
out of interest or choice, but out of fear that their 
absence might be noticed by their colleagues and superiors.
An electoral event held by NDP candidate, Muhammad Al- 
Sayyed, prior to the 1995 legislative elections illustrates 
some of the features of this predicament. 376 The event in
375 Personal interview with member of the NDP Women's Group, Helwan 
Youth Club, 25 November 1995.
376 Information derived from personal attendance of event, 26 
November 1995.
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question took place in Hada'iq al-Qooba, the electoral 
constituency Muhammad Al-Sayyed has been representing in 
the People's Assembly since 1990. The event was arranged to 
be held in two consecutive places. At approximately seven 
in the evening, we arrived with Al-Sayyed, an ex-football 
player and a local of the constituency, at JamjLeyyat 
Tanmeyat al-Moj tamaj__, a state owned and run building 
intended to provide the locals with advice and guidance on 
social service related matters. The plan was that Al-Sayyed 
would give a speech to the local women before moving on to 
the other location.
Inside the large room sat approximately two hundred women. 
The social contrast between the women was difficult to 
overlook. In the front row for example, sat rather 
elegantly dressed women who seemed slightly out of place in 
a working class area such as Hada'iq al-Qooba. In the row 
immediately behind them sat women, who to judge from their 
outward appearance seemed to fit the category of lower 
level state bureaucrats. The majority of women however were 
in the back rows, and judging from the predominantly black 
jalabeyyas (long gowns) which they wore, held little more 
than menial jobs, if at all.
These jalabeyya dressed women, it would seem, were 
returning favours for the Jam^eyya staff whose assistance 
they regularly seek and who in turn, had 'invited' them to
3 7 7
attend.' It also emerged that the front row women 
comprised both the wives of senior bureaucrats who came on 
behalf of their husbands, and senior bureaucrats who came 
in their formal capacity of representatives of the NDP 
Women's Group. The women located in the middle rows were 
indeed state employees representing both the local knitwear 
factory and the JamJ_eyya where the event was taking place. 
According to Nevin, an administrator at the factory, she
377 This information was initially derived from Sala h , Al-Sayyed's 
nephew and assistant, 2 6 November 1995.
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attended the gathering because like her colleagues, she was 
asked to do so by a senior manager. As she put it:
"We were told that the General Manager of 
our factory would be a guest speaker today.
We had the choice of coming here, to the 
women only gathering, or going to the event 
where the Manager would be speaking. I 
chose here because it starts first and then 
I can go home early to the children. . . 
[pointing at the front row women] if they 
weren't here, all of us [from the factory] 
would have gone to the other event 
otherwise no-one [i.e. work superiors] 
would have known we were present... what is
» 378the point of coming if nobody sees us?"
Perhaps due to the above reason for attendance, the 
atmosphere at that gathering appeared rather formal and 
strained. Indeed, most of the women, excluding those in the 
front row, chanted slogans such as "hanintikhib min? 
Muhammad Sayyed! wa habibkum mi^n? Muhammad Sayyed" (who 
will we elect? Muhammad Sayyed! and who do you love? 
Muhammad Sayyed!) However, that the gathering appeared a 
superficial demonstration of support can be detected in the 
bored expressions of the women's faces whilst being 
addressed. Moreover, the chanting at the end of the 
gathering lasted only a few minutes before the women 
abruptly quietened down and swiftly made their exit.
The second location of the evening was not too dissimilar 
in terms of atmosphere. Held in a khama (tent) located a 
few minutes walk from the JamJ_eyya, the gathering was 
however more subdued. This it would seem, was because the 
audience (approximately three hundred men and women who 
were predominantly administrative employees from the 
knitwear factory) did not appear so eager to chant
slogans of support for the candidate. In fact, the audience 
appeared very bored and uncomfortable as they 
unenthusiastically acknowledged each speaker with a weak 
applause at the start of an address.
318 Personal interview, 26 November 1995.
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The extent to which the audience seemed uninterested was 
evident when most of them got up to leave prior to the last 
speaker taking the microphone. Whilst it would seem the 
speeches were presumed over, it is interesting to note that 
even when the speaker took to the microphone, most of them 
still ignored him and left. The unfortunate speaker was 
left with an audience of less than fifty. The most logical 
conclusion derived from this situation was that the 
audience continued to leave even after realising there was 
a final speaker because: (i) their General Manager and his
entourage had slipped away a short time earlier, and (ii) 
they did not recognise the final guest speaker and 
therefore assumed (rightly) that he was not a senior
379official and therefore did not possess power over them.
That manual workers at the knitwear factory were 
conspicuous by their absence at the above gathering leads 
us to the second point regarding the nature of formal NDP 
electoral campaigns. In contrast to bureaucrats, it would 
appear that state employees in the manual workers category 
are less prepared to attend such events simply because they 
are instructed to do so by their superiors. The reason for 
this could be that these individuals have less to lose in 
terms of career prospects if they disobey the management. 
It could also be that senior state officials do not place 
excessive pressure for them to attend for fear of risking 
friction or even riots. What appears evident however, is 
that workers not only appear to have a realistic grasp of 
the organisation of formal electoral campaigns for NDP 
candidates, but are also less willing to act the role of 
passive audience in the same manner as their higher ranking 
colleagues in the public sector. As one worker asserted 
following one such gathering:
"All these important speakers and outsiders
[referring to the bureaucratic-looking
379 The speaker in question was indeed rather insignificant in that 
he was not an important official. He was apparently a supporter of 
al-Sayyed and had come simply to present a gratitude type of 
speech based on how al-Sayyed assisted him during a family crisis. 
Personal observation.
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members of the audience which include 
members of the NDP Women's group and what 
appears to be their male counter-parts] 
they are all here because they have to 
attend. They must all show support to the 
Party. Not out of choice, but because they 
are all fi khedmat al-Dawla {at the service 
of the state). We [the local workers] came 
because we want to know when they will 
provide us with some basic services in this 
place! "38°
The problems faced by both old and new working class areas 
in particular, arguably ensures that a proportion of the 
local workers do turn up to formal NDP events in order to 
question officials on communal matters or to present them 
with personal petitions. It would appear however that 
because workers are less inclined to attend such events 
simply to act as an audience, it is not uncommon to provide 
them with financial inducements to ensure their turn-out. 
This situation was explained by a group of workers from one 
of Helwan's military factories. During the one month 
authorised for electoral campaigning, according to the 
self-designated spokesman of the group:
"... we find empty coaches waiting outside 
the factory after work. The other factories 
in the area also get coaches after work.
But we do not get them everyday, just two 
or three times a week. When we see the 
coaches outside we know that the government 
needs us to cheer for its election 
candidates at some place or other... its up 
to each person if he wants to board the 
coach or go home, but usually no-one minds 
going. Actually we like going because we 
know that as soon as we board the coach the 
driver will give us ten pounds 
each. . .Before he drives off, he tells us 
where we're going and who to cheer for so 
that we are prepared."
Observing these workers chant slogans of support, cheer and 
clap during that particular gathering, one could easily
380 Personal Interview, factory worker, Hike Step, 18 Nov. 1995.
381 Personal Interview with factory worker attending with 
colleagues the NDP electoral event held at the Helwan Youth Club, 
2 5 November 19 95.
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presume this was a genuine projection of support for the 
candidates and their guest speakers. It is interesting 
therefore to discover that they (and presumably this was 
not a unique occasion) were effectively rented for the 
occasion.
In the final analysis, what this means is that whilst 
extensive gatherings of the nature discussed above 
constitute a privilege conferred on NDP nominated 
contestants, it would be erroneous to view the audience 
turn-out as an indication of either the extent of the 
contestant's popularity or the size of the NDP's base of 
support. Indeed, the vision of hundreds of people attending 
an NDP electoral campaign might appear on surface 
impressive and perhaps unfair compared to the more modest 
formal events organised by opposition parties for their 
candidates. Yet the attendance of large audiences does not 
necessarily provide NDP candidates with a significant 
advantage over their opposition counter-parts. This is not 
simply because the disparate reasons which appear to induce 
such turn-outs strongly suggest an absence of genuine voter 
support at such events. But also because there is little 
evidence to suggest the NDP as an organisation, is 
concerned that these reasons are not directly linked to 
genuine electoral support.
It should be noted that NDP candidates also seem aware of 
the above predicament. Indicative of this is the 
observation of Muhammad Al-Sayyed, the NDP's candidate for 
Hada'iq al-Qobba. According to personal experience and 
knowledge of his constituency, he expected only a fraction 
of those who attend his gatherings to actually vote on 
election day. According to him, out of approximately eighty 
thousand eligible voters residing in the constituency:
"... no more than twenty thousand are 
registered voters... Even with about twenty 
thousand voters, we [implying all the 
candidates competing in the constituency]
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will be very lucky if eleven thousand turn
, , ..382up to vote."
In terms of the public sector employees who attend his 
formal gatherings, he was aware that "not all of them 
reside in the constituency" and that in the case of 
,.those who are registered here, no-one can force them to 
vote."383 The same view also appears to be held by potential 
voters. As one Helwan factory worker argued:
" A lot of people might be brought in to 
attend all these government election 
events. But the government can't make you 
turn-up to vote. If they do, how can they 
be sure you vote for their candidates? you 
can vote for whoever you want, they won't
384know who voted for who."
The inadequacy of formal NDP events in terms of voter 
recruitment is perhaps better illustrated through the 
sceptical comments of one factory worker following the 
Helwan Youth Club gathering discussed previously. At that 
gathering, the Minister of Public Enterprises concluded his 
speech by informing the audience that "this year we will be 
giving a pay rise for all our workers in Helwan.., it is in
385gratitude for all the hard work we have achieved..."' The 
worker's response was: "Who is he trying to fool by telling 
us this at election time, we are not getting the pay-rise 
because they are charitable or good. We are getting it 
because we have not had one for over two years. So it is
386our due, that's the law, nothing more, nothing less!"
382 Personal Interview, 26 November 1995.
383 Ibid. .
384 Personal Interview following an election event for Mostafa 
Bakri at Mayo area of Helwan, 22 November 1995.
385 iAtef AObayd, Minister of Public Enterprises, 25 Nov. 1995.
386 Remark during personal interview with group of Helwan factory 
workers, 25 November 199 5.
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4.2 (b) Formal Electoral Participation: 
opposition candidates
That public campaigning seems to be of little assistance in 
terms of recruiting voters for NDP candidates, is a 
predicament that appears to be faced to an even greater 
extent by candidates representing opposition parties. This 
is because in the case of the participating opposition, the 
inability to generate mass support through formal electoral 
participation is due to more complex constraints to that 
encountered by NDP candidates.
Campaign gatherings, it should be noted, cannot formally 
take place under the state of emergency without prior 
permission from the Ministry of Interior. What this means 
is that if a candidate plans to hold a public gathering, he 
is formally required to submit an application to the local 
police station stating details such as the date and 
approximate location of the intended campaign gathering. 
The application is then officially passed to the Ministry 
of Interior, where it is then decided whether permission 
will be granted or withheld. Whilst NDP candidates, for 
logical reasons, do not encounter major difficulties in 
gaining permits to hold their respective gatherings, the 
situation for opposition candidates is not as simple and 
straightforward an affair.
The most conspicuous aspect in relation to the 
authorisation of election gatherings is perhaps the nature 
of site allocations. In contrast to NDP candidates, 
opposition candidates are rarely allowed access to youth 
clubs, halls or other state-owned property in which to 
conduct their gatherings. Instead, when political opponents 
are granted permits to hold such events, it is not uncommon 
for the authorities to allocate them sites which constitute 
little more than alley-ways located in difficult to reach 
areas. To illustrate the nature of such sites and the 
implications they appear to have for a candidate's 
campaign, we will take the example of a formal gathering
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authorised for Neo-Wafd candidate, Norman Jomya, during the 
1995 elections.
Jom'a and thexH a w  al-Munira al-Gharbewa' gathering 
As a contestant for the fe 'at seat in the electoral 
constituency of Imbaba, Noiman Jomia, the Neo-Wafd's 
deputy-chairman, had applied for permission to hold twenty 
formal gatherings during the one month authorised for 
election campaigning. According to iAbir, one of his 
personal campaign assistants, one of the main problems with 
this arrangement is that whilst the authorities had yet to 
deny them permission to hold any of the gatherings, it is 
routine procedure not to be notified of a formal decision
387except on the day a gathering is intended to take place. 
What this means is that iAbir and her fellow co-workers are 
given a few hours to find the designated location, hire a 
Khama, arrange the installation of a microphone system, and 
notify supporters and locals of both the event and 
location.
On the evening which the 'Hayy al-Munira al-Gharbeyya' 
gathering was to be held, the haste in arrangements was 
detected even at the hired office which Jomia was using as 
his campaign headquarters in Imbaba. To start with, none of 
the people present seemed to know the directions to the 
intended destination. After about half an hour of 
uncertainty and waiting, it was eventually decided that 
those with cars (Jomia and a few of his friends/ 
supporters) would follow the mini-bus which was carrying 
approximately twenty campaign assistants and supporters. 
Accompanied by iAbir and another of her colleagues, we 
subsequently followed the mini-bus out of the main roads in 
Imbaba and into a maze of small alley-ways.
It is perhaps an understatement to note that Hayy al-Munira 
al-Gharbeyya was difficult to reach. We not only found 
ourselves lost in many dead-end alley-ways, but also, these
Personal Interview, 19 November 1995.
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alley-ways were so narrow that on several occasions the 
mini-bus got stuck in them. In addition to this complex and 
arduous route, we arrived at the Khama over an hour later 
to find it crammed in a small alley-way directly next to 
another Khama in which a local wedding celebration was 
taking place.388
The loud music emitted by the neighbouring wedding meant 
that it was impossible for JomJ_a to give a speech to the 
small audience that had gathered to listen and enjoy his 
hospitality of free soft drinks. Exasperated by this 
predicament, Jomf_a eventually decided to go and introduce 
himself, congratulate the bride and groom and, present them
389 *with a noqjza in the hope this would encourage them to 
turn the music down. The plan did appear to work, because 
the wedding music was abruptly switched off thus allowing 
Jom/_a to start his speech. However, it seems JomI_a was 
aware he had to make his speech brief so that the 
neighbouring celebrations could be resumed. Consequently, 
with a mixture of frustration and irony he told his 
audience:
uIt is a pleasure to be here among you all 
... I would first like to congratulate the 
bride and groom next door. It must be a 
sign of good luck for us to be so near a 
happy occasion like this. We should 
therefore thank the Minister of Interior 
and the police officers for they are the 
reason we are here today.."390
388 In both working class districts and rural areas of Egypt, it is 
not uncommon practice for wedding celebrations (and post-funeral 
congregation) to take place in a Khama in the street so that as 
many guests as possible could be accommodated. This is largely 
because the close-knit nature of such communities means that 
weddings and funerals are regarded as communal affairs which the 
entire neighbourhood are invited/expected to attend.
389 A 'IVoqla' is money traditionally given to a bride and groom 
instead of a wedding present. In this case, Jomia presented them 
with one hundred Egyptian pounds- a large sum considering his 
position as a stranger to the couple. Personal observation, 19 
November 199 5.
390 Nolman Jomia, 19 November 1995.
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Almost ten minutes later, the wedding music was resumed 
thus compelling Jomia to thank his audience once more 
before making an exit with his assistants in tow. It was 
impossible, given the distractions, for Jomia to continue 
any further. Hence, the fact Jornia was not given an 
opportunity to communicate at length with the audience, 
meant that he was subsequently unable to project his views 
and thus potentially expand his base of support.
The obstacles and efforts JomJ_a and his assistants 
experienced, as well as the financial costs (which included 
hiring the mini-bus, the Khama and the micro-phone system, 
and also the purchasing of a large quantity of soft drinks 
and giving a noqta to the bride and groom) strongly suggest 
that the overall costs concurred did not realistically 
justify what, in the final analysis, was little more than a 
tense fifteen minute address to an audience of less than 
fifty.
It should be noted however, that for opposition candidates, 
gaining formal permission to hold electoral gatherings, 
appears to be largely dependent upon the relationship 
between the government and the party which the candidate 
officially represents. Hence, in the case of Jomia, one can 
argue that obstacles aside, he was not actually refused 
permission to hold formal gatherings because his party, the 
Neo-Wafd, appears to have conceded that participation in 
elections is not to gain power but to: "buy some space in
^91the political landscape."'
Interacting with the public: selective constraints 
In the case of opposition parties that do not particularly 
share the above view (currently the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
Labour Party and the newly established Nasserite Party) the 
permission to hold formal election gatherings seems to be
391 Ambassador Tahsin Bashir, retired Egyptian diplomat and 
political analyst, relaying a personal conversation with Neo-Wafd 
Chairman, Fu'ad SeraJ Al-Din. Personal Interview, Cairo, 14 
December 1994.
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automatically denied to their respective contestants. 
According to Muhammad Mahdi jAkif, the Muslim Brotherhood's 
1995 nominee for the electoral constituency of Hada'iq al- 
Qobba, the constituency's chief of police {al-Ma'mur) had 
warned him at the start of the campaigning period that 
because of the prevailing state of emergency, he had been 
given specific "orders from the presidential office to
392prevent any candidate from holding election gatherings". 
Obviously the implementation of these "orders" was 
selective. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain how, 
in the very same constituency, the NDP's Muhammad Al-Sayyed 
held public electoral gatherings such as those noted 
earlier in the chapter.
In the electoral constituency of Doqqi, another Brotherhood 
candidate, M a 'mun Al-Hudhavbi, encountered similar 
constraints. When we first interviewed him at what was then 
the official Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in central 
Cairo, he mentioned that only the previous day, he and "a 
few young Brothers" came out of a Doqqi mosque following 
Friday Prayers to find five vans full of policemen parked 
outside. Upon enquiring as to the reason for this 
conspicuous presence, he replied:
"Of-course [the authorities] knew we must 
attend Friday Prayers. But they were 
worried because we are not allowed to hold 
election gatherings. They thought that we 
will use the mosque to hold a gathering 
with the congregation after the 
prayers... it was totally unnecessary to 
deploy five police vans but they wanted to 
make sure everyone dispersed immediately 
after the prayers... the message was very
n ,,393clear."
Placing police officers outside mosques it seems, was not 
only aimed at preventing Muslim Brotherhood contestants 
from holding unauthorised gatherings, but also aimed at 
contestants representing the party most linked to the
392 Personal Interview, 11 November 1995.
393 Personal Interview, 11 November 1995.
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Muslim Brotherhood, the Labour Party. In the first week of 
November 1995 for example, _\Adel Husayn, a senior member of 
the Labour Party, and its then candidate for the electoral 
constituency of Madjuiat Nasr, faced a similar predicament 
to Al-Hudhavbi following Friday Prayers. However, it would 
seem that in that particular case, the police decided to 
disperse the congregation swiftly and thus entered the 
mosque immediately after prayers. The consequence of such 
eagerness being that a scuffle broke out leading to six 
arrests. The Labour Party candidate and his assistants, it 
should be noted, had already become familiar with police 
tactics of this nature because they had previously
. . . . .  394experienced three similar incidents.
That the Labour Party and the Nasserite Party were not 
permitted to hold elections gatherings was also evident in 
the fact that like the Muslim Brotherhood, their main 
method of making contact with the public at large rested 
upon personal walkabouts, coffee-house visits and the 
distribution of election material. The adoption of such 
tactics however always carries the risk of arrest and 
prosecution since the prevailing state of emergency is not 
formally lifted during the one month campaign period. It is 
simply that the government chooses to allow most 
contestants to overlook it. A simple illustration of this 
is the fact that during the election period, the streets in 
urban Egypt are covered with banners and posters 
advertising the various contestants who are competing in 
the respective areas.
Yet, the presence of such conspicuous material reflects the 
conscious decision of the authorities to ignore the 
publicity tactics of contestants. If the authorities chose 
to implement emergency measures during this period however, 
then it would be difficult for contestants to pursue this 
form of advertisement because the handling or erecting of
394 Personal interview with 'Ahmad Solayman Muhammad, Labour Party 
member and campaign assistant to AAdel Husayn, 13 November 1995.
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such material in public places would subject the 
individuals concerned to instant arrest. The point 
therefore is that having actually experienced the arrest of
* ■ 395 .various assistants m  such circumstances, (circumstances 
which one must stress, is common procedure that does not 
involve personal contact with the public and is otherwise 
overlooked for other candidates) one can thus comprehend 
the risk these contestants take when participating in 
unauthorised personal communication with the public.
In view of the risk of being arrested and perhaps as a 
consequence, being forced to withdraw from electoral 
competition, the tactics of unauthorised personal 
walkabouts, coffee-house visits and the distribution of 
election propaganda cannot therefore be regarded as 
efficient methods of voter recruitment. This, for a start, 
is because contestants participating in such activities 
must remain constantly on the move to avoid being caught by 
the police. In turn, it is difficult for potential voters 
to become familiar with a candidate if he is simply 
'passing' through. Illustrative of the nature and 
inadequacy of adopting these tactics is the campaign 
efforts of Labour Party candidate, iAdel Husayn.
Unauthorised public interaction: 
some shortcomings
Since the start of the 1995 election campaign month, J_Adel 
Husayn decided, as compensation for being denied formal 
permission to hold electoral gatherings, to use Monday and 
Friday evenings to walk around the constituency, meeting 
members of the general public. On Monday the 13th of
395 According to Ma'mun Al-Hudhavbi for example, five of his 
assistants were awaiting their lawyers in jail because on the 
evening of the 10th of November they were arrested for "putting up 
posters" in his Doqqi constituency. Personal interview, 11 
November 1995. In another example, several assistants for, and 
including two brothers of Sayyed Hussayn_Shaiban - the Nasserite 
Party candidate for the electoral consituency of Al-Manyal- were 
arrested for the same reason. They did however get released from 
jail nine hours later. Personal Interview with Shabban, 9 November 
1995 .
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November, we joined him on one such walk-about. Meeting him 
at his home at 6.pm he was unaware of the route that was to 
be taken that evening. Instead Husayn confirmed that his 
first route would be to a mosque in Heliopolis where he 
wanted to perform the Maghreb {early evening) prayers.
After we waited in his car for about fifteen minutes, 
Husayn eventually emerged from the mosque accompanied by 
ten other men. These men it turned out, were Husayn's 
designated guides and assistants. It later emerged that 
they comprised an equal combination of junior Labour Party
396members and junior Muslim Brotherhood members.'
The planned route, as it emerged, was to start near the 
College for Girls, reach the Marwa Buildings area and back 
again to the College for Girls area. During the three and a 
half hour journey, Husayn entered most of the local shops 
en route, shaking hands with customers and shop keepers 
whilst his assistants distributed the simple pamphlets. 
Probably due to the fact this was a predominantly upper 
middle class residential area, the atmosphere was rather 
subdued and the streets were rather empty at that time. One 
of the most noticeable aspects of the walk-about however, 
was the fact that most of the people encountered appeared 
to be taken by surprise. With the assistants distributing 
pamphlets and Husayn shaking their hands whilst repeating 
the same words: "you must vote, use your votes against the 
thieves, you know what I mean, you know what is wrong and 
right", there did not seem to be enough time for those 
approached to gather their thoughts before the entourage 
moved on.
At one point during this walk-about, we reached a coffee- 
shop whose owner was apparently familiar with Husayn. He
396 Interestingly, the Muslim Brotherhood influence on the Labour 
Party was apparent not only by the presence of their members, but 
also in the leaflets planned for distribution. The leaflets, which 
carried Husayn's name and picture carried the famous Brotherhood 
slogan: "Islam is the Solution."
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therefore invited him to give a speech to the customers 
whilst he prepared some refreshments for the group. With 
this invitation, Husayn began to address the coffee-shop 
clients by urging them to: "be united and vote on election 
day" so that "the polling station is kept busy and the 
[government] officials will not have time to fill out the 
empty forms." However, before he could continue, a young 
officer, apparently having just completed his work shift, 
entered the coffee-house, ordered a drink and sat in a 
discreet corner. Even though the coffee-shop owner assured 
him there would be no problems because the officer was a 
"local boy", Husayn abruptly ended his speech and decided 
it was best to move on. The remainder of the evening 
subsequently finished as it started, in a hasty walk-about.
As Husayn's walk-about illustrates, it is difficult for a 
contestant to purposefully interact with potential voters, 
when, at the same time, he must constantly be vigilant of 
the authorities. The extent to which the constant vigilance 
of contestants negatively affects the quality of their 
walk-abouts was perhaps best illustrated during one 
particular walk-about. The walk-about in question involved 
Muhammad Mahdi fAkif, whom we mentioned previously, was the 
Muslim Brotherhood's 1995 nominee for the working class 
district of Hada'iq al-Qobba.
As with Husayn, _\Akif and his assistants decided to pray at
397the local mosque before starting the walk-about. Upon 
approaching the mosque, we found one uniformed and two 
officers in civilian clothes sitting outside drinking 
coffee. As J_Akif acknowledged them upon departure from the 
mosque, he mentioned that the authorities decided to have 
the mosque monitored daily because he was a regular and 
presumably did not want him to hold any electoral 
gatherings inside. Also, to avoid trouble, he chose to 
remain a regular attendant because if he stopped, he
397 The following information derived during personal attendance 
the walk-about on 15 November 1995.
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believed the police would get angry, search for him
398elsewhere and then, they would "never leave me alone". 
_VAkif therefore, appeared to view his daily attendance at 
that mosque as a sort of 'sign-in' whereby the authorities 
would be reassured of his whereabouts and the fact he was 
not campaigning inside.
The walk-about - which did not differ significantly from 
Husayn's except for the fact the streets in Hada'iq al- 
Qobba were bustling with people - began once we reached a 
safe distance from the mosque and the officers. iAkif's 
encounters with members of the public comprised little more 
than handshakes and reminders that "Islam was the 
Solution". At one particular stage however, _\Akif had just 
entered a ma.kwa.ji' s (clothes ironer) workshop and before he 
could acknowledge any of the workers, an aide appeared from 
what seemed like nowhere and told _\Akif they were being 
followed by police in civilian clothes. Within seconds, 
everyone dispersed, leaving a startled and perhaps even
399frightened work shop of ironers.'
Fortunately for the group, the walk-about was resumed 
shortly afterwards because the crowded environment of the 
area meant they did not have too much trouble losing the 
officer. The point however, is that electoral walk-abouts 
cannot realistically be expected to serve any significant 
function in terms of contestant-voter relations, especially 
when incidents of this nature are constantly looming over a 
contestant's shoulders.
Indeed, one can argue that the informal coalition that has 
continued between the Muslim Brotherhood and Labour Party 
since 1987, and their apparent refusal to accept the 
political status-quo, renders them a sufficiently serious 
electoral challenge to the government to the extent it sees
398 Personal interview, 15 November 1995.
399 It should be noted that the abruptness in which the Islamic 
group dispersed meant that we were left stranded and one of 
AAkif's aides had to subsequently return and find us.
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the need to impose severe participatory restrictions. This 
compels them to interact with the public through electoral 
walk-abouts and other forms of unauthorised campaigning. 
What is worth noting however, is that contestants 
representing opposition parties that can be considered less 
challenging and, arguably, co-opted by the government, also 
appear inclined to adopt similar campaign strategies.
As we attempted to illustrate using the example of Norman 
Jornla, it is not uncommon for opposition contestants to be 
granted, at very short notice, formal authorisation to hold 
election gatherings that are subsequently located in 
undesirable locations. Such strategies on the part of the 
authorities, logically discourage contestants from seeking 
formal permits to hold their respective gatherings. An even 
more discouraging strategy however, is when the authorities 
decide to completely ignore a contestant's application. In 
doing so, the applicant is subsequently forced to cancel 
the intended gathering for fear the information submitted 
in the application, in conjunction with the absence of a 
permit, would provide ample ammunition for a police raid if 
the event went ahead. Hence, it is largely due to this 
predicament that resorting to unauthorised public 
interaction is not a procedure confined only to certain 
sectors of the opposition.
Illustrative of the above assumption was some of the 
campaign strategies adopted by contestants such as Fatheyya 
Al-_lAssal of the Tajammuf and the Liberal Party's Mustafa 
Bakri. Al-_L.Assal, who, during the 1995 elections, competed 
in the electoral constituency of Imbaba, chose for example, 
to relinquish authorised electoral gatherings altogether, 
and instead, interact with members of the public through 
walk-abouts and informal speeches arranged at local coffee­
houses.400 Bakri, on the other hand, focused much attention 
on speaking at organised gatherings which attracted large
400 Personal interview and observation of Al- LAssal on 6,7 and 8
November 199 5.
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audiences, but were, again officially unauthorised 
activities.401
Arguably, candidates such as those mentioned above did not 
appear to suffer dire consequences as a result of pursuing 
unauthorised campaigning because they represent parties 
that had, as we discussed previously, indicated their co­
operation with government and also their distance from the 
Muslim Brotherhood, prior to, and during, the 1995 
legislative elections. Nevertheless, the fact that certain 
candidates are not pursued by the police during 
unauthorised election activities, does not necessarily 
imply such activities are particularly advantageous in 
terms of voter recruitment.
Indeed, judging from personal observations throughout the 
1995 election period, members of the public, especially 
those from urban working class areas, generally appeared to 
show some interest when meeting and listening to what 
various opposition contestants had to say. Yet showing 
interest in a candidate's presence and actually voting for 
that candidate are two factors which are separate and 
distinct. As an audience member argued following one 
campaign gathering:
"Every candidate promises to change the 
area if he gets elected. . . After work, we 
go home and eat and then go to the coffee­
house to have a drink and chat with our 
friends. But during the elections we have a 
break from the normal routine. . . sometimes 
we go and listen to an opposition candidate 
and sometimes they come to visit us at the 
coffee-house,., Their views are sometimes 
very interesting. But even if we agree with 
the views of one contestant, this is not 
reason enough to vote for him. To vote for 
someone, you must know who he is so that if 
you need a favour you will know where to 
find him. . . it's silly to vote for a
401 According to Bakri, over sixty such gatherings were held during 
the campaign period. Personal interview, 20 December 1995.
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complete stranger because if he wins you 
will never see him again ..."
These words bring us to arguably the most important point 
about the limitations of public campaigning whether they be 
authorised or unauthorised: activities of this nature are 
of little significance when contestants have the problem of 
insufficient support from their respective parties. 
Insufficient support includes the reassurance of some form 
of party base in the constituency where a seat is being 
sought. Whilst this may appear a logical assumption, it 
would seem that this is not an uncommon issue in Egypt's 
contemporary multi-party arena.
4.3 Insufficient Party Support:
the NDP and the legalised opposition
Party candidates, one would assume, should be in a more 
advantageous position than, for example, independent 
candidates, if only for the material and organisational 
support one would expect them to obtain from their parties 
during electoral competition. Yet, in Egypt's multi-party 
arena, it would seem that the formally unrecognised Muslim 
Brotherhood constitutes the sole participating organisation 
which adheres to such logic. The overall nature of Muhammad 
J_Akif's 1995 electoral campaign in Hada'iq al-Qobba 
provides an apt illustration of the type of support the 
Muslim Brotherhood extends to its candidates.
Brotherhood support: one candidate's case
The constraints imposed by the authorities on participating 
Brotherhood contestants appear to have led to the adoption 
of spontaneous and arguably futile forms of public 
campaigning such as informal walk-abouts. It should be 
noted however, that to compensate for this predicament, the 
Muslim Brotherhood appears to provide its candidates with a 
strong support system. In iAkif's case for example, he was, 
for the 1995 elections, provided with a temporarily rented
402 Personal interview, 'Amin IsmaJ_il, school teacher attending 
Mostafa Bakri gathering in Helwan, 14 November 1995.
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office in a well presented apartment block in Hada'iq al- 
Qobba, the constituency in which he was competing. This 
office, which was spacious and contained modern equipment 
such as a telephone, computer and facsimile machine, was 
intended as a base for iAkif to discuss campaign strategies 
with other Brotherhood members, as well as store election
J3 403propaganda.
The importance of maintaining such an office during the 
electoral period is not to present potential voters with a 
local site which could be easily identified and located. 
This, one can argue, is not necessary because the presence 
of social projects such as the religious school funded and 
run by the Muslim Brotherhood for the locals, constitutes 
the equivalent of a permanent base in the area. The office 
therefore, was allotted to _\Akif and the Brotherhood 
members specifically involved in his electoral campaign. In 
view of the fact J_Akif was provided with no less than one 
hundred assistants, the necessity of such a base is 
understandable.
These assistants, it is worth noting, were, prior to the 
start of the election campaign, personally unfamiliar with 
_\Akif, and vice versa. What this means, is that their 
participation in his campaign was not tied to obligation or 
support for the candidate on a personal level, but for the 
Muslim Brotherhood as a group entity. The intensity of 
support these assistants portrayed to the organisation in 
which they are members is well reflected for example, in 
the case of one assistant. This assistant who, like the 
majority of his colleagues was a local resident of Hada'iq 
al-Qobba, put on hold his Master's Degree in engineering, 
so that he could help the campaign efforts of a contestant 
with whom he was personally unfamiliar, and whose only link 
to him was as a fellow member of the organisation.
403 Personal observation, 15 November 1995.
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The role of the student, along with seventy-nine other 
local Brotherhood members focused primarily on door-to-door 
canvassing. This campaign technique was simplified because 
as a registered candidate (formally: independent) , QAkif
was allowed police access to the names and addresses of the 
constituency's eighty thousand or so adult residents. 
Consequently, being local residents themselves and thus 
familiar with the area and the people, the eighty young men 
were each given a list of approximately one thousand people 
to visit at home. The purpose of this was two-fold.
First, those on the electoral register were to be persuaded 
to vote for the Brotherhood on election day. Second, those 
residents who were not registered to vote (and according to 
both J_Akif and the NDP' s Muhammad Al- Sayyed, that 
constitutes the majority of residents) , were to be 
persuaded to do so by the assistants and subsequently 
helped with the obligatory paper work. Since assistance of 
this nature would require Brotherhood members to interact 
several times with the potential voter, the gratitude, or 
at least familiarity, which emerges as a consequence, is 
intended to ensure that a proportion of them become 
recruited as supporters of the organisation.
In addition to helping household members to register, 
discussing religious ideology and distributing election 
material, the Brotherhood campaigners are also expected to 
present each household with token gifts. Gifts such as 
Qur'anic verses, Islamic theme calendars and, a range of 
Islamic theme stationery for the children.
The process of providing stationery for children is also 
extended to schools. Subsequently another, albeit, smaller 
group of young Brotherhood members were assigned the task 
of waiting outside local schools when the pupils came out 
with the sole purpose of distributing rulers, pencils, 
erasers, sharpeners and exercise books all printed with the 
slogan "Islam is the Solution" and the occasional verse 
from the Qur'an.
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Targeting children with stationary gifts, according to 
_\Akif, is considered an important aspect of Brotherhood 
campaign activities, especially in poor areas such as 
Hada'iq al-Qobba. This, as he maintains, is because for 
poor parents, the purchasing of stationery for their 
children is very much a burden on their already strained 
budget. Consequently, by providing children with these 
token objects, the parents would see the Brotherhood slogan 
and remember that the organisation is sympathetic to their 
circumstances. Even if the parents are not affected by this 
gesture, J_Akif maintains that his organisation's efforts 
would not be in vain. This, as he argues is because the 
Muslim Brotherhood also has:
"a programme for the recruitment of 
children... from those at primary school to 
those at the secondary and university level 
of their education, , . if parents do not 
respond to us, children are still going to 
remember who gave them goodies at the 
school gates and hopefully this means our 
message is being slowly passed to the next 
generation directly. . .we are not in a 
hurry, our plans are very long term. "404
i^Akif's campaign strategy as outlined above, strongly 
reflects the existence of group cohesion. It would seem 
that _l_Akif, and arguably all Brotherhood contestants, 
receive sufficient support from the Muslim Brotherhood for 
campaigning not to be focused on a personalistic level but 
on a group level. The fact the Brotherhood funds all the 
campaign costs of its candidates, encourages its junior 
members to play an active role in assisting the 
contestants, and ensures that campaign literature 
emphasises the contestants not as an individual 
personalities who happen to be Brotherhood members, but 
first and foremost as representatives of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, all indicate this to be the case.
404 Personal Interview with J_Akif, 15 November 1995.
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That the legalised opposition does not appear to possess 
the type of group cohesion found within the Muslim 
Brotherhood organisation on the other hand, can be detected 
in the seemingly insufficient assistance and organisational 
support extended to their candidates. It is worth pointing 
out for example, that the Muslim Brotherhood does not 
receive or presumably expect, its long-standing ally, the 
Labour Party, to provide it with party members to help with 
the electoral campaigns of its candidates. In contrast, the 
presence of Muslim Brotherhood members during the electoral 
activities of Labour Party contestants is evident. An ample 
illustration being that when one of the Labour Party's most 
senior members, _l_Adel Husayn, decided to enter the 
electoral competition for the first time in 1995, he 
campaigned, as mentioned previously, with the help of 
Muslim Brotherhood members. If the Labour Party provided 
sufficient support to its electoral candidates, one would 
assume that as senior member, Husayn would not have 
accepted the assistance of an organisation which he does 
not represent.
The issue of finance
That contestants representing the legalised parties appear 
to lack sufficient support from their parties, is however, 
more prominently reflected in the campaign framework of 
these contestants. It would seem that, in contrast to 
Brotherhood contestants, opposition and NDP candidates 
alike, appear to personally finance a large part of their 
own electoral campaigns. If, for example, we look at those 
party candidates whom we particularly observed during the 
1995 elections, we find that apart from _\Akif, all the 
other candidates have personally contributed towards their 
own campaigns. 405 NoLman Jomfa. (Neo-Waf d) , 406 Fatheyya Al-
405 This information is based on various interviews derived during 
the time spent on the 19 9 5 electoral campaigns of :Hamdi Al-Sayyed 
(NDP) ; Muhammad Al-Sayyed (NDP) ; J_Adel Husayn (Labour) ; Khaled 
Mohyi Al-Din (TajammuU ; Fatheyya Al-_tAssal (TajammuU ; Jaber LAbd 
Al- _\Aziz (Nasserite) ; No_l_man Jonda (Neo-Wafd) ; and Mpstafa Bakri. 
(Liberal).
406 Personal interview with Joird.a's assistant, 19 November 1995.
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TAssal (Tajammuj_) 407 and Mostafa Bakri. (Liberal) 408 for 
example, were responsible for the financing and running of 
the rented premises which were temporarily used as their 
campaign base in Imbaba and Helwan respectively.
It should be noted however that these offices were 
primarily used by the contestants and their assistants to 
meet, discuss campaign strategies and store election 
advertisements. It is for this reason that when we first 
attempted to locate these offices, we found that the locals 
whom we asked for directions, were familiar with these 
addresses, but seemed oblivious to the purpose for which 
they were being used. One can argue therefore, that these 
contestants with rented offices were arguably as physically 
remote from the constituents as Jajber J_Abd Al-LAzjLz 
(Nasserite). He not only lacked a temporary office in his 
competing constituency of DoqqjL, but, like the three 
candidates mentioned above, was neither a resident of the 
constituency in which he was competing, nor did his party 
possess a local base there.
Logically, one can argue that opposition parties in 
particular, may, due to financial restraints, lack 
sufficient resources to allow them to maintain local bases 
in electoral constituencies where they have nominated 
candidates. Yet, in reality it is difficult to accurately 
assess whether the lack of local bases is solely the result 
of governmental constraints, of which finance laws plays a 
major part, or whether a lack of enthusiasm on the part of 
party leaders also contributes to this predicament. As we 
mentioned in the previous chapter for example, political 
parties are forbidden by law to accept donations from 
foreign individuals and organisations. The Egyptian 
companies or individuals that donate to political parties 
must bear in mind that by law, the recipient party must
407 Personal interview with J_Assal's uncle at her rented premise, 6 
November 1995.
408 Personal interview with Bakri, 14 November 1995.
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publish details of the transaction in its newspaper if the 
amount exceeds two thousand Egyptian pounds. Logically, 
this process can act as a deterrent to prospective donors 
who may not want the publicity and arguably, the 
aggravation entailed if the contribution is intended for an 
opposition party.
However, political parties have access to other sources of 
financing such as the one hundred thousand (Egyptian) 
pounds each registered party receives from the Shura 
(consultative) Council, party membership fees and revenues 
derived from the sale of newspapers and other party 
publication sales both in Egypt and abroad.409 Indeed, 
judging from the contrasting appearance of party 
headquarters, some parties it would seem, are more 
financially secure than others. The Neo-Wafd with its 
Headquarters, for example, in a multi-million pound villa 
in central Cairo, does not appear to be suffering dire 
financial problems. The success of its newspaper Al-Wafd, 
is reflected in the fact that it constitutes the sole daily 
opposition party newspaper in Egypt. Moreover, according to 
iAli Salama, the party's deputy secretary-general, the more 
senior a member, the more he is expected to pay in 
membership fees. Hence, it is not uncommon for example, for 
a senior member to pay between "five and ten thousand 
pounds" in annual membership fees.410
In this context, one would assume that an opposition party 
in the Neo-Wafd's position would only be too willing, if 
the opportunity arose, to finance the establishment of a 
small local base outside Cairo. Apparently, this is not the
409 It has been noted for example that political parties appear to 
receive a decent income as a result of the regular sale to Gulf 
states, and Saudi Arabia in particular, of a set amount of 
newspapers for the price of one U.S. dollar a copy. Personal 
Interviews including Abd Al-Ghaffar Shokr, deputy secretary- 
general of the Tajammu_L, 17 December 1994, and Must.afa Bakri., 
Editor in Chief of Al-Ahrar, 20 December 1995. It is worth noting 
that in Egypt these papers are sold for about fifty piasters a 
copy. That is the equivalent of ten U.S. cents.
410 Personal Interview, 8 January 1995.
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case. A discussion we observed in which JLAli Salama and 
several other prominent Neo-Wafd members including _\Abd Al- 
j_Aziz Zayam and Hasan Hafez were attempting to convince a 
young Neo-Wafd member to personally pay the deposit 
required for a new party base appears indicative of this.
One example regarding parties and finances411
The young man in question had come from his rural hometown 
to the party Headquarters in Cairo, with the news that he 
had found a vacant office in his locality which he felt 
would be suitable as a local base for the party. Moreover, 
he appeared rather excited because the property owner was 
demanding about eight thousand Egyptian pounds for deposit, 
followed by a monthly rent of one hundred Egyptian pounds. 
Judging from the young man's description of the premises it 
seemed a very good deal. The place was apparently in a good 
location and was well constructed with all the necessary 
amenities. He also argued that apart from the deposit, its 
running costs would be minimal because he was planning to 
run it on a voluntary basis.
The aim, it would seem, was to use the office as a focal 
point for the recruitment of unemployed young people in the 
area. As these unemployed people had little else to 
distract them, he seemed sure his efforts would contribute 
towards expanding party membership at the grass roots 
level. Whether this would be the case or not, it would seem 
Salama and his colleagues were not very eager to find out. 
Rather, they argued that the young man should first show 
his commitment to be genuine by personally paying the 
deposit himself. If he did, then he would have proved his 
commitment to the project and the matter of party material 
such as posters and publications, monthly rent and the 
annual electricity, water and telephone bills would 
subsequently be paid by the party.
411 This example was derived from personal observation at JAli 
Salama's office, Neo-Wafd Headquarters, Cairo, 8 January 1995.
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In view of the fact that government subsidies ensure annual 
electricity, water and telephone bills are very cheap, this 
proposal seemed rather unfair. This was not, after all, a 
private enterprise proposal and it should be noted that the 
young man was volunteering his services for no monetary 
reward. Over an hour of debate and discussion in which the 
young man stressed several times that he could not 
personally afford to pay the deposit, those present 
eventually came to the consensus that if he were to come 
back with half of the required deposit, then the matter 
would be seriously referred to the Party Chairman. In the 
final analysis, what this meant was that the young party 
member left Cairo with less hope than when he had arrived.
One can argue that the tactics of the Neo-Wafd may not 
necessarily be representative of other opposition parties. 
The majority of opposition parties may after all, be 
genuinely unable to finance the maintenance of permanent or 
even temporary local bases. It could be for this reason 
therefore, that their candidates are compelled to rent 
their own temporary premises in their respective electoral 
constituencies. Yet on the other hand, if this is the case, 
one would presume that the parties officially represented 
in the electoral arena would attempt to compensate the lack 
of financial assistance extended to its candidates with 
manpower assistance. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood 
not only provides volunteer members to assist its own 
candidates, but also assists candidates representing its 
political ally, the Labour Party. Yet it would seem that 
such form of assistance appears to elude not only Neo-Wafd 
candidates, but also candidates representing the other 
opposition parties.
The issue of party manpower assistance
Indicative of the above assumption is the apparent 
dependence of candidates on hired help during their 
electoral campaigns. As a senior member of the Neo-Wafd, 
one might logically assume that Nojjnan Jom_fa for example, 
would be surrounded by junior party members eager to assist
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one of the party's most senior leaders. Instead, what we 
found were privately hired assistants unconnected to the 
party he was officially representing. Some of these 
assistants were participating as a favour to Jom_[_a, not 
because of party connections, but because they were junior 
employees from his own law firm. The majority however, were 
local Imbaba youth. Again, none were Neo-Wafd members. 
Instead, all of them were apparently hired specifically for 
the electoral campaign period.
According to one of the law firm 'volunteers', at least ten 
of these privately hired assistants were being paid the 
enormous sum of five hundred (Egyptian) pounds a week to 
help promote Jonda's campaign in Imbaba. In view of these 
wages and the fact that Jomia's daily expenditure on the 
campaign averaged £L.E.2,500, one would assume a candidate 
in this position would only be too happy to forsake most of 
his private helpers in order to cut the cost of his 
campaign. This however would have been virtually impossible 
because the Neo-Wafd's contribution to his campaign was no 
more than that extended to other party candidates. Namely a 
few party posters and other inexpensive party propaganda 
material .412
The 1995 election campaign of Mo.st.afa Bakri, editor-in- 
chief of Al-Ahrar's mouthpiece of the same name, provides 
another example of this predicament. In a similar situation 
to Jomia, Bakri had secured the assistance of some junior 
journalists from the newspaper which he edited. As hired 
professionals at the newspaper, these young journalists 
were not participating in Bakri's campaign as fellow party 
members, but as a favour to their boss. In addition to 
these 'volunteers', Bakri also depended upon the help of 
his brothers, who incidentally, were Neo-Wafd members. In 
the final analysis, the bulk of Bakri's campaign help came 
from privately hired Helwan locals. Whilst Bakri refused to
412 The above figures were obtained from J_Abir, a young lawyer at 
his law firm, and also one of Jomf_a's 'volunteer' campaign 
assistants. Personal Interview, 19 November 1995.
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disclose the amount spent on hired help, or indeed his 
campaign cost in general, it is sufficient to note that he 
acknowledged it was not an insignificant amount.413
On the surface therefore, it would seem that of those 
representing the legalised political parties, it is the NDP 
candidates who are in the most advantageous position in 
terms of party support. After all, the NDP organises for 
its candidates formal electoral gatherings which opposition 
candidates cannot compete. Yet, as we discussed earlier, 
formal electoral gatherings, whether held on a grand scale 
for NDP candidates, or on a more moderate scale, as appears 
to be the case for opposition candidates, are not 
necessarily efficient mechanisms of voter recruitment. In 
addition, one should bear in mind that except in cases 
where a candidate is also a Minister and thus has direct 
access to the resources of his Ministry, the NDP does not 
support more than a few of such gatherings for each of its
• * * i 414officially nominated candidates.
What this means is that in between such gatherings NDP 
candidates are left to organise and finance their own 
electoral campaigns. The financial and organisational 
burdens of maintaining their own campaigns is reflected for 
example in Hamdi Al-Sayyed's comment that:
In fact, because Bakri. was personally responsible for his 
entire campaign, including the payments for hired help, the costs 
incurred had been so high that he was compelled to seek financial 
assistance from a "friend in Alexandria" who also happened to be a 
"rich businessman". Personal Interview with Bakri., 20 December 
1995.
414 If we return to our discussion with the 'rented' audience that 
comprised Hel w a n  workers for example, (at Helwan Youth Club 
gathering, 25 November 1995) we find that during the official one 
month designated for electoral campaigns, it was stated that they 
were required only two or three times a week. Moreover, the fact 
that the bus driver had to inform them in advance where they were 
going and who they should be cheering, means that such formal NDP 
gatherings were predominantly for a different candidate/s each 
time. Also, it is worth noting that NDP candidates, Muhammad Al- 
Sayyed and Hamdi Al-Sayyed mentioned that they did not participate 
in more than a few such gatherings. Personal Interview, M. Al- 
Sayyed, 2 6 November 1995 and; H. Al-Sayyed, 27 December 1994.
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"Election campaigns vary in cost from one 
candidate to another. Sometimes you get 
various contributions from certain members 
of the constituency [note: no mention of
contribution from party]. Personally, my 
costs are low because of my reputation, my 
previous history with the constituents and 
the good work I have been doing on their 
behalf since 1979. Therefore I usually 
spend in the region of twenty thousand 
pounds. This is spent on posters, some 
publications and the cost of arranging 
meetings. Usually constituents would 
provide their vehicles to transport people 
to the meetings, but of-course it would not
* 415be fair if they also paid for the fuel."
To judge from the above comment, it would seem that al- 
Sayyed is suggesting that less established or unpopular 
colleagues are faced with personal costs exceeding those he 
incurs. This assumption appears to be verified by Muhammad 
Al-Sayyed, who also maintained that his campaign costs have 
been "very low" due to the locals who "all help" him out. 
The costs concurred by less fortunate colleagues however, 
can, as he points out, reach into "hundreds of 
thousands. "416 It would therefore seem that during electoral 
campaigning, the predicament faced by NDP candidates is not 
too dissimilar from that faced by their (legalised) 
opposition counter-parts. Both sides appear more dependant 
upon their personal resources, networks and the goodwill of 
their constituents than on their respective parties.
On another level, one can argue that NDP candidates at 
least have one particular advantage not readily available 
to opposition candidates: namely if a candidate required a 
formal base in a particular constituency, it would not be a 
problem for the party to secure one from the various state- 
owned properties . In the case of Hamdi. Al-Sayyed for 
example, the NDP provided him with access to a state-owned 
office, located behind a mosque in Heliopolis. Therefore, 
since becoming a member of the People's Assembly in 1979,
415 Personal Interview, 1 January 1995.
416 Personal Interview, 26 November 1995.
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Al-Sayyed has been able to maintain a permanent base where 
his constituents could locate him, and where he could 
personally meet them on a regular basis.
Yet it is worth noting that the office is used for such 
purposes predominantly as a result of Al-Sayyed7s personal 
efforts than due to those of the NDP. In other words, 
whilst the office is actually provided by the NDP, the 
office itself is run by Al-Sayyed with the help of two 
privately hired assistants, not NDP personnel. 
Consequently, if it were not for the personal efforts of 
Al-Sayyed and his privately hired assistants, the office 
would be little more than empty state-owned property. Al- 
Sayyed' s personal efforts, it should also be noted, extend 
to the fact that, as the long running Head of the Egyptian 
Medical Syndicate, he is able to give locals the assurance 
that in cases of absolute emergency, he is also reachable 
at the Syndicate Headquarters.417
Since entering the People's Assembly in 1990, Muhammad Al- 
Sayyed, has also held a regular office in the local state- 
owned JamJ_eyya> Yet, it should be noted that al-Sayyed 
originates and resides in the working class area of Hada'iq 
al-Qobba. Therefore, had he been denied access to an 
official office in the constituency, it would still not be 
too difficult for locals and potential supporters to locate 
either himself or a member of his family. Moreover, like 
Hamdi Al-Sayyed, Muhammad Al-Sayyed has also been 
personally responsible for running the state-owned office. 
This is primarily reflected in the fact his office 
assistants comprise a nephew and a couple of other local
According to Hamdi. Al-Sayyed, his two assistants see the 
constituents four times a week. One of these times he is also 
present at the office. However, it is not only the office which he 
depends upon to meet constituents. In his words, he also does:" 
regular site visits to see their problems first hand." Personal 
Interview, 1 January 1995.
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young men, none of whom are NDP members and all of whom are 
on Al-Sayyed's private payroll.418
One can argue therefore, that once in office, NDP 
candidates may be in a more advantageous position than 
their opposition counter-parts in terms of directing state 
resources into their respective constituencies. But during 
electoral competition, it would seem that NDP candidates 
and legalised opposition candidates face a similar 
predicament. Namely, insufficient financial and, more 
importantly, organisational support, from their parties. 
This point, it would seem, is of particular significance if 
one is to appreciate why electoral candidates representing 
the legally participating parties appear more compelled, in 
comparison for example, to the Muslim Brotherhood, to adopt 
individualistic campaign strategies that are predominantly 
independent of their parties. These strategies, in turn, 
appear to further reinforce the role of non-competitive 
multi-party elections as an instrument of co-option and 
clientelist control.
4.4 Individualistic Campaign Strategies
As we have already mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter, the two most important aspects of individualistic 
campaign strategies in relation to this study are: firstly, 
the way in which the dynamics involved seem to do little to 
encourage the recruitment of party supporters at the grass 
roots level, and as a consequence, this form of political 
participation thus appears to, secondly, reinforce the role 
of elected politicians as intermediaries between the centre 
and those on the periphery.
The electoral campaign of first time candidate Muhammad 
Mesyri. (NDP: constituency of Kafr Ghanem) in 1990,
illustrates the main features of the predominantly
Personal Interview with Al-Sayyed, and also Salah
{nephew/assistant), both interviews on 26 November 1995.
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personalistic strategies pursued by party candidates in 
attempts to secure voter support.
. . 419Campaign strategies of first-time party candidate 
Muhammad Mesiri., it should be noted, is a multi­
millionaire, agricultural/industrial businessman located in 
Tmay, the main town of the predominantly rural constituency 
of Kafr Ghanem. Mesiri's wealth and status within the 
community could not have passed unnoticed by the local 
residents, not simply because they considered him one of 
the wealthiest men in the area, but also because he was 
judged to be one of the largest private employers in the 
community. Mesiri it would seem, caught the attention of 
the authorities in the late eighties, when, having 
personally financed the construction and equipping of a 
multi-million pound technical college in Tmay, he 
subsequently donated it as a gift to the state. The 
publicity surrounding this grand gesture was further 
accentuated by the fact that President Mubarak had decided 
to officially open it himself.
Interestingly, Mesiri.'s rise in the eyes of the 
authorities, appears to have coincided with the declining 
status of the constituency's incumbent (NDP fe'at) 
deputy.420 It would seem that as a result, the incumbent
419 Information for the above example was derived from the locals 
of the village 'Mit Na.s ' during our 1995-6 research period in 
Egypt. It should be noted that 'Mit Nas' is a pseudonym intended 
to protect the privacy of the village inhabitants. The real name 
of the village can be obtained at the discretion of the author.
420 The then incumbent deputy had become increasingly unpopular in 
Kafr Ghanem allegedly as a result of his inaccessibility to the 
locals, the long periods spent in Cairo and his inability to 
divert sufficient state resources into the constituency. In fact, 
he had lost so much support within the constituency that ballot 
fraud was necessary during the 19 87 elections in order to prevent 
his Muslim Brotherhood rival (then registered under the Labour 
Party banner) from winning the seat. The headmaster of one of the 
two primary schools in Mit Nas was actually involved in that 
episode. According to him, he was summoned, in his capacity as a 
state employee, to participate in the formal ballot count 
traditionally held in the constituency's main town of Tmay. During 
the ballot-count, a fight instigated by one of the NDP's formal 
observer's ensued with his Labour Party counter-part. This, it was 
alleged, was an intentional strategy aimed at creating a chaotic
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Deputy was dropped from, the NDP nomination list for the 
1990 legislative elections and subsequently replaced by 
Mesiri. Judging from our previous discussion of the NDP, 
one can argue that this is not an uncommon party tactic. 
The focus here however, is on the main factors on which 
Mesiri based his first electoral campaign.
On the communal level, Mesiri already laid claim to 
influence and networks that largely rested upon his 
position as one of constituency's largest employers. Yet, 
one can argue that the construction of a technical college 
undoubtedly raised his position and esteem in the 
community. Especially if one takes into account that 
without this college, parents had previously been faced 
with the equally hard choice of denying their off-spring 
the opportunity of further education or of sending them to 
either one of the Governorate's two large urban centres, 
Senbellawayn or Mansura. This in turn, would have meant
scene in order to ensure the security personnel expel all 
observers from the hall for unruly behaviour. Once the observers 
were out of the hall, the ballot counting supervisor, along with 
some security personnel told the ballot counters, that as "good 
citizens and nationalists working for the good of the state" they 
must fill in all the unused votes in favour of the "President's 
Party". As voter turn-out was not particularly high, this meant 
filling-out a lot of ballot papers. According to the headmaster, 
as state employees, none of them were in a position to argue with 
the authorities. Half way through the night however, as they were 
busy filling out the empty ballots, one of the opposition 
observers found his way back in. Unfortunately for the headmaster, 
his table was directly next to the entrance, thus immediately 
catching the observer's attention. On seeing what was happening 
the observer started screaming "help, they're cheating!" As the 
other observers found their way to the hall, the security 
personnel had no choice but to take everyone on the premise to the 
police station. After a few hours, everyone was discharged and 
thus returned to finish what they started. The observer, it 
emerged, could only prove that the headmaster's table was 
cheating, therefore only the ballots from that table were counted 
as spoiled. Since everyone in the hall had participated in that 
fraud, the spoiled votes did not prevent the NDP candidate from 
gaining more votes than the more popular Muslim Brotherhood 
candidate. Personal Interview, 30 November 1995. It seems that 
this case was widely publicised at the time, because by 
coincidence, it was also mentioned earlier by former Tajammui. MP 
(1976-79), lAbu Al-J_Iz Hariri., during personal interview, 28 
December 1994. Hariri, it should be noted, mentioned the case to 
illustrate how "respectable citizens" such as teachers are 
pressured by the government into unethical electoral activities.
He is not however, personally familiar with the headmaster or 
anyone else in that constituency.
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these predominantly poor parents being burdened with the 
cost of private lodging and living expense for their off­
spring. A technical college in Tmay however, meant that 
local students from Tmay and the surrounding villages could 
attend their studies and return home at the end of each 
day.
Whilst the above gesture on the part of Mesiri. can be 
viewed as overtly generous in nature, it should, however, 
be noted that Kafr Ghanem is a large and densely populated
421
constituency with 174,000 registered voters. What this 
means is that if, for example, one takes into account those 
individuals whose votes Mesiri may easily secure out of 
gratitude or loyalty- individuals such as employees, 
beneficiaries of his social donations, family, friends and 
associates- one can argue that this would not necessarily 
be sufficient to ensure majority votes in such a large 
area. However, this is not to imply a major contribution to 
the community such as the technical college would not be 
beneficial in his campaign efforts. Rather, its benefit, 
one can argue, is more symbolic in nature. That is, it 
indicates that he cares for the community and that on this 
basis, if he were to reach public office, he would be 
likely to ensure sufficient state resources were channelled 
into the constituency. This in turn, suggests that the 
candidate had, through his famous donation, secured overall 
recognition and goodwill from the constituents.
To ensure faithful turn-out on election day however, 
Mesiri., it would seem, was required to supplement this 
communal gesture with the construction and expansion of 
personal networks of electoral alliances. What this meant 
was travelling around the constituency visiting the _1 omdas
421 This statistic was provided by a government appointed 
supervisor at the voting station located in Mit Nas. It was also 
confirmed by the village headmaster mentioned previously. 29 
November 1995. If, for example, we compare the 8 0,000 or so 
registered voters in the densely populated urban constituency of 
Hada'iq al-Qobba, to the 174,000 in Kafr Ghanem, one can better 
appreciate the scale of the latter constituency.
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(headmen) and the other local notables of Tmay and the 
surrounding villages. Behind the courteous talk, the 
purpose was to discuss whether these notables could use 
their local influence and networks to ensure sufficient 
voter support on election day. In other words, this process 
involved the recruiting of personal allies who in turn, 
would be in a position to bring with them into this 
alliance as many voters as they could.
It would also seem that it is not uncommon for such 
campaign tactics to involve a financial transaction. The 
J_omda of our 'research village' for example was given by 
Mesiri, an undisclosed 'donation' which he maintained that 
he used to pay for a communal supper in the village mdyafa
422 *(guest house). Events such as a communal supper, it 
should be noted, are not festive affairs. Rather, they are 
subdued events to which the heads of extended households in
423the village would be invited. The purpose is primarily to 
discuss, in a relaxed atmosphere, the elections, the absent 
host, and what the plan would be for election day. In this 
particular case, the situation was overtly complicated 
because two of the villagers had decided to compete, as 
independents in the fe 'at and J_amel/fellah categories 
respectively. What this meant was that the _fomda and most 
family heads, were engrossed in discussions on how to 
convince both, or at least the local fe'at candidate, to 
drop out of the electoral race. This process involved 
several other informal sittings, most of which were held in
424the ’ omda' s home .
422 The yomda maintained that he could not remember how much Mesiri. 
donated at that time, but he did remember that it was over two 
thousand (Egyptian) pounds. Personal Interview, 3 December 1995.
423 The invitation of family elders appears to be based on the 
logic that their senior status within their respective families 
renders them in the position to ensure whatever conclusion arises 
in such informal gatherings would subsequently be implemented by 
the registered voters in their family on election day.
424 On the basis of the one man two-votes procedure discussed 
previously, the logic here was that if the fe'at candidate dropped 
out, the villagers could give that vote to Mesiri. provided he 
entered a vote-exchange pact with the local candidate in the 
alternate category. This way, the remaining local candidate would
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One may argue that the effort entailed in attempting to 
convince one or both of the local candidates to relinquish 
their place in order to assist Mesiri.7 s campaign would not 
have taken place if Mesiri was not such a prominent figure 
and had not made a substantial 'donation7 to the fomda. 
Yet, one can also view this predicament from another 
perspective. Namely that neither of the local candidates 
were of particular prominence or wealth. Rather, one 
candidate was a humble village school teacher and the other 
a minor seed merchant. What this meant was that outside the 
village, they were unheard of. As we pointed out 
previously, being in such a position does little to 
encourage voter support. Moreover, in the absence of 
sufficient financial resources it would be difficult for 
those candidates to pursue strategies that potentially 
expand personal networks of support, but which involve the 
numerous transactions which accompany extensive travelling 
across the constituency.
The J_omda therefore, felt, along with most family heads in 
the village, that if the local candidates dropped out, or 
at least the fe'at candidate were to drop out, this would 
provide the villagers with the opportunity to support an 
almost certain winner in the form of Mesiri. This act would 
would provide the villagers with the opportunity to claim 
additional benefits once the candidate reached office and 
would thus have access to state resources. However, it 
would also save the local candidates, whom the villagers 
did not expect to win, a lot of wasted time, effort, and 
more importantly, financial resources, which realistically, 
they could not afford to squander.
increase the number of votes obtained on election day, and at the 
same time, the village would have also been able to show their 
support to Mesiri. As the local fe'at candidate did not see why he 
should be the one to drop out, the village elders felt it was 
perhaps better if both dropped out. That way, neither of the 
candidates would loose face, and at the same time, the village 
votes could be freely used as a bargaining tool with Mesiri and 
other lesser candidates within the constituency.
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Unfortunately for Mesiri and arguably the village, neither 
of the local candidates agreed to dropout, and as communal 
ties meant that the villagers were compelled- albeit 
reluctantly in this case- to support their own 'awlad al- 
balad (sons of the village), Mesiri was unable to secure 
any of the 6,800 votes from that village in the 1990
425 « i • * . . ielections. MisirjL, did however win the elections in 1990. 
This, one can argue, was simplified by the fact that he did 
not face a predicament of this nature in the majority of 
other localities in the constituency. The point here 
however, is that the overall structure of Mesiri's campaign 
illustrates how, as a party candidate, his party did not 
appear to play a significant role in the recruitment of 
electoral supporters. Instead, it seems that it was the 
clientelist ties which he was able to build and expand as a 
result of his prominent position in the constituency, which 
in the final analysis, helped ensure first time entry to 
the People's Assembly in 1990.
More examples of campaign strategies 
of first-time party candidates
Clientelist methods of voter recruitment are not a strategy 
confined solely to NDP candidates. Rather, it appears to be 
a mechanism that can also be detected in the electoral 
campaigns of legalised opposition candidates attempting 
first time entry to the Assembly. The Neo-Wafd's No_L_man 
Jomjja for example, was observed discussing with the Shaykh
425 The communal ties which lead rural villages, and to a lesser 
degree, close-knit urban areas inhabited by poorer sections of 
society, to give priority to a local 'son', appear to be based not 
only on the grounds of sentimentality and primitive loyalty. They 
are also based on the clientelist logic that if, by some chance, 
the candidate won, then he would be likely to give priority to 
helping his 'own' area and people before the rest of the 
constituency. If, upon gaining office, he does not match such 
expectations, then, as one villager put it: "no-one will support
him again". Personal Interview, 3 December 1995. Returning to 
Mesiri however, that the effort and personal expense he concurred 
in that particular village did not produce the desired results on 
election day, does not, as we will discuss later, necessarily 
imply such efforts were completely futile.
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al-Balad426 of Korn Bara, a rural area on the outskirts of 
Imbaba, the plan for Joxnfa's second visit to the locals. 
During the discussion, the Shaykh mentioned that the one 
and a half thousand voters in his area had not only agreed 
to support Jomia, but as a show of such support, many 
jeered Jom/a's rival when, a few days earlier, he attempted
427 *to visit the area. The six thousand pounds which Jom_fa 
'donated' to the area through it's Shaykh undoubtedly 
contributed towards ensuring such enthusiastic electoral
. 428support.
It should also be noted that during the 19 95 campaign 
period, Jorrha was in the process of establishing a branch 
of his law firm in Imbaba. The reason, according to one of 
his campaign assistants, was so to provide work for some of 
the unemployed young law graduates in the constituency. If 
this adventure proved successful, then it was expected that 
further branches would be established around the
429constituency at later dates.
Whilst there is no evidence to suggest Jom_fa's concern for 
youth unemployment in Imbaba is not genuine, the fact that 
his decision to help tackle this problem coincided with his 
election campaign, indicates additional motives. Jomj_a, 
after all, is not a resident of Imbaba, nor does he have 
family ties within the constituency. In other words, he is
426 Shaykh al-Balad is the name given to a local leader who is of 
lesser status than an ±omda. In large rural villages such as Mit 
Nas, several of these individuals are elected (and thus registered 
in the Ministry of Interior) throughout the village. Their role is 
to assist with problems in their immediate neighbourhoods, but at 
the end of the day they are responsible to the _lomda. On the 
outskirts of urban areas such as Imbaba, the situation is slightly 
different because the community might be rather small thus not 
requiring an J_omda. In this situation, usually one Shaykh al-Balad 
is sufficient to head the community.
427 Personal Observation, 20 November 1995.
428 Also, according to several of Jornfa's campaign assistants, the 
candidate had, up to time of interview, contributed from his own 
money, no less than £L.E.2 0,00 0 in "assistance" to various other 
communities in Imbaba. Personal Interviews, 20 November 1995.
429 Personal Interview, 19 November 1995.
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an outsider. It would seem therefore, that by establishing 
a business in the constituency, he was aiming to establish 
his prominence in the community, rather like Mesiri. - 
albeit on a lesser scale. The logic arguably being that 
with his own law firm in the constituency - which as a very 
wealthy and highly successful law professor, he aimed to 
subsidise through existing academic/business ventures- he 
would be in the position to build and expand his 
clientelist ties in the community, not only as an employer, 
but also as someone in the position of providing legal 
advice and assistance to needy constituents.
As a professional journalist, the decision of the Liberal 
party's Most,afa Bakri to personally establish the weekly 
newspaper, "Sawt Helwan" (Voice of Helwan), also points to 
a similar tactic. The newspaper, according to Bakri, was 
established with financial assistance from personal friends 
and associates, six months prior to him entering the 1995 
elections. The main purpose being that he wanted to provide 
a service to the constituents, and thus felt that a 
newspaper which would focus primarily upon parochial and 
national issues which are of particular concern to the 
Helwan community would be of benefit.430
Indeed, it would seem that Bakri appears to be a more 
strategic planner than Jomia, since he did not wait until 
the elections before embarking upon his venture. Yet the 
intended outcome of this tactic appears to lead to the same 
argument. Namely that Bakri, who, like Jomia, was also a 
stranger to the constituency in which he was competing, 
was, through the establishment of this local newspaper, 
attempting to establish a prominent name for himself on 
which he could build and expand his base of support in the 
area. The logic in this case being that as Editor-in-Chief 
of this newspaper, he would not only build clientelist ties 
within the community through his employment of numerous 
local staff. More importantly, these clientelist ties would
430 Personal Interview, 14 November 1995.
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expand as aggrieved constituents approached him with 
social, economic and political concerns they want publicly 
aired. In this context, one can argue that his eventual aim 
was to secure sufficient electoral support from grateful 
constituents.
To a large degree, Bakri.'s strategy appears to have been 
successful. His local newspaper, he maintained at the time 
of interview, reached a circulation of approximately twenty 
thousand a week431 and on that basis, one assumes he had 
thus become a familiar name within Helwan. Realistically 
however, neither Bakri nor Jomia could have managed to 
cultivate sufficient clientelist support through their 
respective ventures unless constituents had been given 
sufficient time, in terms of years rather than months, to 
come to terms with, and more importantly, to genuinely 
benefit from the 'services' provided by these candidates.
Yet again, what the above examples are intended to 
illustrate, is that when it comes to mechanisms of voter 
recruitment, opposition candidates, like their NDP counter­
parts, are predominantly left to their own devices. The 
primary consequence being that rather than focus upon 
recruiting party supporters, candidates are left with 
little option but to utilise their personal resources to 
build their own personal following. A strategy which in 
turn, focuses predominantly upon the creation and expansion 
of clientelist ties between candidates and voters- dynamics 
which further encourage the prevalence of political 
individualism in a multi-party arena.
Seeking re-election and some consequences
In terms of candidates seeking re-election, it would seem 
that they too face a predicament not too dissimilar to that 
discussed above. Whilst these candidates may not be 
required to focus much attention upon the establishment of 
a clientelist base of support, it would appear that
431 Personal Interview, 14 November 1995.
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sufficient voter support on election day means renewing and 
attempting to expand existing clientelist ties. This, it 
would seem, is not a simple task in view of the numerous 
participating candidates, some of whom may possess 
sufficient prominence and resources to constitute a serious 
challenge to those seeking re-election.
One can argue that it is a potential challenge of this 
nature which constitutes the most important factor in 
understanding a candidate's clientelist dependence upon 
government and hence the role he comes to perform as a 
consequence. To paraphrase, a new candidate competing in 
elections appears to utilise personal resources in an 
effort to establish as large a base of voter support as 
circumstances will allow. Mesiri., Jom_L_a and Bakri for 
example, adopted different methods of voter recruitment all 
of which however, were based on the same clientelist logic. 
Yet, having spent a significant part of one's personal 
resources in efforts to reach political office, and then 
reaching office, one can argue that it would be 
economically illogical if not impossible to repeat this 
process if the individual concerned decides to seek re- 
election a few years later. On the other hand, whilst the 
candidate seeking re-election may have depleted much of his 
personal resources during his initial stand for office, his 
new rivals, especially if they are first-time competitors, 
are less likely to be in this position.
Perhaps more importantly however, is the fact that having 
reached public office, it would seem that the expectations 
of voters appear to increase considerably. Thus, whereas 
previously a candidate may have secured electoral support 
on the basis of his overall recognition in a community and, 
on occasion, the offering some modest donations during his 
campaign, once in office such electoral support appears to 
change and become increasingly conditional upon the 
downward flow of state resources.
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In such a context, one can argue that once in office, and 
bearing in mind a desire to seek re-election, an 
incumbent's most logical option would be to focus upon the 
channelling of state resources into his constituency in 
order to preserve and perhaps even expand his existing 
clientelist base of support. This process in turn means 
clientelist dependence upon the centre and hence in the 
process, being compelled to conform to the designated role 
of being an intermediary between central government and 
those on the periphery. To illustrate this argument, we 
will return to Mesiri and, as our first example, examine 
part of his 1995 re-election campaign.
Renewing and expanding existing
432base of voter support
During his initial participation in elections, we discussed 
how Mesiri., depended upon the creation and expansion of a 
clientelist base of support. This was achieved through 
three main avenues: (i) traditional avenues (i.e. personal/
business /employment ties); (ii) charitable contributions 
directed at the entire community (i.e. the technical 
college) and; (iii) financial contributions directed at 
specific individuals and communities (i.e. money directed 
at Mit Nas through the yomda).
The first avenue, whereby clientelist ties are formed as a 
direct result of Mesiri's position as a major businessman 
and employer in the community, one can argue, is an on­
going process which does not necessarily require renewal 
upon his return to the arena of political contest. Also, 
because the technical college constitutes a grand 
contribution to the community as a whole, it is unlikely 
that Mesiri would be personally expected to repeat a 
gesture of this magnitude. This leads us to the third 
avenue stated above. Whilst Mesiri may have established a 
clientelist base of support as a result of the first two
432 Information regarding the above case, was again, derived during 
our 199 5 stay at Mit Nas.
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factors, the candidate, during his initial campaign, was 
also compelled to strengthen and expand this support base 
by travelling around the constituency, meeting specific 
community heads and generally bestowing some financial 
contributions.
The importance of this later avenue, it would seem, is not 
simply the fact it contributes towards strengthening
and expanding Mesiri,'s base of support, but that the 
clientelist ties on which it is based, appear to require 
renewal and reaffirmation during the electoral period. If, 
for example, we return to Mesiri's encounter with Mit Nas 
during the 199 0 elections, Mesiri gave the ±omda several 
thousand pounds as a 'donation' to the village. In reality, 
this money was given in return for electoral support from 
the village. Whilst the money changed hands, and the _iomda 
and other senior villagers appear to have genuinely wanted 
to support Mesiri, the fact remained that they did not.
In view of the above outcome, one might be led to assume 
that the J_omda, having accepted money on behalf of the 
village and subsequently unable to keep his part of the 
deal, would attempt, at the next electoral opportunity, to 
make amends. This, however, does not appear to have been 
the case. Instead, when Mesiri returned to the village 
during his re-election campaign in 1995, new demands were 
presented by the villagers in return for electoral support.
At that time, the village did not have a local fe'at 
candidate running for office. However, the same seed 
merchant who competed (and lost) in the fellah/'amel 
category during the 1990 elections, had decided to compete
433yet again, as an independent m  the 1995 elections. The 
villagers therefore, did not simply expect from Mesiri 
tangible rewards in return for electoral support, but also
433 His view was that he had a good chance of winning in 1995 
because he felt he had built upon and expanded the networks he 
constructed during the 1990 elections. Personal Interview, 28 
November 19 95.
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expected him to enter a vote-exchange deal with their local 
candidate. In other words, in order for the villagers to 
give their 6,800 fe'at votes to Mesiri, they wanted as part 
of the deal, for their local candidate to receive, in 
return, the equivalent amount of votes, but in the 
fellah/J_amel category. Such votes were logically expected 
to come from Mesiri's own home town of Tmay, where, in his 
capacity as ibn al-balad, his most loyal supporters can be 
found. Supporters, who, most importantly, would be willing 
to give not only their fe'at vote to their candidate, but 
also to 'donate' their fellah/famel vote to the candidate 
of his choice- so as to better their candidate's electoral 
position.
In addition to the above vote-exchange pact, the tangible 
benefit agreed upon in this particular case was the paving 
of one of the main roads leading into the village. 
Moreover, it was agreed with the candidate that work on
this road would proceed and finish before election day. The
following quotation provides some explanation as to the 
logic behind such demands:
"I do not think that we are asking too much 
from Mesiri. Al-taJ_awun (vote-exchange deal) 
with our candidate is not too much to ask.
Tmay is a large place and he has a lot of 
support there, so giving our candidate some 
of the fellah votes which he controls is not
a problem for him. Anyway if we did not ask
for them, some other candidate would have 
taken them instead. In fact Mesiri has made 
vote-exchange pacts with almost every 
competing f e l l a h  and /_amel in the 
constituency...of course it is all based on 
how many votes they can offer him, not the 
other way around. . .with his supporters he 
can meet everyones' demands. We did ask for
the road to be paved before election day
because we wanted to make sure his part of 
the agreement was kept. I'm sure he would 
not intentionally ignore his side of the 
deal, but he is a very busy man looking 
after the interests of a large consituency.
If it is not done now, then who's going to
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travel to Tmay and Cairo everyday looking 
for him and reminding him."434
With regard to the query as to whether paving the road was 
an excessive demand in view of Mesiri's 1990 'contribution' 
to the village and the fact he received no electoral 
support in return, the same respondent argued:
"Mesiri knew two locals had nominated 
themselves for election. He did not expect 
us to leave our own and support him. He 
came to us then in case there was any 
chance they might drop out. We kept our 
part of the deal. . . we did everything to 
convince our candidates to drop out, but 
they were both stubborn as mules. Even [the 
seed merchant's] wife left him because she 
was angry that he was squandering their 
life savings. Actually she's left him again 
because of his participation this time 
around... In the last elections we did not 
promise something and then not keep to it.
But now we are promising something and 
paving a road in return is not a big thing 
to ask from someone in his position... He 
must have a lot of important connections in 
government now, so really, he is not 
expected to give from his own pocket. But 
he is expected to offer more than the other
435contestants."
The villagers' demands from Mesiri, and the logic on which 
they appear to have been based, thus illustrates how 
returning to the electoral arena is not a simple process. 
Rather, seeking re-election appears to pressure an out­
going deputy to continue the pattern of clientelist 
recruitment if he is to expect re-election. Indeed, he 
might not depend upon his personal resources whilst seeking 
re-election, but to reaffirm his clientelist base of 
support, the exchange of tangible benefits in the form of 
state resources, emerges to play an important part in this 
process. The following words reflect the increasing 
pressure placed on candidates seeking re-election:
434 Personal Interview, local headmaster of village primary school, 
2 9 November 1995.
435 Ibid. .
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"Before Me si r i we had a useless 
representative. No-one supported him 
because he could not provide anything from 
the government. . , if he could not manage 
that then there were plenty of other 
candidates who could take his place... In 
1987, the government had to cheat to keep 
him in office, but they too got fed up and 
decided to put MesjLri. in his place."436
Even candidates themselves openly admit the predicament 
they face during elections:
"I have competed in legislative elections 
eight times. . . The voters have specific 
expectations. . . 'I'll get you the water, 
the school, the electricity' this is all I 
say in my election campaign. Nobody cares 
what my political orientation is. Nobody 
bothers to ask me."437
Placed in such a predicament whereby party nomination is 
dependent upon the size of one's assumed or established 
base of support, and subsequently being compelled to depend 
upon state resources in order to preserve that base of 
support- and thus one's place in the Assembly, the party 
and also the community- is instrumental, not only in 
understanding how the electoral arena appears to shape the 
role of NDP deputies as intermediaries between the centre 
and those periphery. It also shows how shapes the role of 
opposition deputies.
In the case of opposition candidates seeking re-election 
the situation, one can argue, appears to be more or less 
the same. That is, the individualistic approach to 
political participation is not only reinforced as 
clientelist ties become renewed and reaffirmed, but also 
such ties appear increasingly conditional upon state 
controlled resources. The base of support on which Khaled 
Mohyi al-Din, leader of the Tajammu_[_, appears to have
436 Personal Interview, Haj Muhammad, prominent village landowner, 
4 December 1995.
437 Hamdi. Al-Sayyed, speaking during conference on elections at 
Cairo's Research Centre for Human Rights, 25 December 1995.
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depended for re-election in 1995 seems reflective of this 
predicament.
Renewing and expanding existing
438base of voter support (2)
Mohvi Al-Din's role as one of the Free Officers responsible 
for the 1952 'revolution', and his subsequent membership of 
the Revolutionary Command Council means that in 
contemporary Egypt, he is not simply regarded as an 
opposition leader, but also as a national figure. Seeking 
election in his rural home constituency of Kafr Shokr, 
therefore, one can argue that as its most famous 'ibn al- 
balad', it did not require much effort on his part to gain 
overall recognition from the inhabitants. The point here, 
however, is that when it comes to seeking re-election, the 
process of renewing and reaffirming electoral support, and 
the clientelist conditions on which such support is based, 
does not appear to differ extensively, from what we have 
discussed above.
The day we joined Mohvi Al-Din on his campaign trail, he 
was due to visit the two villages of Kafr 'Abu Zahra and 
Kafr Shaykh Ibrahim. On arrival at each village, Mohvi Al- 
Din and his aide were greeted by the village iomda, who 
guided him first to his home, and later, to the homes of 
the most prominent local families. Homes such as that 
belonging to Haj Husayn Mahmud Husayn, a 107 year old man, 
who, as head of eight generations that comprise 182 
individuals, remains one of the most influential people in 
Kafr 'Abu Zahra. On the surface, such visits might not 
appear overtly political. Mohyi Al-Din for example, spent 
no more than twenty minutes in each of the fifteen 
households he visited on that particular day. Moreover, 
conversation with the hosts extended to little more than
438 Information for the above example includes that obtained from 
personal interviews and non-participant observation during visit 
to Mohvi Al-Din at his rural constituency of Kafr Shokr, 12 
November 199 5.
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social niceties. Elections and politics, in other words, 
were not topics of conversation.
It should be noted however, that Mohvi Al-Din spent a large 
part of his re-election campaign travelling around the 
constituency on such visits. Hence, this was his second 
trip to these families. Moreover, he hoped to visit them
439 * * .once more before election day. ' What this implies 
therefore, is that conversation relating to his re- 
election, and the conditions of their support, is likely to 
have been discussed on a previous, more private occasion. 
If arrangements relating to these issues had not already 
been agreed upon, it is unlikely the candidate would have 
made arrangements for three visits during the relatively 
short one month period designated for campaigning. This in 
turn, means that Mohyi Al-Din's presence was arguably, a 
reaffirmation of existing clientelist ties.
Whilst the host families did not personally participate in 
political conversation with the candidate during that 
particular visit, it is worth noting that many other 
villagers did however take this opportunity to present 
Mohvi Al-Din with written petitions relating, amongst other 
things, to employment, water and road work problems.440 As 
the nature of such petitions indicate, regardless of Mohvi 
Al-Din's position as a respected national figure, or the 
fact that he heads an opposition party, his election to the 
People's Assembly appears nevertheless, to be viewed 
predominantly as a link to central government and hence, 
the provision of state controlled resources. A member of 
one of the host families in Kafr Shavkh Ibrahim explains 
how he believes Mohvi Al-Din is perceived in this rural 
community. In his words:
"Khaled Mohyi Al-Din is our hero. He is
Egypt's hero and we are all very proud of
the things he did with Nasser for the
439 Personal Interview with Mohvi Al-Din, 12 November 1995.
440 Personal Conversation with some of the petitioners, 12 November 
1995 .
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country... People vote for him because they 
are proud of him. But also because he does 
a lot to help . . . until recently, the 
children used to go to a secondary school 
outside the village but he got the 
government to build one here. It's things 
like that which are important here."441
Again, the above comment appears to suggest that whilst 
Mohvi Al-Din is held in exceptionally high esteem, it is 
also the state resources he channels into the community 
which ensures his re-election efforts receive sufficient 
voter support. In terms of party politics, the situation 
appears more or less the same. It is the candidate's 
demonstrated skills at diverting state resources to the 
community, not his party stand, which constitutes a 
decisive factor in his re-election prospects:
"The peasant will always give his support 
to the person or candidate that will look 
after his problems. It is not really 
important what party that person 
represents. . . [Mohyi Al-Din ] does not talk 
to us about his party and nobody is 
bothered about that. He can do what he 
wants with it. As long as he continues to 
help solve the people's problems, people 
will elect him. If he stops, then there 
will be no votes."442
Moreover, that the above logic appears equally clear to 
participating candidates, is reflected in the views of Al- 
Badri Farghali, currently a second term deputy of the 
Assembly and long term member of the Tajammul:
"My party connection is of no help at all. 
Actually my party is not popular in Port 
Said [where his constituency of Hayy al- 
AArab is located]... I am proud of being of 
a member of the Tajammui and everyone knows 
I am a member of that party. But in 
reality, they vote for me because I am able
441 Personal Interview with a member of the Salim family, (of which 
the late J.omda of Kafr Shavkh Ibrahim belonged), 12 November 1995.
442 Personal Interview with member of the Khatab family (of which 
Kafr AAbu Zahra's shavkh al-balad is head), 12 November 1995.
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to help them with their everyday living 
problems. "443
To acknowledge this predicament and to seek re-election on 
this basis, is, in the final analysis, an indication of the 
extent to which electoral contest in Egypt's multi-party 
arena has influenced politicians representing disparate 
political views into performing the role of intermediaries 
between central government and those on the periphery. A 
role which in turn, contributes towards inhibiting the 
expansion and perhaps more importantly, the strengthening, 
of political parties as group entities. Whilst at the same 
time, it reinforces the clientelist chain of dependence 
leading to government.
4.5 Conclusion
The government's ability to utilise non-competitive multi­
party elections as a mechanism of clientelist co-option and 
control, as we have argued throughout the thesis, is made 
easier largely as a result of governmental power to impose 
various constraints on virtually every level of political 
participation. Constraints which in turn, are intended to 
pressure political actors and the parties they represent 
into accepting the rules of this non-competitive game.
Yet, the fact that the majority of political parties 
accept, or have at least come to terms with the role of 
elections as defined from above, is not something which can 
be attributed solely to government imposed constraints, 
Political parties, it would seem, also contribute to this 
predicament. The fact that legalised political parties 
provide their candidates with minimal financial and 
organisational support for example, appears to affect the 
role of elections from a number of perspectives. The most 
significant of these appears to be the near absence of 
party identification by the voters. A process which in turn 
leaves candidates with little choice but to focus upon the 
promotion of themselves as the main form of voter
443 Personal Interview, 31 December 1994.
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recruitment. The clientelist base of voter support which 
accompanies such personalistic political behaviour, we have 
subsequently argued, further helps to reaffirm the 
clientelist role of elections.
260
Conclusion
Conclusion 
Prevailing and Potential Consequences 
of Multi-Party Elections in Mubarak's Egypt.
It would seem that the personalised system of rule 
established by Nasser following the 1952 'revolution' has 
remained intact to date. Reflective of this is that 
following Nasser's death, his personally appointed 
successor, Anwar Sadat, managed to dominate the political 
arena for ten years until his own demise in 1981. At the 
time, Sadat's personally appointed vice-president smoothly 
assumed office and remains, to date, President of the 
Egyptian Republic. On the basis of the powers he inherited 
upon taking office, President Mubarak, like his 
predecessors, Nasser and Sadat, has thus remained the 
ultimate source of power and authority in contemporary 
Egypt.
The fact remains however that personal authoritarian rule 
can never be fully institutionalised. Instead, regimes of 
this nature are characterised by an "inherent uncertainty" 
based upon "vulnerability to, or dependency on, the wills, 
wiles, and abilities of others."444 In other words, because 
an institutionalised system: "in which individuals and
organisations engage publicly to win the right to govern or 
to influence a government's policies within an overall and
445legitimate framework of agreed-upon rules" does not exist 
in personal authoritarian regimes, the ruler's position in 
power is thus inherently linked to a number of factors. The 
two most important of which are the armed forces and the 
position of other political actors.
In the case of post-1952 Egypt, the extensive patronage 
bestowed by Egypt's' consecutive Presidents upon the armed
444 R.H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, (1982), P26.
445 R.H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, (1982), Pi.
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forces, along with the President's clientelist powers of 
appointment at the highest level of this establishment, 
have shaped the role of the Egyptian armed forces as the 
ultimate protectors of the post-1952 political system. 
Furthermore, the enormous powers of the Presidency 
including control over the coercive powers of the state, 
overall control of the resources of the state and a 
President-friendly legal-constitutional framework, all 
constitute major factors which have contributed towards 
weakening the position of political actors and 
organisations, whilst preserving the pre-eminent position 
of the Egyptian President. In such a context, we have 
argued in this thesis that non-competitive multi-party 
elections in Mubarak's Egypt can best be viewed as an 
additional mechanism which is used to hinder the 
development of organised political participation and thus 
further contribute towards the consolidation of 
Presidential power and the preservation of the political 
status-quo.
Extent to which the electoral system has 
accomplished its role as an instrument 
of clientelist co-option and control
We started this thesis by questioning the role of non­
competitive multi-party elections in Mubarak's Egypt. We 
maintained the view that since these elections do not 
affect the replacement or succession of government, then we 
must focus upon their role for the government rather than 
for the individual voter. As a means of legitimising regime 
rule, non-competitive multi-party elections in Mubarak's 
Egypt have a limited role. Instead, non-competitive multi­
party elections in contemporary Egypt, as we have argued in 
this thesis, function predominantly as a tool with which 
the Mubarak regime reaffirms and expands the clientelist 
structure which links central authorities to those on the 
periphery.
Multi-party elections within the government-defined arena 
seem to have encouraged and expanded an overall pattern of
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participation in which intra-party rivalry, political 
individualism, patronage and parochialism all play an 
important role. The expansion of links between political 
parties and voters on the basis of programmatic and 
ideological stands is consequently an issue which appears 
to be overlooked by voters in favour of both received and 
anticipated rewards which are predominantly channelled from 
the centre. In other words, these rewards further encourage 
the clientelist chain of dependence leading to the centre. 
This clientelist chain of dependence in turn, seems to have 
made it less difficult for the government to define the 
role of political actors officially representing disparate 
political parties as intermediaries between central 
government and those on the periphery.
The development of political parties as organised group 
entities in such a context, is not a process which Egypt's 
multi-party arena of political contest has aimed to 
produce. Participation within the prevailing arena of 
political contest for example, appears to have greatly 
contributed towards ensuring that the President's own 
party, the NDP, comprises little more than a conglomerate 
of personalities each possessing their own personal network 
of supporters. Indeed, a dominant party structured along 
such lines is easier for the President to control, 
especially when government initiated legislation needs to 
be formalised in the People's Assembly. Yet, in the absence 
of group organisation, party cohesiveness, and strong links 
binding supporters to the party itself rather than to 
personalities who also happen to be party members, the NDP 
cannot be viewed as an institutionalised political entity 
that can maintain its current position without the 
President's chairmanship and patronage.
We also found that the utilisation of the electoral arena 
to entice opposition parties to enter the same system of 
clientelist co-option and control as that practised on the 
NDP does not appear to have been difficult for the Mubarak 
regime. Apart from the Labour Party and the Nasserite
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Party, the behaviour of the other 'major' legalised 
opposition parties (the Tajammu_L, the Liberals and the Neo- 
Wafd), demonstrate this to be the case.
The various constraints imposed on political participation, 
in addition to the limited resources accessible to these 
parties, can be regarded as the two major factors which 
have contributed towards their weak position and hence 
inducement to enter the electoral chain of clientelist 
dependence and control. In fact, it would not be erroneous 
to suggest that if it was not for the support it receives 
as a result of its alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood 
Organisation, the Labour Party would also have been tempted 
to follow suit. In the absence of such an ally, the 
Nasserite Party appears to be in a rather vulnerable 
position.
It is not inconceivable for the Nasserite Party to also 
join forces with the Muslim Brotherhood in order to 
strengthen its position. In addition to the Labour Party, 
this, for example, was an avenue previously pursued by both 
the Neo-Wafd and the Liberals respectively. However, as 
these parties later discovered, it is difficult to maintain 
separate and equal identities within a political 
partnership. As the Neo-Wafd's deputy-secretary general 
explains, following the 1984 electoral alliance:
" Shavkh Sal ah 'Abu IsmaJ_il, who was the 
main connection in the operation between 
the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood, tried 
to convince us to join his organisation in 
more than an election partnership. He 
wanted to push the Wafd into Islamist 
thought and ideology. . . [but this was not 
possible] because Wafd ideology is too 
different from the Muslim Brotherhood 
ideology. "446
The decision of the Labour Party to relinquish its 
socialist stand in favour of a more Islamically oriented 
one largely explains why the party, since 1987, has managed
446 Personal interview, _VA.li Salama, 8 January 1995.
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to maintain an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood.447 The 
point here, therefore, is that the Nasserite Party could 
enter an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. But the 
government's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood prior to 
the 1995 elections, and the fact that the Muslim 
Brotherhood constitutes an organisation whose ideology and 
political history is totally incompatible with the 
Nasserist legacy which the Nasserites believe they 
represent, makes it more likely that the Party might 
instead be induced into covert government co-option.
The vulnerable position which the Nasserite Party has found 
itself to be in following the legislative elections of 
1995, in which it won only one seat, appears to further 
reinforce the above possibility. The Party's Chairman, 
Dhiya al-Din Dawud for example, was, according to his 
personal assistant, showing signs of depression after 
losing the seat he had previously won in 1990 (competed for 
as Independent during 1990 elections) in his home 
constituency of Sariskur.448 Whilst this might appear an 
exaggerated observation, the fact that Dawud's personal 
assistant noticed her boss was spending long hours alone in 
his office, refusing to meet anyone except in the most 
urgent of circumstances, indicates at least that low morale 
prevailed at the highest level of the Party. This is 
arguably regarded as a positive sign by the government 
since it suggests the Party is experiencing a sense of 
weakness and defeat - especially since it had won three 
seats in the previous elections before it was even 
oficially a party - that could induce it re-consider entry 
into the government's clientelist system of co-option and 
control sooner rather than later.
447 The decision of Ibrahim Shokri., Chairman of the Labour Party, 
to adopt an Islamic stand was not without problems. Members loyal 
to the ideology of socialism, for example, vented their 
frustration during a party conference held in 1989 by shouting 
slogans such as: "Shoukry sold the party to the Muslim Brothers" 
and "How much were you paid, Shoukry?" - H.F. Singer, (1993), P19.
448 Personal interview, Mme Hekam, 19 December 1995.
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The utilisation of the electoral arena as a clientelist 
mechanism with which to co-opt and control political 
parties is logically a tactic aimed at ensuring these 
parties remain weak and thus unable to challenge the 
existing political order. It is probably reassuring for the 
government therefore, that the participation of opposition 
parties in elections has produced an overall pattern of 
activity not too dissimilar to that of the NDP. In other 
words, a parochial-oriented, personalistic mechanism of 
cultivating voter support. As such, patterns of 
participation appear to have hindered the development of 
political parties as a strong, cohesive group entity that 
could potentially challenge the political status quo. It is 
not too suprising that the prevalence of such a form of 
activity within the multi-party electoral arena, seems to 
be encouraged by the President. Reflective of this is the 
fact the President publicly urged voters, during the 
elections of 1995, to: "go to the polling stations and vote 
for the candidate best able to shoulder the responsibility, 
regardless of his or her party orientations and
449commitments. "
The President's urging of voters to ignore party politics 
and instead concentrate upon the candidate's personal 
abilities may indeed be beneficial to the regime in so far 
as it further hinders the expansion of party links with the 
masses. Yet perhaps more problematic is that encouraging 
allegiance to candidates on a personal and hence 
clientelistic level also appears to encourage electoral 
violence.
The problem of electoral violence
Carl Lande notes that conflict tends to emerge when 
participating parties and groups are characterised by: 
"unstable membership, uncertain duration, personalistic 
leadership, a lack of formal organisation, and by a greater 
concern with power and spoils than with ideology or
449 The Egyptian Gazette, 17 December 1995.
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policy"450. In such a context, as the author explains, 
conflict emerges because the aim of participants is to 
bring benefit to leaders and adherents. Yet the problem is 
that: "The losers in such zero-sum games are likely to be 
resentful, to hope for a turn-about in which they can "put 
down" their opponents as they have been put down 
themselves. This leads to the related subject of 
feuding."451 In contrast to group feuding whereby individual 
"conflicts of obligation do not arise", feuds within the 
confines of personality based politics: "are more easily
. 452begun and harder to contain. " This is because m  such a 
setting:
"An injury to any individual leads to the 
clustering around him of those upon,\he has viKit-h 
claims for support, minus those who have 
conflicting obligations to the other side.
A similar cluster forms around his 
opponent. The ensuing violence which others 
than the primary rivals may suffer 
especially if vengeance is inflicted on 
substitute victims - creates new persons 
with grievances. . . the result. . . may be an 
endless succession of killings between 
shifting groups of partisans whose 
composition at any point in time depends 
upon the identity of the latest victim and
i . 453the next victim to be."
Along these lines, one can detect similar patterns emerging 
in Egypt. In fact, by the 1995 legislative elections, 
electoral violence had escalated for "the first time in the 
history of [Egyptian] parliamentary elections" to an 
unprecedented level which left, according to the Centre for 
Human Rights Legal Aid, fifty-one people dead and 87 8 
others wounded.454 One such example was in the electoral 
constituency of Naja_i Hammabii, in Upper Egypt. In this 
case, an unidentified person fired shots which killed a
450 C.H. Lande, (1977), Pxxxii.
451 C.H. Lande, (1977), Pxxxii.
452 C.H. Lande, (1977), Pxxxiii.
453 C.H. Lande, (1977), Pxxxiii.
454 Final Report on the Legislative Elections in Egypt 1995. Centre 
for Human Rights Legal Aid, Cairo, December 1995, P50.
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supporter of Al-Sayyed Al-Menufi, a prominent Independent 
candidate. Assuming that the hitman was probably linked to 
Fahmi AOmar, the NDP's official candidate, and Al-Menufi.'s 
biggest rival, an armed confrontation erupted between the 
supporters of both candidates. The confrontation had, by 
the end of that day, claimed the lives of seven people and 
left more than double that number wounded. Included in the 
fatalities were fOmar' s (who did eventually win the 
elections) son and nephew.455
The fact that electoral violence prevails between 
Independent candidates and official NDP candidates can 
arguably be regarded as another, more extreme, reflection 
of the individualistic intra-party rivalry that exists (and
456is encouraged) within the NDP. ‘ This view is further 
reinforced in view of the fact that of the one hundred and 
eleven seats won by Independents during the 1995 election, 
ninety-nine of them were NDP members who were: "not
nominated by the party in the election battle."457 As one 
prominent political analyst notes:
"It is hard to explain how, after claiming 
so many victims, the electoral battle ended 
in such a sweeping victory for one party.
No one can believe that these casualties 
were the result of confrontations between 
one party which won over 90 percent of the 
votes and fourteen opposition parties which 
together managed to win only 14 seats! They 
are seen rather, as reflecting the vicious 
in-fighting among the candidates of the 
National Democratic Party (NDP) itself, or 
among its candidates and defectors from the 
NDP who ran as ' independents' when not 
nominated by the party and who, on being 
elected, returned to its ranks."458
The prevalence of electoral violence between NDP candidates 
and opponents representing the opposition parties, 
nevertheless, cannot be ignored. In fact, the supporters of
455 Al-Ahram Weekly, 14-20 December 1995.
356 As previously discussed in chapter 3, in particular, PP22-30.
457 Al-Ahram Weekly, 14-20 December 1994.
458 Muhammad Sid 'Ahmad, Al-Ahram Weekly, 14-20 December 1994.
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Mustafa Bakri - a Liberal Party candidate whose campaign we 
followed during the 1995 elections - were, on several 
occasions, involved in physical confrontations with the 
supporters of Muhammad Mahjub (NDP), the then Minister of 
Religious Endowments and Bakri's main rival.
During one such incident, we had just attended a major 
campaign gathering held jointly by Mahjub and three other 
senior NDP candidates in Helwan's youth club. Shortly after 
leaving the club, we met in the street one of Bakri's aides 
who informed us that Bakri was at the local police station 
filing a complaint against Mahjub. Joined by the aide, we 
made our way to the police station in order to join Bakri 
and enquire about the problem. However, since the Minister 
of Religious Endowments had reached the station before us, 
the place was sealed off for security reasons. Yet, it was 
not too long before the Minister left with his extensive 
entourage in tow and we were thus allowed to join Bakri in 
the Ma'mur's (chief of police) office.
As it turned out, some of Mahjub's supporters had 
apparently been sent to disrupt an electoral gathering 
Bakri was also holding that same evening in a Khama (tent) 
in Helwan. These supporters, it would seem, were not simply 
content with smashing the parked vehicles belonging to 
Bakri's entourage, but had also decided to throw stones at 
the constituents attending Bakri.'s gathering. 
Paradoxically, a van full of police which had been sent on 
that particular occasion to ensure Bakri supporters did not 
disrupt the important NDP gathering held by Mahjub and his 
NDP counter-parts, resulted in the police shooting bullets 
in the air to ward off Mahjub supporters. Those who 
continued the violence were subsequently arrested. The 
Minister as we therefore discovered, had gone to the police
station immediately after his electoral gathering in order
459to bail out his arrested supporters.
459 Personal attendance of Helwan Police Station, 25 November 1995.
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It is worth noting that the violence that was escalating 
between Mahjub and Bakri supporters, constituted the main 
reason Bakri pulled out of the race on the second election 
day. Election day was on Wednesday 29 November 1995. 
However, since neither Mahjub or Bakri managed to gain an 
absolute majority (i.e. over 50 percent of the total 
votes), the candidates, like hundreds of others nation­
wide, were compelled to compete in the second round of 
elections held on Wednesday 6 December. In contrast to the 
first round of election, the second round did not require 
any candidate to surpass the 50 percent mark, but only to 
gain the most votes.
During the first round of election, it became clear that 
violence might erupt when Mahjub's brother Ismaiil, 
surrounded by a personal army of bodyguards wearing Mahjub 
T-shirts, arrived along with a group of Mahjub supporters 
at one of the main polling stations and started shouting 
indecent slogans such as: "Bakri. is a passive
homosexual."460 Since this group appeared very intimidating, 
Bakri supporters had little choice but to ignore these 
remarks. However, at that same polling station, one of 
Mahjub's wives, Saleha SaJ_id, was noted by a female poll- 
watcher as having voted four times (the polling station was 
in fact a girl's school of which Sa_l_id was headmistress) . 
As she confronted Sa_fid, the young woman found herself on 
the floor, being punched and kicked by Ismaiil's 
bodyguards.461 It is perhaps the helplessness Bakri 
supporters felt on the first election round, that led some 
of these individuals to attend the second and final 
election round better equipped to deal with Mahjub 
supporters.462 However, by one-thirty that afternoon Bakri 
had decided to pull out of the race.
460 Middle East Times Egypt, 3-9 December 1995.
461 Middle East Times Egypt, 3-9 December 1995.
462 In fact one of Bakri's supporters was arrested that day for
possessing sixty-eight molotov cocktails. See: Middle East Times
Egypt, 10-16 December 1995.
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It is unlikely, for various reasons previously discussed, 
that Bakri would have beaten the Minister. In fact, Bakri 
was aware that critics might accuse him of trying to save 
face by pulling out before it was officially confirmed that 
he had lost the election. This indeed, could be true. 
According to Bakri however, his main concern was to prevent 
the bloodshed he felt would become inevitable as the events 
of that morning unfolded: "What other sensible choice was 
there? IsmaJ_il [Mahjub's brother] had arrived with no less 
than six-hundred baltajeyya (thugs) and they looked ready
■ c  i i 463for war."
Whilst Bakri may have had the sense to direct his 
supporters out of potential danger at the last moment, the 
point remains that both Mahjub and Bakri held senior 
positions within the NDP and the Liberal Party respectively 
yet were competing against each other as rival 
personalities not as candidates representing different 
party points of view. Their supporters were tied to them 
therefore, by personal ties of loyalty. Violent 
confrontations between the supporters of both men cannot, 
in such a context, be totally unexpected. What is 
unexpected however, is for President Mubarak, on the topic 
of electoral violence, to note that:
"In the pre-revolution era there were some 
battles in certain constituencies during 
the election races as feudal families, who 
dominated these areas, insisted on entering 
the parliament. Now the outbreak of 
violence is quite strange after feudalism 
was abolished."464
The President himself has been noted to urge voters to 
choose a candidate on the basis of personal qualities 
rather than on party considerations. Moreover, it would 
appear that his government is determined, through the 
enforcement of formal and informal barriers, to hinder the 
development of genuine multi-party competition, preferring
463 Personal Interview, 20 December 1995.
464 The Egyptian Gazette, 15 December 1995.
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instead to utilise elections as a mechanism of reaffirming 
and expanding its clientelist grip over political 
participation. Electoral violence, therefore should not 
really be regarded by the President as "strange". Rather, 
it should be seen as one of the major consequences of his 
reluctance to allow, after nearly two decades in power, 
genuine multi-party elections to develop.
Indeed, the President has frequently justified his actions 
by pointing out his concern for Egypt's stability and the 
view that: "There is a very thin line between democracy and 
anarchy".465 Yet one can also argue that the prevaling 
electoral system is not particularly conducive to Egypt's 
long-term stability prospects. Of-course on one level, the 
electoral violence which appears on the increase, may not 
necessarily be regarded as threatening to the immediate 
stability of Egypt because such action is predominantly 
confined to political rivalry between individual actors and 
their personal network of supporters. Yet, on another 
level, one should not overlook the fact that such violence 
is largely a consequence of the individualistic, 
parochially-confined, clientelistically-oriented patterns 
of participation that the regime seems to encourage through 
its 'multi-party' electoral arena. Such a strategy on the 
part of government is arguably more detrimental to Egypt's 
long-term stability prospects than the "anarchy" which 
President Mubarak maintains is so closely linked to 
democracy. These patterns of participation in Egypt's 
multi-party arena after all, cannot be regarded as 
beneficial in terms of eradicating the winner-takes-all 
mentality which is currently reflected on the parochial 
level through violent confrontations between individual 
candidates and their supporters.
It would not be erroneous to suggest that the regime's 
efforts to encourage political parties to view 
participation in elections as a process through which its
455 The Egyptian Gazette, 17 December 1995.
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members and their supporters can become part of the 
existing political system and thus gain access to some of 
the resources it controls, can also contribute towards 
potential violence on another level. This is because those 
parties and groups (namely the Muslim Brotherhood and its 
long-term ally, the Labour Party) who do not want to accept 
the rules of this game appear to be increasingly excluded 
from the prevailing 'multi-party' arena. The government's 
overt crack-down on Muslim Brotherhood members and their 
allies prior to the 1995 elections, as we discussed in 
chapter three, 466 illustrates this to be the case. The point 
is that in pursuing this strategy, one can argue that the 
government is not so much eradicating the Islamic 
organisation as it is pushing it away from electoral 
contest and into clandestine and illegal channels of 
participation. This in turn increases the possibility of 
further political violence in contemporary Egypt.
More potential consequences relating 
to the prevailing electoral system
Since multi-party elections appear to be used by the regime 
to contain rather than strengthen party organisation and 
develop multi-party participation, political parties, 
whether one is referring to the Presidentially chaired NDP 
or any of the legalised opposition parties, have been 
unable to: "become the buckle which binds one social force
to another. . . [thus creating] a basis of loyalty and 
identity transcending more parochial groupings."467 
Consequently, Egypt's formal multi-party arena is, 
realistically, no more institutionalised than a weak single 
system. As Huntington explains:
"In a strong multi-party system a one-to- 
one relationship tends to exist between 
social forces and political parties... Such 
a strong system can exist only with a high 
level of mobilisation and political 
participation. If the latter are limited,
466 See for example: "The Muslim Brotherhood and the Labour Party"
in section 3.3, chapter three.
4G1 S. P. Huntington, (1968), P405.
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the social forces active in politics are 
limited, and the social base for a strong 
multiparty system thus does not exist. If a 
multiparty system does exist in these 
circumstances it typically reflects 
differences of clique and family within a 
r e s t r i c t e d  elite. The poor
institutionalisation and narrow support for 
the parties in such a multiparty system 
makes that system extremely fragile. The 
step from may parties to no parties and 
from no parties to many parties, 
consequently, is an easy one. In their 
institutional weakness the no-party and the 
multiparty system closely resemble each
. ,,468other.'
Along these lines, one can argue that under the Mubarak 
regime, efforts to prevent high levels of mobilisation do 
not simply mean that multi-party participation is 
subsequently limited to the desired role of reinvigorating 
and expanding the vertically-based clientelist structure of 
dependence and domination. It also means that the multi­
party arena of political contest is not sufficiently 
institutionalised to continue functioning without further 
increasing the demands on resources from the centre.
The issue of resources
In the first case, the multi-party arena in Mubarak's Egypt 
does not (nor, as we have argued, is it intended to) 
function as a mechanism through which political parties 
compete for control of government. Yet one cannot overlook 
the fact that the inclusion of opposition elements in the 
electoral arena produces, in the long-term, a significant 
expansion in the number of competing candidates for any one 
legislative seat. Reflective of this for example is the 
Minister of Interior's announcement that nearly four 
thousand candidates competed for the four hundred and 
forty-four available seats in the 1995 legislative 
elections. 469 An average of ten candidates therefore 
competed, at the time, for each place in the Assembly. The
468 S. P. Huntington, (1968), PP423-24.
469 Al-Ahram Weekly, 14-20 December 1995.
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1977 legislative elections in comparison, saw one thousand 
six hundred and sixty candidates representing the then 
newly created centre, right and left platforms along with 
independent candidates, compete for three hundred and
470 * .forty-two Assembly seats. In other words, competition
averaged just over four contestants per seat. The point
here therefore, is that whilst the increase in the number
of candidates competing in elections continues to have no
affect on the choosing and replacement of government, it
would be difficult to argue that such a predicament has not
affected those who reach public office.
In view of the increasing number of competitors in 
elections, those who reach the People's Assembly, one can 
argue, are even more compelled to actually seek to fulfil 
the demands of their constituents with regard to the 
channelling of state controlled resources. This is because 
the increase in the number of electoral contestants, 
logically implies that the bargaining position of voters 
increases and hence the social approval of the constituents 
becomes more important for an incumbent deputy: he becomes 
more aware of the necessity of proving his superior 
abilities over his rivals, consequently, he must focus upon 
channelling as much state-controlled resources into his 
constituency as possible in order to maintain his local 
power-base, status and prestige within the community. It 
would seem, judging from the campaign strategies of out­
going deputies, that this predicament is already being 
encountered.471
The increase in demands on resources from the centre may 
indeed serve to reinforce the role of incumbent deputies as 
predominently intermediaries between those on the periphery 
and central government. The clientelist chain linking those 
on the periphery to the centre is theoretically
470 M. N. Cooper, (1982), P205.
471 See for example the: "Renewing and expanding existing base of
voter support" and "Renewing and expanding existing base of voter 
support (2)" in section 4.4, chapter four.
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strengthened as a result. The problem nevertheless is that 
an electoral system which- as is the case in Mubarak's 
Egypt- functions predominently on the basis of: "concrete
material incentives rather than ties of affection or 
deference", is in the long-run more inclined to produce 
what James C. Scott terms 'inflationary patron-client
472democracy' . What this means is that the distributive 
pressures and hence the expense entailed in the maintenance 
of such a system is largely beyond the economic capacity of 
the regimes which hold them, hence making it even more 
difficult to avoid running into budget deficits and other 
forms of financial crises.
In the case of Egypt's contemporary electoral system, the 
informal nature of distribution, as well as the lack of 
detailed government expenditure reports make it impossible 
to determine the amount of financial and material 
inducements used by the Mubarak regime to sustain itself. 
Nevertheless, such a patronage-based electoral system 
appears to be the only 'multi-party' system the Mubarak 
regime has been willing to consider. And at the lowest (and 
hence largest) tier of the clientelist structure, voters 
have also come to expect the material inducements it offers 
in return for support, or at least acquiescence. In such a 
context, it would be very difficult for the government to 
attempt altering the nature of such elections without the 
risk of undermining the basis of its own domination in the 
process.
Moreover, the fact remains that it is possible that as 
demands on the centre continue to increase, the inability 
to deal with such demands means that the electoral system 
intended to strengthen and expand the government's 
clientelist control over political participation, may in 
the long-term, lead to an erosion of the domination it 
originally was intended to reaffirm. In such a context, the 
issue of whether Egypt's current 'multi-party' arena can
472 J.C. Scott, (1977), P142.
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survive in the post-Mubarak era leaves open a large 
question. This is not simply because of the drain on 
resources which these elections entail, but also because of 
several other factors which should be taken into 
consideration. The first of which is the political
orientation of the individual who assumes the Presidency.
The post-Mubarak era and some 
other factors to be considered
Since President Mubarak has been reluctant to appoint a
Vice-President, an apparent successor does not therefore
exist. If the President were to die in office without an 
heir apparent, the formal procedure would be for the
Assembly Speaker to temporarily assume the Presidency until 
three quarters of the Assembly, i.e. the NDP, agree on a 
new President to present to the people through referendum. 
The point however, is that if a power struggle ensues 
between certain members of the elite for the position of 
the President, the weakness of the NDP as an organised 
group strongly suggests the 'ruling' party's role in the 
decision would be very limited indeed. Moreover, the 
weakness of the NDP and the fact that as the dominant 
party, it has little, if any experience, in mobilising mass 
support means that should Mubarak's successor decide, for 
one reason or another, to disband the NDP and create his 
own party, or indeed, to suspend elections indefinitely, 
the NDP, regardless of its current status, would hardly be 
in a position to oppose such a decision.
Should the arena of electoral contest remain intact for the 
foreseeable future, thus allowing Mubarak's successor to 
continue in the same electoral strategy of clientelist co­
option and hence control, one still cannot overlook the 
issue of opposition parties. At this point in time, the 
formal and informal constraints imposed on the legalised 
opposition parties have made it less difficult under the 
Mubarak regime for the majority of these parties to be co­
opted into the electoral patron-client structure we have 
discussed in this thesis. Yet, as we have also discussed,
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particularly in chapter four, the use of elections to co­
opt members of the opposition has also been made easier as 
a result of the weak organisational structure of these 
parties. The weak organisational structure for example, 
which compels individual candidates to organise their own 
electoral campaigns and as a consequence recruit personal, 
rather than party, based support.
It is difficult to overlook, in this context, the fact that 
all five 'major' opposition parties in Egypt's contemporary 
arena have, since their establishment, been headed in a 
rather personalistic manner by elderly individuals whose 
political careers have spanned no less than three decades. 
It would not be unexpected therefore, with the demise of 
these leaders in the foreseeable future, to notice - as a 
consequence of new, younger, leadership- some significant 
changes in the organisational structure, and hence 
attitude, of at least some of these parties. Put 
differently, the personalistic cliques which currently 
appear to characterise the nature of opposition parties in 
contemporary Egypt, cannot, realistically, function as such 
in the absence of their 'founders'. New opposition leaders 
might be more inclined than their predecessors to establish 
a more effective organisational structure which would 
strengthen their respective parties as cohesive groups, and 
theoretically, help to expand its links to larger sectors 
of society on a more binding basis.
In fact, divisions between old and young party members with 
regard to party direction and structure can already be 
detected. A few younger members of the Nasserite Party for 
example, have begun to air their discontent about existing 
Party leadership. Indicative of this are the blunt views 
expressed prior to the 1995 legislative elections. One such 
view was expressed by Hamdin Sabahi. a member of the 
Party's political bureau, who questioned the legitimacy of 
the Party's current leadership. As he put it: "What did
they do for the movement? their only qualification is that 
they were state employees under Nasser, but this doesn't
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473give them legitimacy." ' 'Amin Iskandar, the Party's 
secretary for cultural affairs, was even more to the point. 
In his opinion: "I believe it is time for all these
declining figures to disappear, leaving the stage for the
474younger generation." Whilst this younger generation of 
party members have yet to take control of the party, such 
attitudes nevertheless reflect the potential emergence of 
an opinionated set of opposition leaders who might actually 
possess sufficient ambitions and energy to challenge the 
political status-quo.
The relative absence of personalistic leadership within the 
contemporary Muslim Brotherhood, and its organisational
475efficiency, as we discussed m  chapter four, is 
illustrative of how, under enormous government imposed 
constraints, it is still possible for political 
organisations to function within the prevailing political 
system, as cohesive, and thus potentially challenging group 
entities. The point worth stressing therefore, is that a 
potentially strong political party which appears to have 
some appeal to certain sectors of the population and 
indeed, possesses the capability to bind these masses to it 
through an effective organisational structure, already 
exists in the form of the 'illegal' Muslim Brotherhood 
Organisation. It is not therefore impossible for at least 
one or two of the legalised political parties to also 
develop along similar lines in contemporary Egypt. The 
potential development of opposition parties in this 
direction, would mean, as is currently the case for the 
Muslim Brotherhood, that it would be difficult to expect 
these parties to accept an electoral system that continues 
to be structured along the lines we have discussed in this 
thesis.
473 Al-Ahram Weekly, 9-15 November 1995.
474 Ibid..
475 See for example: "Brotherhood support: one candidate's case" in 
section 4.3, chapter four.
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Even in the unlikely event that none of the formal 
opposition parties manage to develop into much more than 
the weak entities they currently are, the Muslim 
Brotherhood on its own constitutes, and is most likely to 
continue to constitute, a large thorn in the side of 
Egypt's existing political system. The regime's crackdown 
on the Muslim Brotherhood in recent years, and in 
particular, prior to the 1995 legislative elections, is a 
clear indication that the participation of those who reject 
the prevailing political system are not tolerated in the 
'multi-party' arena of political contest. One main point 
that appears to be overlooked by the government with regard 
to this strategy however, is that the Muslim Brotherhood is 
much more organised and structured than the personalistic 
cliques which continue to characterise the legalised 
political parties in contemporary Egypt. Consequently, it 
would be rather naive if the authorities were to expect the 
organisation to be irrevocably destroyed as a consequence 
of repressive tactics such as the imprisonment of some 
Muslim Brotherhood personalities.
Moreover, the tactic of utilising multi-party elections as 
a mechanism of clientelist co-option and control rather 
than as a mechanism to promote party development and the 
expansion of genuine party competition means that the 
threat of religious radicalism cannot, realistically, be 
efficiently challenged. President Mubarak himself has aired 
his concern about not wanting to repeat the Algerian 
experience.476 Yet the role of the electoral arena in 
hindering the development of organised political 
participation within a legal-constitutional framework, is a 
strategy he seems willing to maintain in order to preserve 
the political status-quo.
476 This, for example was the President's justification during a 
personal discussion with Muhammed Sid Ahmad on the limitations of 
electoral participation in Egypt. Personal Interview with M.S. 
Ahmad, 8 December 1994, Cairo.
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The Muslim Brotherhood thus remains the main challenger to 
power in Egypt's 'multi-party' arena even though it is not 
officially recognised as a political party. This one can 
argue is not necessarily because the Muslim Brotherhood 
constitutes an enormously strong entity which seems 
controllable only through government repression. Rather, it 
is because the legalised, secular political parties, 
including the President's own NDP, are neither encouraged 
by the regime, nor are they provided with sufficient 
opportunity, to develop into strong political entities that 
could legitimately challenge and potentially marginalise 
such a threat. The reluctance to pursue a strategy of this 
nature is because it would logically obliterate the main 
function which 'multi-party' elections in Mubarak's Egypt 
are intended. The development and institutionalisation of a 
strong multi-party electoral arena, after all, cannot be 
expected to safeguard against religiously-inspired politics 
whilst at the same time keeping the existing system of 
personal authoritarian rule intact. Consequently, non­
competitive multi-party elections are more beneficial in 
contemporary Egypt when utilised as a tool to reaffirm and 
expand the regime's clientelist structure of dependency and 
hence control. It is unlikely therefore, that a significant 
change with regard to the role of these elections will be 
witnessed in the near future.
Consideration of findings: a general perspective 
As we have pointed out in this thesis, the adoption of a 
formal democratic framework can, on the international 
level, provide an authoritarian regime with limited 
legitimacy insofar as such a move signals "its good conduct 
to the outside world"477 and in some case makes it easier 
for Western states to provide it with aid.478 Yet, on the 
national level, non-competitive multi-party elections 
appear less significant as tool of legitimization. This
477 G. Hermet, (1978), P15.
478 As pointed out in the case of Egypt for example. See R. Owen, 
(1994), P190.
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would seem to be particularly the case in view of the 
absence, in such political systems, of a dominant party 
based on a strong ideological or programmatic position, the 
reluctance of rulers to endorse wide scale mobilisation, 
and most importantly, the fact that elections of this 
nature do not affect the replacement or succession of 
government. Thus the fact that an authoritarian regime can 
preserve the political status quo whilst at the same time 
holding multi-party elections, significantly with minimal 
use of the state's coercive apparatus, highlights, in 
conclusion, the power of patronage as a mechanism of 
clientelist co-option and control.
The importance of patronage, as we discussed in this 
thesis, lies largely in the fact that such a process 
appears to hinder the development and expansion of 
potentially challenging parties and groupings which are 
based upon categorical ties such socio-economic interests 
or conceptions. This is because with patronage ultimately 
under the direct control of the ruler and his government, 
it is possible to distribute to the masses tangible and 
other forms of reward in return for regime-directed 
support. In fact, the prospect of obtaining a share of 
government controlled resources in return for political 
support, or at least acquiescence, can be very enticing in 
societies where authoritarian regimes tend to thrive. In 
other words, societies where there is a general scarcity of 
resources and where reliable avenues to deal with economic 
survival do not exist. As a mechanism of social control 
therefore, patronage performs an important role in 
reinvigorating and reaffirming the vertical patterns of 
clientelist dependency.
This, in turn, makes it very difficult for categorical 
bonds of social solidarity to develop. Put simply, when 
voters come to expect benefits that can realistically only 
be channelled from the centre, and when opinion-based 
voting is of little significance to the outcome of 
election, political actors, whether members of the 'ruling'
282
Conclusion
party or the opposition, are more tempted to seek the 
patronage of the power-holder. This in turn, means having 
to accept, at least publicly, the rulers7 definition of 
"the rules of the game" if some electoral gains are 
achieved. In doing so, their role as representatives of a 
party point of view remains insignificant in comparison to 
their main role as intermediaries between the centre and 
those on the periphery. Consequently, whilst the 
clientelist chain linking those on the periphery to central 
government is strengthened and expanded as a result, it is 
difficult for political parties and groupings to develop 
into well organised and autonomous group entities. The 
context of multi-party elections in which patronage 
radiates from a single point in the political system (i.e. 
the ruler) therefore, is first and foremost advantageous to
the regime that holds them.
In the final analysis, the importance of patronage for the 
long-term survival of certain authoritarian regimes is well 
illustrated within the context of non-competitive multi­
party elections. After all, it would not be erroneous to 
suggest that in the absence of government-directed 
patronage, an authoritarian regime would find it extremely 
difficult to maintain peacefully for very long its dominant 
position within the framework of a multi-party arena. 
Indeed, as our study of Mubarak7s Egypt has illustrated, an 
authoritarian regime's monopoly of various forms of 
patronage can provide it with the flexibility to utilise 
even a potentially threatening process such as multi-party 
elections very much to its own advantage. Whether the
potential consequences of such strategies of rule, as
raised in this chapter, eventually materialise, is best 
left to a future study on the subject.
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Background Information on 
Political Parties in Contemporary Egypt*
Party Brief History Composition
National Democratic Party 
(NDP)
Established by President 
Sadat in 1978 to succeed 
the Arab Socialist Misr 
Party - initially the 
Centre Platform that 
succeeded the Arab 
Socialist Union in 1976. 
The pre-revolutionary 
Nationalist Party which 
was established by 
nationalist-patriot 
Mustafa Kamel in 1907 was 
the inspiration behind the 
NDP name. As the ruling 
party, its official 
program is predominantly a 
reflection of the official 
rhetoric and policies of 
government: productive 
infitah; agricultural 
development leading to 
self-sufficiency in food 
production; public sector 
revitalisation leading to 
a strong state within a 
market-oriented economy; 
upholding of democracy and 
the multi-party system.
T e c h n o c r a t s ;  rural 
notables; government 
officials; businessmen, 
contractors etc. The 
President's Party. First 
headed by President Sadat; 
c u r r e n t  C h a i r m a n ,  
President Mubarak.
Official Newspaper: Mayo
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The Liberal Party (al- 
Ahrar)
The party started 
political life in 1976 as 
one of the three platforms 
created by President 
Sadat. Very similar to 
Neo-Wafd in ideology. The 
Party, for example, 
advocates the principle of 
P r e s i d e n t  t h r o u g h  
election; and political 
a n d  e c o n o m i c
liberalisation. The Party 
reversed its liberal 
policies, when, during its 
1987 coalition with the 
Muslim Brotherhood, it 
used the Islamic slogan: 
"Islam is the Solution". 
No longer linked to the 
MB, it has reverted to its 
liberal stand.
Has little grass-roots 
support, although it is 
meant to represent the 
national bourgeoisie. This 
is perhaps a result of its 
shifting views and the 
fact its leader fully 
supported all of Sadat's 
initiatives, including the 
1979 peace treaty with 
Israel.
Headed by: Mos.tjifa Kamel 
Murad, an ex-Free officer. 
Newspaper: Ai-Ahrar
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The National Progressive 
Unionist Party: NPUP (Al- 
Ta j ammui )
Along with the NDP and the 
Liberal Party, the 
Tajammui originated as one 
of the three platforms 
created by President Sadat 
before becoming a fully- 
fledged party in 1978. The 
'leftist' label it held as 
a platform, continues to 
date with its advocating 
of workers rights; 
preservation and expansion 
of Nasser's social and 
economic reform; public 
sector; social justice and 
protection of the rights 
of the poor. Opponent of 
Israel and also of 
Islamic-based movements.
The Party appears to 
attract intellectuals and 
self-educated workers. 
Since its establishment, 
the Party has been headed 
by Khaled Mohyi al-Din, a 
m e m b e r  of t h e
Revolutionary Command 
Council which comprised 
the group of officers who 
took power following the 
1952 'revolution'. 
Newspaper: Al-Ahali.
i
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The L a b o u r  Party Created by President Sadat Headed by Ibrahim Shokri,
(previously the Socialist in 197 8 to represent a p r e v i o u s l y  Sadat's
Labour Party) loyal opposition in his Minister of Agriculture.
newly established multi­ In 1936, Shokri along with
party arena. Until 1984 it the late 'Ahmad Husayn
officially represented a were among the founders of
socialist platform based Misr al-FataJi (young
upon government planning; Egypt), a nationalist
economic development in political party which
which public sector plays until 1984 was considered
leading role; and the an important source of
promotion of Arab unity. inspiration for the
Strong anti-Israel stand. Socialist Labour Party.
Between 1984-7, the Party Ironically, it was 'Ahmad
u n d e r w e n t  d r amatic Husayn's Brother _\Adel,
transformation based upon and son, 'Ahmad- both
Islamic ideology. This senior Party leaders and
move coincided with its in the case of _\Adel, a
electoral alliance with renowned Marxist advocate-
the Muslim Brotherhood in who played major roles in
1987. Its ties with the restructuring the Party
M u s l i m  B r o t h e r h o o d along Islamic lines.
continue to date. Also, Newspaper: Al-ShaJ_b.
the Party's anti-Israeli
position continues, but
more focus on unity of
Islamic states rather than
simply Arab unity. Urges
the amendment of the
constitution to stress the
Islamic identity of Egypt.
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The Neo-Wafd Originally established as 
the Wafd Party in 1919 by 
nationalist-patriot Saf.d 
Zaqhlul, the party, along 
with all existing parties 
was suppressed following 
the coup of 1952. It 
reformed in 1978 but then 
in protest to a
Presidential Decree issued 
by Sadat, it dissolved 
itself, only to re-emerge 
under the Mubarak 
Presidency shortly before 
the 1984 legislative
elections. Official 
platform derived from its 
pre-1952 origins. Calls 
for President to be
directly elected by the 
people (i.e. abolish 
affirmative referendum); 
the genuine encouragement 
of private enterprise and 
'true' capitalism; removal 
of restrictions on 
political participation; 
greater civil liberties 
and a strict separation of 
p o w e r s  in the
presidential, legislative 
and judicial branches of 
government. Anti-Nasser 
stand, and following its 
1984 electoral alliance 
w i t h  the M u s l i m  
Brotherhood Organisation, 
also came to hold anti- 
Islamist views.
Membership predominately 
comprising upper middle 
class professionals. 
Chairman (for life); Fu'ad 
Seraj al-Djin, ageing 
aristocrat who joined 
original party in 1936 
becoming its Secretary- 
General in 1942.
Newspaper: Al-Wafd.
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The Arab 
Nasseris t 
Nasserites)
Democrat ic 
Party {the
Established in 1991 by a 
few senior figures from 
the Nasser era, the Party 
aspires to carry the 
Nasser torch. Its official 
platform rejects Zionism 
and what it regards as 
American imperialism. In 
terms of economic 
development, the Party 
advocates self-reliance in 
which the state plays a 
central role. Arab unity 
is also a theme strongly 
advocated by the Party.
High level state officials 
from the Nasser era who 
lost favour when President 
Sadat took power in 1971. 
Middle aged people who 
campaigned for Nasserism 
as students in the Sadat 
era also constitute a bulk 
of party membership. Some 
unive r s i t y  students 
attracted to the Nasser 
legacy also constitute a 
small part of Party 
membership.
Headed by its principal 
founder: D h iya al-Din
Dawud, a cabinet minister 
and high ranking ASU 
official in the Nasser 
era. Dawud spent the 
entire Sadat era in prison 
after being sentenced to 
ten years in prison 
following Sadat's 1971 
'corrective revolution'. 
Newspaper: A1 ~J_Arabi_
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The Muslim Brotherhood 
Organisation
Although it does not 
possess legal party 
status, the Organisation's 
participation in the 
political competition in 
the Mubarak era warrants 
its inclusion. Originally 
founded in 192 8 by Hasan 
al-Banna, the Organisation 
was banned in 1954 by 
President Nasser. Its 
return to the political 
arena was initially 
encouraged by Sadat who 
hoped it would counteract 
the perceived threat of 
leftist ideology. Its 
platform has changed 
little from the time of 
establishment. It views 
Islam not simply as a 
religion, but as a system 
which deals with all 
aspects of life; source of 
authority should be 
derived from the Holy 
Qu r ' a n  and Sunna 
(teachings of the Prophet 
M u h a m m a d )  . Entered 
electoral alliance with 
the Neo-Wafd in 1984; in 
19 87 it entered electoral 
alliance with Labour and 
al-'Ahrar. Continues to 
have close relations with 
the Labour Party.__________
Attracts sectors of 
Egyptian society that 
comprise largely the 
educated poor: school
teachers, clerical workers 
and unemployed university 
graduates etc.
Supreme Guide: Mostafa
Mashhur has occupied the 
position following the 
death of Hamid lAbu al- 
Nasr in 1997. The General 
Guidance Bureau however, 
is the executive body 
r e s p o n s i b l e  for
formulating policies and 
running the activities of 
the Organisation.
The constituents have 
their views expressed 
through their own 
assembly: the Shura
Council.
Has access to the Labour 
Party's newspaper Al- 
ShaJ_b. Its own monthly 
magazine Al-DaJ_wa, was 
established in 1976 and 
banned by Sadat in 
September 1981. It remains 
banned.
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Splinter Parties: Al-Umma, all legalised but none Made up predominately of
Al-Takaful, Green Party, have ever won a seat in founders with support from
Unionist Democratic Party, electoral competition. their friends and
Misr Arab Socialist Party- associates.
* Information derived from various sources including party 
programmes and personal interviews with party members.
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Personal Interviews
As we stated in chapter one, personal interviews were 
predominately an on-going process whereby most interviewees 
were met on several occasions. All personal interviews 
however were undertaken in Egypt between October 1994- 
January 1995 and October 1995-January 1996. Those most 
relevant to our research were:
Dr Hamdi Al-Sayyed (member of People's Assembly, NDP and 
Head of the Egyptian Medical Association), Muhammad Al- 
Sayyed (member of People's Assembly, NDP), Dr Hamdi Faysal 
(member of People's Assembly, NDP) Dr AEsam Al-AEryan 
(senior Muslim Brotherhood leader, former secretary-general 
of the Egyptian Medical Association and former (1987-1990) 
Assembly member), Al-Ma'mun Muhammad Al-Hudhavbi (official 
spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood and former (1987- 
199 0) Assembly member), Muhammad AAkif (senior leader in 
the Muslim Brotherhood and former (1987-1990) Assembly 
member), Dhiva' Al-Din Dawud (chairman of Nasserite Party 
and Assembly member), Hamed Mahmud (deputy chairman, 
Nasserite Party), Jaber AAbd Al-AAziz (Nasserite Party 
Candidate, 1995 elections) AAdel Husayn (senior member of 
the Labour Party and editor- in -chief of its newspaper, 
Al-Shaib) Majdi Ahmad Husayn (former Assembly member, 
senior member of the Labour Party and editor of Al-Shaib), 
AAli Salama (deputy-secretary general of the Neo-Wafd 
Party), Dr Noiman Jomia (deputy chairman, Neo-Wafd Party) 
Mona Makram AUbayd (ex- Neo-Wafd member and Presidential 
appointee to the Assembly, 1990-1995), Khaled Mohyi Al-Din 
(Assembly member and chairman of Tajammui party), Lotfi 
Waked (deputy chairman, Tajammui party) , Dr Rifiat Saiid 
(secretary general, Tajammui party and Presidential
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appointee to the Shura Council, 1995-), iAbdel Al-Ghaffar 
Shokr (deputy secretary general, Tajammui party) Al-Badri 
Farcrhali (member of Assembly, 1990- , Tajammui party),
Fatheyya iAssal (senior Tajammui member and electoral 
candidate 1995) Mostafa Bakri (senior member of the liberal 
party and editor of its newspaper, Al-Ahrar and candidate 
in 1995 elections), Fikri Al-Jazzar (Independent Assembly 
member under Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak (1990-5)), Mostafa 
Jalfar (independent electoral candidate, Helwan, 1995), Dr 
Mostafa Kamel Al-Sayyed (Cairo University), Dr Salwa 
Shalrawi Jomla (American University in Cairo), Dr Hoda 
lAwadh (American University in Cairo) , Dr Mostafa Al-Ficri 
(Director of Diplomatic Institute), Dr Said Al-Din Ibrahim 
(Director of Ibn Khaldoun Research Centre), Dr lAli Al-Din 
Helal Desucri, (Dean of Political Science and Economics 
College, Cairo University), Dr lAbd Al-Monlim Sayyed lAli 
(Director of Centre of Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram) iAmr 
Hashem (researcher on Egyptian parlimentary affairs, Centre 
of Strategic studies, Al-Ahram), Dr 'Osama Ghazali Harb 
(Editor of Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliyya, Al-Ahram), Dr Wahid lAbd 
Al-Majid, (editor of Al Hayat - Cairo branch, and editor of 
Al-Ahram's Centre of Strategic Studies Annual Report) Dr 
Hala Mostafa (senior researcher and specialist on Islamic 
movements in Egypt, Al-Ahram's Center of Strategic Studies) 
Muhammad Sid 'Ahmed (senior political analyst, Al-Ahram), 
Fahmi Howaydi (Islamic writer and senior political analyst, 
Al-Ahram) Noiman Al-Zayyati (political and economic 
journalist, Al-Ahram Al- ' Icrtisadi) , Tahsin Bashir (retired 
ambassador and senior political analyst), Dr Muhammad 
AAsfur (political analyst and ex-senior Neo-Wafd member) 
and General Muhammad Fawzi (minister of defence, 1968-71), 
disparate voters as quoted throughout thesis, including the 
kind people of Mit Nas (27 November-15 December 1995).
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